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for future research.
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From the Editor
I take this opportunity to report on recent developments and
thank all who continue to support AHJ.
Submissions: the quality of submissions to AHJ continues to
improve though the rejection rate still remains rather high. An
analysis of the reasons why referees suggest that papers be re-
jected shows that the principal concerns are deficiencies in his-
torical scholarship. Negative comments usually relate to one or
more of the following: a tendency to submit purely descriptive
papers as opposed to those exhibiting a combination of descrip-
tion, narrative and analysis; a failure to identify the contribution
made by the paper (the absence of a research question or his-
torical problem, not answering the ‘so-what’ question); inad-
equate gathering of pertinent evidence; disconnection from the
relevant literature and inadequate literature review; and, an ab-
sence of contextualization. It should be emphasized that weak
English and an ‘uncritical’ approach are seldom reasons for the
rejection of papers. If the submission has the potential to make
a contribution then concerns about language and grammar can
invariably be remedied with assistance from the editor or a
kindly member of the editorial board.
Special Sections: The current issue contains an Autobiographical
section. While AHJ is primarily concerned with publishing the
results of quality historical research, it is also receptive to sub-
missions which relate the experiences of those who have con-
tributed to the evolution of accounting thought and practice. As
source material, memoirs, of course, should be interpreted with
much circumspection. However, the paper by George Staubus
further illustrates the increasing recognition in accounting
history of the need to record personal experiences. Like
biographical studies in general, the points at which the
individual’s life course converges with significant events in ac-
counting are of particular value. Hence, the paper illuminates
the development of key concepts such as decision-usefulness
and activity costing as well as the work of institutions such as
the FASB and the AAA. Staubus’ autobiographical account also
highlights the contributions of other significant actors, the na-
ture of academic life and accounting research in past decades.
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The manuscript referees identified these contributions of the
paper and were also impressed by its candid and engaging style.
Richard Vangermeersch (rvang@uriacc.uri.edu) is guest editing
a special section on International Congresses of Accounting to
coincide with the theme of the World Congress of Accounting
Historians in 2004. See the Noticeboard section (p. 158) in the
December 2002 number.
Cheryl McWatters, Reviews Editor, would be pleased to hear
from potential contributors to the Interfaces section. Authors
should identify published works in sister disciplines which have
implications for accounting history research.
Prize Winners, 2002: I am delighted to announce that the edito-
rial board have decided that the prize for the best paper in
Volume 29 be awarded to Alan J. Richardson for his article on
“Professional Dominance: The Relationship Between Financial
Accounting and Managerial Accounting, 1926-1986”. The follow-
ing papers were also highly commended: Margaret Lamb, “De-
fining ‘Profits’ for British Income Tax Purposes: A Contextual
Study of the Depreciation Cases, 1875-1897”, and Christopher J.
Napier, “The Historian as Auditor: Facts, Judgments and Evi-
dence”.
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Trevor Boyns
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
IN MEMORIAM: ALEXANDER
HAMILTON CHURCH’S
SYSTEM OF ‘SCIENTIFIC MACHINE
RATES’ AT HANS RENOLD LTD.,
c.1901 - c.1920
Abstract: In 1901, Alexander Hamilton Church wrote a path-breaking
article in The Engineering Magazine, entitled ‘The proper distribution
of establishment charges’. This article, published in six parts, is gener-
ally considered to have been one of the most important articles on the
subject of overhead allocation and Church’s system of scientific ma-
chine rates is often seen as a precursor of work which eventually
resulted in the emergence of standard costing. Around the same time,
Church introduced his system at Renold, a firm of British chain
manufacturers, where it was used well into the First World War.
Towards the end of the war, however, the system was gradually aban-
doned in favor of standard costing and budgetary control. Using ar-
chival and published sources, this paper examines the factors leading
to the demise of Church’s system at Renold and, in so doing, throws
light on the between scientific management, organizational change
and the development of successful costing systems.
INTRODUCTION
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there developed, in
the Anglo-Saxon world, a literature that began to deal with cost-
ing generally and, in particular, the issue of overheads (or bur-
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank the Economic and Social Re-
search Council for their funding (grant no. R000237946) which has made pos-
sible the archival research underlying this paper, Renold plc for allowing me
access to the Renold archive, and the archivists based at Manchester Central
Library, especially Judith Baldry, who have facilitated my research into the
archive. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Richard Vangermeersch for gener-
ously providing me with copies of material which he acquired when carrying out
his own research into Alexander Hamilton Church some 15 years ago.
Submitted September 2000
Revised October 2002
Revised January 2003
Accepted January 2003
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den). Some of this burgeoning literature was produced in the
form of scholarly texts which were to be used for educational
purposes, while a significant role was played by journal articles,
in both the accounting and trade press, illustrating ideas and
systems favored, or utilized, by the authors and/or the compa-
nies that they represented. One important article, published in
the Engineering Magazine in 1901, was ‘The proper distribution
of establishment charges’, written by Alexander Hamilton
Church. Within 20 years, however, articles had begun to appear
on the topic of standard costing, a system which is considered to
have had a much greater impact during the 20th century than
Church’s system of scientific machine rates for allocating over-
heads. Indeed, Johnson and Kaplan [1987, pp. 127-128] have
suggested that although manufacturing cost systems designed to
trace costs accurately to diverse lines of products, and hence
producing information for assessing efficiency and opportuni-
ties for product differentiation, such as that of Church, were
available by 1910, they had disappeared by the First World War.
It is in this light that the experience of Renold is of interest to
accounting historians since this chain manufacturing business
adopted Church’s system at the beginning of the 20th century,
but then subsequently abandoned the system in favor of stan-
dard costing and budgetary control. This paper therefore adopts
something of the genealogical approach advocated by Miller and
Napier [1993], since it focuses in the main upon the factors that
led to the failure of Church’s costing system at Renold, thereby
possibly shedding further light on why this system failed to find
widespread acceptance.
This paper attempts to fill in many of the gaps in the details
associated with the use of Church’s system at Renold, thereby
correcting a deficiency noted by Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p.
128], and does this by taking up Vangermeersch’s challenge to
conduct “a careful mining of the excellent archives at the Renold
Company in Manchester, England” [1988, p. 103]. Since
Vangermeersch made his comment, the Renold archive has been
transferred from the headquarters of Renold plc to the archives
section of Manchester Central Library, where it occupies 85
shelves of space. The archive, which is extremely limited for the
pre-1909 period, is nevertheless very detailed thereafter, and
provides an extremely rich source of material not only for ac-
counting historians but also for anyone interested in the devel-
opment of scientific management practices in Britain. The dif-
ferential survival of pre- and post-1909 material reflects a major
change in the organizational structure of the company and the
12
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impact of scientific management. From around 1909 the
company’s management began to embrace Taylorism, both at
the shop floor level (e.g. introduction of time studies c.1910/11,
the use of functional foremen, etc.) and within the higher levels
of management. The latter involved a decisive shift from an
organization dominated by the owner-entrepreneur, Hans
Renold, to one in which committees began to proliferate and
play an increasingly more important role in decision-making
[for fuller details see Boyns, 2001, pp. 721-722]. The proceedings
of all committees, many of which met weekly, were minuted in
copious detail, indicating the nature of discussions and who said
what. The various sets of minute books have been preserved and
provide a major source of information for this study, though the
archives also contain large amounts of supporting material, not
least the detailed reports, cost investigations, etc., upon which
the committee discussions took place and decisions were based.
For certain sets of documents there are also explanatory notes
and comments, written some years after the event by Charles
Renold, which provide additional contextualization. Most sig-
nificantly from the point of view of this paper, the survival of
records relating to the costing and accounting systems for the
period c.1908/09 to c.1920 are reasonably full and informative.1
In this paper, the operation of Church’s system at Hans
Renold Ltd., the problems which arose, and the success or oth-
erwise of attempts made to overcome them is examined in the
light of the development of Church’s ideas, as expressed in his
various writings over his lifetime.2 In this way, the paper throws
light on the relationship between the development of costing
theory and practice. Given that Hans and Charles Renold have
long since been recognized as pioneers of scientific management
in Britain [Urwick and Brech, 1953, pp. 162-169; Boyns, 2001],
the paper also throws light on this topic and the inter-relation-
ship between developments in organizational structure, new
theories of management and costing methods.
1 The one major drawback to using the collection, however, is that there is,
as yet, no complete catalogue, researchers having to rely on a useful, but limited,
card index compiled by the company’s librarian prior to the transfer of the
collection to Manchester Central Library.
2 The second article by Church, ‘Organisation by Production Factors’, al-
though published in the US under Church’s own name, was published in Britain
under the nom de plume of H.C. Alexander. Although it is the British version of
the paper which is cited here, throughout the text and in the bibliography it is
referred to as [Church, 1909/10] rather than [Alexander, 1909/10].
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THE COSTING CONTEXT IN BRITAIN, c.1880-c.1920
According to Wright [1962, pp. 3-4], the development of
scientific costing systems in Britain can be traced back to the
work of John Walker [1875], who developed a system of allocat-
ing overheads based on prime costs. Writing at the beginning of
the 1890s, John Mann Jr. noted that, in theory, direct overheads
varied directly with the labor time occupied on a job and in-
versely to wages paid [Mann, 1891, p. 635]. While noting that
the basis of allocation should be labor time rather than wages
paid, a view echoed ten years later by Cowan [1901, p. 90],
Mann accepted that for “nearly all practical purposes, however,
the direct expenses may be safely applied in proportion to the
wages paid” [1891, p. 635 – italics in original]. He went on to
note that, in practice, direct expenses were often loaded on to
both materials and labor. By the beginning of the 20th century,
however, Mann [1903, p. 207] noted that there were five differ-
ent methods in use to spread the expense burden over current
work: (1) a rate varying with quantity of material handled, i.e.
the unit system; (2) a percentage on cost of wages and materials;
(3) a percentage on wages alone; (4) a percentage on time; and
(5) the tool basis or machine rate.3 It was the third method that
was described as being the most popular in Great Britain at the
time [Church 1901, p. 727; Mann, 1903, p. 208], though alterna-
tive methods, especially the machine rate method, were finding
increasing support from some writers.
The writer considered to have been the most influential
thinker on the use of machine rates in the early years of the 20th
century was Alexander Hamilton Church. For him, both the per-
centage on wages and hourly burden methods suffered from a
crucial failing: they relied on a single factor for the apportion-
ment of overheads — the percentage system relied on wages,
and the hourly-burden system on time. While he accepted that
either system might work in situations where there was unifor-
mity, Church noted that, in real life, workshops or factories
were often complex entities, with different types of machines
and different qualities of labor being employed. In such situa-
tions, the percentage-on-wages and hourly-burden systems
would prove inaccurate in determining product costs. It was in
3 A similar five-fold classification was presented by Mark Webster Jenkinson
[1914, p. 569] just before the outbreak of the First World War: (1) a percentage
on prime cost; (2) a percentage on the cost of labor; (3) a fixed sum for each
hour of time worked by each man; (4) a fixed sum per hour for each machine;
and (5) a fixed sum per unit of weight or quantity.
14
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such a context that Church argued that, “we must seek a method
capable of recording [cost] with approximate accuracy under
the most complex and difficult conditions” [1901, p. 729]. For
him, “the business of costs [is] to represent facts and nothing
but facts” [Church, 1909/10, p. 26].
Church clearly had an impact. In 1902, shortly after the last
part of Church’s article was published, Urie [1902] presented a
paper to the Glasgow Chartered Accountants Students’ Society
on the subject of oncost and its apportionment, providing a brief
résumé of Church’s system. When Bardsley [1902] likewise pre-
sented a paper to the Kingston-upon-Hull Students’ Society, he
mentioned the machine rate method alongside the other alterna-
tive methods. Indicating that each method had its pros and
cons, Bardsley suggested that a mix of methods may have to be
used within the same business, noting that “I find I have to use
two or three of these methods” [1902, p. 1092]. Church’s refined
machine rate system entered the literature then at a time when
certain persons were beginning to push for the development of
the use of costing systems. Such systems were seen by their
advocates as being part of the scientific approach to business,
and it was considered that there was a need for their more
widespread application in Britain. One critic of the lack of a
scientific approach was the chartered accountant, Harvey Preen,
whose book, Reorganisation and Costings – A Book for Manufac-
turers, was first published in 1907. In a second, new and en-
larged version, published in 1913, Preen began his chapter on
costings by emphasizing the importance to manufacturers of
‘correct costings’. To stress his point, Preen provided an example
of ‘wrong costing’, namely a ‘system’ which determined the sell-
ing price of a good by merely taking an estimate of direct costs
and then added some guessed percentage to represent estimated
fixed charges, and a further guessed percentage to represent
profit [Preen, 1913, p. 127]. In his 1907 work, Preen had pointed
out that ‘adding a bit’ was unscientific, and that the “necessity
for accuracy cannot be too strongly insisted on” [1907, p. 69].
Preen, by pushing for ‘scientific costing’ [1907, p. 65], was
providing portents of what was to come, though he himself
never mentions the use of standards or standard costing, a tech-
nique which was gathering strength across the Atlantic. How-
ever, Preen did point out that “The past is dead and gone, and
what has been, has been, and cannot be changed; it is as a guide
to the daily present and future that costings are so useful”
[Preen, 1907, p. 65]. Preen, in a short chapter entitled ‘The Bud-
get System’, also referred to the potential use to management of
15
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budgets. However, as revealed in his text, Preen’s concept of a
budget was essentially as a backward rather than a forward
looking document. Indeed, Preen’s budget was more in the form
of a monthly trading account, though he does suggest that,
echoing his view of costing, it would have forward looking con-
notations [Preen, 1907, pp. 81-82]:
[The budget system is] a method which will enable the
manufacturer at the end of each month to know with
comparative exactness how the business stands, what
has been occurring during the month, to form a fairly
reliable estimate of what is likely to occur in the ensu-
ing month, and also, to enable comparisons to be made
with the same trading period, and the corresponding
month, in the previous year or years.
The key to his ‘budget system’ was that the information should
be quickly available, i.e. within no more than four days of the
end of the month, since otherwise the manufacturer could not
act with certainty: “If the preparation is delayed, the informa-
tion becomes ancient history, and its usefulness is greatly im-
paired” [Preen, 1907, p. 84].
In the years leading up to the First World War in Britain,
the costing literature illustrates an ongoing concern that manu-
facturers should adopt scientific costing systems. While there is
most probably a link here with the development of scientific
management, the precise nature of this has still to be investi-
gated, not least because the extent of the use of either within
British firms is still too little known. It is generally accepted that
the concepts that are most closely linked with scientific manage-
ment, namely standard costing and budgetary control, were de-
veloped in the USA during the early decades of the 20th century
[Solomons, 1952; Wells, 1978; Epstein, 1978; Sowell, 1973]
though Fleischman [2000] has recently questioned the extent of
the use of scientific management in American firms. In Britain,
although texts on these topics did not begin to appear until the
late 1920s or early 1930s [e.g. Downie, 1927; Willsmore, 1932],
British practice may not have lagged behind that of America to
the extent that has often been suggested in the past. Indeed,
there is evidence that, in the immediate aftermath of the First
World War, a number of British companies began to exhibit
widespread use of budgets and, to a lesser extent, standard cost-
ing [Boyns, 1998a,b; Berland and Boyns, 2002]. Amongst these,
and possibly the most advanced, was Hans Renold Ltd. [Boyns
et al, 2000].
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CHURCH’S SYSTEM OF SCIENTIFIC MACHINE RATES
The rationale behind Church’s system, as expressed in the
title of his first article in 1901, was a concern for ‘The proper
distribution of establishment charges’. In this first article,
Church considered cost to be made up of four components: ma-
terial; wages; a shop charge; and a general establishment charge.
The first three of these elements gave rise to ‘works cost’, and for
Church, following his mentor, Slater Lewis, the crucial distinc-
tion was that between shop charges and general establishment
charges. While the former were related to production, the latter
were not, being more related to selling. Over time, however,
Church modified this categorization so that selling expense was
separated from other general expenses, the latter being included
with factory cost (i.e. material, direct labor and factory expense)
as part of ‘warehouse cost’ [Church, 1923, p. 382]. The addition
of selling expense to warehouse cost produced what Church
termed ‘Sold Cost’. Although Church generally makes some
mention of selling costs in his writings, this is usually only in a
cursory manner, his main concern throughout being with shop
charges and how they should be allocated to jobs or products.
The key to Church’s method of allocation is the independent
production center, which forms the basic unit of analysis. This
could be a machine or a bench at which a hand craftsman might
work, and all of the shop charges that could be identified with
that production center would be allocated to it on the basis of
an hourly (scientific) machine rate. Machine rate systems were
not altogether new, having been suggested at least 50 years ear-
lier, but Church considered them to be limited in their approach
since they had concentrated merely on allocating interest and
depreciation on each machine. For Church, the approach
needed to be extended to cover all shop charges, as far as was
possible, in a scientific manner. Thus, for each type of expense
that could be attributed to a production center, in addition to
the interest, depreciation and insurance charges related thereto,
an hourly rate would be determined, these then being aggre-
gated to give an overall hourly machine rate, based on the prob-
able number of hours the machine would work under normal
conditions. Church realized, however, that while many shop
charges could be ‘narrowed down’, i.e. allocated, to individual
production centers, this was not true of all of them:
In an ideal system, it would therefore be expected that
this narrowing down should be carried as far as it was
practically profitable to do so, and that only such
17
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expenses as were wholly general and could not by any
reasonable analysis be connected with definite points of
incidence, should be treated as general shop charges,
and therefore left to be averaged on the former basis
[Church, 1901, p. 733].
In his 1901 paper, the types of expense which he had in
mind for allocation by machine rates were those of the building,
lighting, power, interest/depreciation/insurance, and overlook-
ing and supervision. However, this paper only outlined the gen-
eral method, Church noting that space did not permit a full
description of how the method should be applied [1901, p. 235].
This formed the basis of his second article in 1909/10, which
provided details of how to determine the production factors, i.e.
unit values, for each type of expense, and the basis upon which
they were to be calculated. Thus, building costs (including items
such as capital cost, interest, rent, insurance, depreciation, heat-
ing, ventilation and lighting), for example, were to be calculated
on the basis of square footage occupied by the machine,
whereas power was to be on the basis of a charge per horse-
power hour. These unit values would then become components
of the overall hourly machine rates and jobs carried out on any
machine would then be charged at the appropriate composite
hourly rate for that machine. The total rent charge (i.e. the cost
allocated against the job) would thus depend on the rate for the
machine and the time occupied by the machine on the job, this
amount being credited to the monthly shop-charges account, to
be offset against the total expenses of the shop, which would
usually comprise more than one production center.
Church recognized that the amounts so credited would not
match the total monthly expense: it would be deficient to the
extent of those shop charges which could not be recovered since
they could not be charged to individual production centers, and
those not recovered because machines were idle for some of the
time. Church considered that such charges remaining unac-
counted for would be small, there being “but one or two items,
themselves of relatively small amount, remaining to be treated
in this way” [Church, 1901, p. 37], the main item not attribut-
able to production centers being that of the overall works fore-
man. To take account of the unrecovered, or unallocated, ex-
penses, however they might have arisen, Church advocated the
use of a supplementary rate which, he argued, if applied as an
hourly burden, could be used as a barometer of efficiency, since
the higher the supplementary rate, the greater the time ma-
chines had spent being idle [Church, 1901, p. 910]. Although the
18
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supplementary rate concept was clarified further in the 1909/10
article, it was the subject of numerous attacks by contemporar-
ies, and its efficacy/rationale has been questioned by accoun-
tants and accounting historians [Vangermeersch, 1988]. By
1930, the idea of attempting to allocate the cost of superfluous
services to each job or product was abandoned, in favor of
charging them directly to profit and loss [Vangermeersch, 1988,
p. 51]. The only purpose left for the supplementary rate, there-
fore, was as a memorandum or indicator of utilization [Church,
1930, p. 178].
Church’s overriding concern in his writings was with the
proper allocation of shop charges so as to be able to determine
the actual cost of production. While his interest in costs largely
ended at the door of the workshop, there nevertheless remained
the issue of what, in his first article, he labeled ‘general estab-
lishment charges’ (GEC), i.e. those costs, essentially adminis-
trative expenses, over and above those incurred in relation to
production. These were considered to include “advertising, trav-
elling, drawings, patterns, catalogues, correspondence depart-
ment, cashiers and bookkeeping, management and all similar
expenditure” [1901, p. 371] and were equated by Church with
selling costs. By the time of his 1909/10 article, however, Church
no longer makes any reference to GEC, rather he talks of general
or administrative expenses. These, he argues, apparently in their
entirety, can be accurately split between factory administrative
expenses and selling administrative expenses. The former can be
allocated to manufacturing cost through various production fac-
tors, such as those for ‘organization’ and ‘management and su-
pervision’, included in the machine rate, while the latter can be
included in the selling expense [1909/10, p. 81]. Thus, by the
time of his second article, Church seems to have moved to a
position where all general or administrative charges can be allo-
cated, albeit some of them going to selling expense.
But how should selling expense be allocated? Church was
well aware that they could not be ignored, since “the question of
selling expense is so closely connected [to manufacturing]”
[1909/10, p. 875]. Even so, he tended to give them short shrift,
often stressing that selling and manufacturing expense bore no
relation to one another [1901, p. 368; 1909/10, p. 81; 1929,
p. 112]. Thus, in his 1930 work, Overhead Expense, which ex-
tends to 412 pages of text, the only reference to selling expense
occurs in the final three pages of the book. In his first article,
Church had been somewhat vague about how to deal with them,
arguing that any method of allocation would necessarily be
19
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somewhat arbitrary: “It would be better, of course, if the figures
pertaining to general charges were as real and reliable as those
of the shop charges. But there seems no possible hope of their
being made so” [Church, 1901, p. 374]. Noting three possible
methods of distributing GEC, i.e. on wages cost only, on works
cost, or on an hourly basis according to the number of hours
consumed in the production, he declared the last to be the least
worst option for “ordinary manufacturing purposes” [Church,
1901, p. 369]. In his 1909/10 article, Church stated strongly that
selling expenses were not amenable to any connection with ma-
chine rates [1909/10, p. 875], a view that does not seem to have
changed throughout the remainder of his writings, in large mea-
sure because he viewed selling expenses as “much less amenable
to standardization than is manufacturing capacity” [Church,
1930, p. 410]. Throughout his writings, Church expressed the
view that since different products gave rise to different types of
selling expense, the only sensible thing to do was to treat prod-
ucts in groups, according to the nature of the selling costs they
incurred [Church, 1901, p. 371; 1909/10, p. 84; 1930, p. 411]. In
his 1930 work, Church does use the term ‘selling factors’ [1930,
p. 411], but indicates that it is hardly worthwhile trying to calcu-
late such factors, since total selling expense can be influenced by
vastly changing activities which can vary greatly from period to
period.
While the treatment of selling expenses varies little between
his early and later works, Church’s attitude towards business
growth does change significantly. In his 1901 article, as part of
the rationale for the adoption of his system, Church stressed the
need for up-to-date methods of shop accounting as part of a
modern system of organization, especially in circumstances of
business growth, whether it be in a business run by a single
proprietor or a joint stock company [1901, pp. 509-511]. It can
be implied, therefore, that at this early stage, Church considered
his system to be of benefit in a growing business. This issue
receives little or no attention in Church’s subsequent works, save
for a few brief words at the end of his 1930 text. On the final
page of Overhead Expense he notes that “The whole question of
an expanding business is also necessarily left out of account”
[1930, p. 412]. The rationale given is that rapid expansion of a
business causes great changes in the factory and would there-
fore result in the need for “Frequent recalculation of schedules
. . . Enlargement of a department necessarily disturbs all values
concerned from service factors to process rates” [1930, p. 412].
This appears to have been a tacit admission that his system of
20
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scientific machine rates could be put under extreme pressure in
times of rapid business change.
CHURCH, SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT,
STANDARD COSTS AND BUDGETING
Church’s early writings during the first decade of the 20th
century clearly place him as a contemporary of F.W. Taylor.
However, as Vangermeersch [1988, p. 102] has pointed out
‘open war’ existed between Church and L.P. Alford on the one
side, and the Taylorists, led by Barth and Gantt, on the other.
For Vangermeersch, part of the explanation for this antagonism
stems from the lack of concern amongst the ‘Taylor imitators’ of
any concern for the workers, something which appalled Church
and which explains why his science of management “was a
much broader concept than scientific management” [Litterer,
1961, p. 220]. Like Taylor, Church was concerned with methods
of improving the efficiency of management, as revealed in his
numerous writings on this topic, and hence his general ap-
proach to matters of organization and efficiency were more ho-
listic than simply finding methods of improving performance on
the shop floor. Church’s costing system was clearly seen by him
as part of an organizational structure which helped to improve
managerial efficiency.
In the context of the development of scientific management,
it is, of course, standard costing which is seen as being the key
accounting change. It seems pertinent to ask, in the context of
this study, where Church’s system fits in to the overall picture.
The choice of term ‘scientific machine rate’ to describe Church’s
system suggests a possible link to Taylorism, but it is far from
clear that there was such a link. In his 1923 work, The Making of
an Executive, Church set out what scientific method meant to
him [1923, pp. 4-5]: “In general the scientific method depends
on taking nothing for granted, and becoming familiar not only
with broad or practical results, but also with the infinitely small
influences and conditions that go to build up results of all kinds,
both successful and unsuccessful. In other words, it is mastery
of minute details and of fundamental principles that is aimed
at”.
Clearly Church’s machine rate method was scientific in that
it attempted to allocate, as accurately as possible through
minute study, all shop charges to individual jobs. Church also
indicated that ‘production factors’ provided “a wider economic
value to staff organization, inasmuch as they enable standards
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to be set up not only as between today and yesterday in the same
works, but as between different works in different places” [1909/
10, p. 190]. The combination of the scientific method and stan-
dards were clearly inter-related:
Only the accumulation of records and of compared ex-
perience can make this possible, but it will be allowed
that a general acceptance of the principle of organization
by production factors would have the effect of making
known the usual or standard values of such factors under
conditions of good practice, and that therefore as soon
as the elements of cost, power, durability, space, and
attendance of any new machine were determined, its
nominal rate under conditions of efficiency and economi-
cal installation and working would also be predeter-
minable with sufficiently close accuracy. In so far as
such theoretical rates are not realised in actual practice
it would suggest a prima facie case for enquiry into
causes [Church, 1909/10, p. 86 – italics in original].
Despite generally recognized as having provided a backcloth
from which standard costs were developed [Vangermeersch,
1988, p. 35; Solomons, 1952, p. 42], Church himself exhibited an
aversion to standard costing. In the second edition of Manufac-
turing Costs and Accounts, Church expressed the view that stan-
dard costs could not do anything that could not already be done
by his standardized scientific machine rate system [1929, pp.
442-443]. Church’s stance appears to have been predicated on
his concern with determining actual costs: “Nothing which sub-
stitutes ratios or mathematical formulae for the actual record of
actual happenings can be called cost accounting in the true
sense, however useful it may be to efficiency engineers” [1929,
p. 445 – italics in original].
In contrast, Church was more favorably disposed towards
the use of budgets in business. Indeed, as early as 1923 he was
expressing the view that they were “One of the most satisfactory
methods of controlling expenditure” [Church, 1923, p. 392]. In
Church’s view, budgets should be based on “a reasonable fore-
cast of the course of business in the coming year” [1923, p. 393]
and control was to be effected through a comparison of actual
outcomes with those expected [1923, pp. 394-395]. This early
advocacy of the use of budgets for control purposes, at a time
when the use of budgets in business was still in its infancy
[Marquette and Fleischman, 1992], was clearly in marked con-
trast to Church’s antagonistic views towards standard costing.
Having examined the key aspects of Church’s scientific
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machine rate system, how Church modified some of his views
over time, and the links between Church, scientific manage-
ment, standard costs and budgeting, it is now time to turn our
attention to an examination of the development of costing at the
Renold company between c.1901 and c.1920.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HANS RENOLD
CHAIN-MAKING BUSINESS, c.1901-c.1918
During the first two decades of the 20th century, the busi-
ness which became Hans Renold Ltd. in 1903 grew rapidly.
Turnover, which had more than doubled during the 1890s, from
£14,000 in 1890 to £30,000 in 1900, quadrupled during the pe-
riod 1900 to 1910, reaching £127,000 by the latter date, and
rising to £197,000 by the First World War [Renold, c.1914, p.
224]. Even so, the company remained medium sized, not only by
international standards but also by that of contemporary British
business. Despite trebling since 1903, employment at the com-
pany was still only 1,350 on the eve of the First World War, far
below the level of more than 5,000 workers employed by the
100th largest British company of 1907 [Wardley, 1999].
The company’s rapid growth up to 1914 necessitated a num-
ber of important changes within the business, not least the move
to new premises. In 1906, recognizing the need for expansion of
the works, then located at Brook Street in Manchester, land was
purchased at Burnage, five miles south of the city. Initially it
was planned to use Burnage as an overflow plant, but the split-
ting of operations between Brook Street and Burnage generated
logistical and managerial problems. These were overcome by
erecting a second Burnage building, commenced in the middle
of 1913, thereby allowing Brook Street to be vacated by early
1915 [M501 650.0124 HR903/5, Report of chairman’s remarks at
the annual meeting, 24 February 1915]. The nature of the prob-
lems resulting from production on two sites, while not totally
responsible for, no doubt had an important influence on, the
company’s performance in the late 1900s. Most noticeably, at
the same time as the company was expanding, in terms of em-
ployment and turnover, its profitability was declining: the ratio
of profit to turnover halved from an average of 26% between
1903 and 1907 to only 12.1% between 1908 and 1911 [M501
650.0124 HR903/1, Company Minute Book 1, figures calculated
from those in directors’ reports to annual general meetings of
shareholders].
The company was thus still in something of a state of flux
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when the First World War broke out and Hans Renold became a
member of the Manchester Armaments Output Committee. On
18 August 1915, at which stage 32% of the company’s output
comprised munitions, the Burnage works became a controlled
establishment under the Defence of the Realm Act [M501
650.0124 HR903/5, Appendix to Company’s Minute Book, direc-
tors’ report to 14th AGM, 22 August 1916]. Within a year, 98.5%
of the company’s output was made up of munitions, especially
shells and fuses but also turnbuckles for aircraft and aero-en-
gine parts [M501 650.0124 HR903/3, Directors’ Report for year
ended 30 June 1919]. The particular problems associated with
incorporating fuse manufacture within the company’s existing
organizational structure led to the formation of a separate Fuse
Department, which later became something of a model for sub-
sequent organizational developments after the war. In the direc-
tors’ report for the financial year ending 30 June 1919, the ex-
tent of the company’s involvement in war work was illustrated
by the fact that throughout the war period the company had
manufactured munitions to the value of £1.75m, a task which
had only been accomplished by doubling the workforce to a
wartime peak of 2,702 in 1917 [M501 650.0124 HR903/3, Direc-
tors’ Report for year ending 30 June 1919]. The end of the war
led to a rapid fall in the number employed by the company: in
June 1918 the figure was only 1,995 (of whom 1,127 were
women), a year later it was down to 1,500 and in January 1922
fell to a post-war low of 760 [M501 650.0124 HR903/5, Appendix
to Company’s Minute Book, Directors’ Reports to various
AGMs].
THE EXPENSE RATE SYSTEM AT HANS RENOLD AND
MAJOR CHANGES THEREIN, c.1908 - c.1915
Although Hans Renold was clearly interested in costing
matters, as revealed in an entry in his diary recording observa-
tions made during his second visit to the U.S. in March and
April 1894 [M501 920 RH 891/1], very little is known of the
costing system used by him prior to 1900. At the beginning of
the 20th century, however, Alexander Hamilton Church was en-
gaged to install a system of costing based on expense rates
[M501 657.471 HR913/9, 1915 Expense Rate Report (hereafter
referred to as ERR 1915), f. 66; Lawrence and Humphreys, 1947,
p. 30]. While Charles Renold, many years after the event, de-
clared that the system had been introduced from America
[Renold, 1950, p. 113], Church, who had been born in England
24
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of an American father,4 was clearly residing in Manchester
around the time that the system was introduced. According to
the 1901 Census [www.census.pro.gov.uk], Church was lodging
in two rooms at 922 Ashton Old Road, Manchester, where he
gave his occupation as “Expert in Organisation of Factories and
Engineering Works”. He also described himself as an ‘employer’
rather than an employee, suggesting that he was engaged by
Renold in a consultancy capacity, a fact which may explain why
the surviving company records of this period contain no refer-
ence to him.5 How long Church was engaged in implementing
his system at Renold is unclear: some commentators have sug-
gested two to three years [Vangermeersch, 1988; Scorgie, 1993]
though Urwick [1956, p. 113] has claimed that he might have
been there from 1900 to 1905. According to Vangermeersch
[1988, p. 7], Church was introduced to Hans Renold by a close
friend and fellow Manchester businessman, Leonard Massey.
Apparently Church had been introduced to Massey by his
company’s auditor, Joseph Bell, sometime in the 1890s and, hav-
ing put into place a costing system there (the precise nature of
which is unknown6), then moved on to Hans Renold.
Despite the absence of manuscript records for the period to
c.1908/09, knowledge of the Hans Renold costing system in the
early years of the 20th century can be gleaned from a number of
sources, both published [e.g. Renold (1913-14), Renold (c.1914),
Allingham (1921-22)] and archival. The 1915 Expense Rate Re-
port, which was submitted to the board of directors by H.G.
Jenkins in December 1915, not only presents a picture of the
basic nature of the system c.1915, but also provides indications
as to how it had changed up to that time. As Table 1 reveals, the
system underwent a number of modifications over 15 years, giv-
ing rise to five distinct phases, and was finally replaced, towards
the end of the First World War or shortly after, by a completely
4 Alexander Hamilton Church was born on 28 May 1866 to Richard Stephen
Hamilton Church and Jane Grace Quick Clemence. His parents were subse-
quently married on 23 October 1867, when the former was 69 years old and the
latter 28 (details from a copy of the marriage certificate obtained by the author
from the General Register Office).
5 The main records to have survived from the early years of Hans Renold
Ltd. are the directors’ minute books. However, those for the period to c.1908/09
unfortunately provide little useful detail on matters other than those relating to
legal issues or of a statutory nature, and contain no mention at all of either
Church or of the costing system.
6 Vangermeersch [1988, p. 7] indicates that the system was used at Masseys
from about 1900 through to 1960.
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different system comprising standard costing and budgetary
control.
TABLE 1
Key Phases in the Development of
the Hans Renold Costing System
1901 - March 1908 Church I: Original ‘Expense Rate System’.
March 1908 - 28 July 1909 Church II: Modified System, including the addi-
tion of Design Expense Rate (known as Old Basis,
Burnage).
29 July 1909 - 30 June 1911 Church III7: Three Factor Machine Rate System
(addition of Selling Expense Rates and sub-divi-
sion of general charges between departmental in-
direct and general works charges).
June 1911 - December 1914 Church IV: ‘C’ rate system (rates revised in Janu-
ary 1913 and July 1913).8
January 1915 Church V: based on budgeted expenses; included
expense rates for general office services and re-
search, and also a material expense rate to cover
stores costs.
Mid -1917 Desire to move to a simpler, more direct system
which would produce meaningful figures more
rapidly.
April 1918 Trial application of standard costing in the Shell
Department.
The original Renold expense rate system echoed closely that
developed by Church in his 1901 article in The Engineering
Magazine.9 It was based on the concept of scientific machine
7 This set of rates was inaugurated after Hans Renold’s visit to the USA in
1909 [ERR, 1915, f. 67].
8 It is interesting to speculate on the nomenclature used here. One possibil-
ity is that there is a link to Church’s 1917 book, Manufacturing Costs & Accounts,
where his own costing system is described as Method C. A more likely explana-
tion, however, is that it is short for ‘compound’, since the nature of the revised
system enabled the generation of both simple and compound machine and labor
rates.
9 It is quite possible that Church’s 1901 article is, in fact, an attempt to set
out the system he was still in the process of developing at Renold. In discussing
how to deal with building expense, Church notes that the method being de-
scribed “was first worked out for and applied to a factory which consisted of two
parts, one being an old building of five storeys, and the other a modern shop of
three” [1901, p. 31]. A photograph of Renold’s Brook Street Works in 1890
[Tripp, 1956, between pp. 16 and 17] shows an older main building, five storeys
high, with a newer addition of three storeys.
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rates applied to independent production centers, which were
charged with all expenses that could be reasonably allocated to
them, and any unallocated shop charges at the end of each
month were distributed over the jobs completed as a supple-
mentary rate, which was used as an index of shop efficiency
[ERR 1915, f. 66]. Having established the rates, they remained
“operative from 1901 to March 1908, modified by supplemen-
tary rate” [ERR 1915, f. 66]. Beginning in 1908, however,
changes began to be made to the Church system at Renold. The
extent of Church’s input to these changes, if any, is unknown,
but it is perhaps not merely a coincidence that his second ar-
ticle, on production factors, appeared in 1909/10. Having ben-
efited from the experience gained from introducing and operat-
ing his system at Renold, Church may have felt that his system
could now be more fully explained to the engineering fraternity.
However, the changes made to the expense rate system at
Renold from 1908 do not entirely reflect Church’s views as laid
out in his 1909/10 article, the company apparently attempting to
develop the system in ways which went beyond those advocated
by Church.
Two important strands can be discerned in the changes in-
troduced into the Renold expense rate system from 1908: an
attempt to improve the allocation method so as to reduce the
residual amount left to be allocated through the GEC and a
concern with identifying the most effective way of incorporating
production factors within the machine rate.
GEC: At Renold, the key element in the expense rate system was
the fixing of the ‘manufacturing rate’, comprising the machine
and labor rates, plus other elements which varied over time. In
the original system it was found that a GEC of about 34% had to
be applied to manufacturing cost to cover “General Works, Gen-
eral Office and selling Expenses” [ERR, 1915, f. 66]. As the com-
pany grew, and its management structure became more com-
plex, overheads became much more significant “than they had
been when the system was conceived” [Renold, 1950, p. 113]. In
an attempt to reduce the amount to be arbitrarily allocated un-
der GEC, the company began to experiment with additional ex-
pense rates from 1908. First, in March 1908, design expenses
were separated from GEC by use of an hourly design expense
rate, and the managing director’s salary was charged direct to
manufacturing. This resulted in a reduction of GEC to about
26% of manufacturing cost [ERR, 1915, f. 67]. Second, in July
1909, general charges were divided into departmental indirect
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and general works, and charged at differential percentages on
the sum of machine and labor. Third, also in July 1909, selling
rates were introduced in an attempt to take account of all tech-
nical and commercial expenses. In January 1915, another major
revision occurred. Additional rates were added, namely a mate-
rial expense rate, to enable the cost of stores to be separated
from the general works charge, and a rate to cover general office
services and research, and a three-fold categorization of the
‘manufacturing rate’ was adopted: machine direct rate, labor
direct rate, and an indirect rate (covering departmental ex-
penses, inspection, general works services and general office ser-
vices) (see Figure 1).
Although the selling expense rate was introduced to reduce
the incidence of GEC, its implementation was the source of
many difficulties. Initially it “was applied as a differential per-
centage on Factory Cost” [ERR, 1915, f. 70] for the various prod-
uct groups in the manner stressed by Church [1901], that is, to
“ensure that each class and sub-class of product got as nearly its
fair share as could be determined” [ERR 1915, f. 70].10 Towards
the end of 1912, however, the issue of using a single rate to
cover all technical and commercial expenses came under de-
tailed scrutiny, not least because of the large variations that
existed between the estimated and actual expenses for 1911-
1912. One means of attempting to resolve this issue was “to have
these expenses frequently recalculated as part of a regular
routine” [M501 650.0522 HR910/3, Board of Trade meeting, 16
October 1912]. A second way of overcoming part of the prob-
lem was to change the basis for allocating these expenses, and
alternative methods were discussed, notably charging on the
basis of invoice entries11 and treating individual items of techni-
cal and commercial expenses in a different manner. In 1914,
selling rates were determined on a variety of bases: some costs
10 A list of the main product classes for late 1912 indicates three main ones,
namely, chains, wheels and ‘machines and tools’, with the first of the three
classes being sub-divided into cycle, block, roller, silent liner, other silent chains,
common, and mortise gear [M501 650.0522 HR910/3, Board of Trade meeting,
16 October 1912]. The selling rate was designed to cover a number of expenses,
including those of the selling office, publication, the cost office, the drawing
office, royalties (i.e. patent fees), costs of carriage in, etc.
11 At a meeting of the Board of Trade committee held on 6 December 1912,
figures had been produced showing that while the average technical and com-
mercial cost per chain order was 18/-, using the percentage on factory cost
method meant that orders were being charged amounts varying between 1/- and
£20 [M501 650.0522 HR910/3].
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FIGURE 1
Machine Rate Card, Hans Renold Ltd.,
30 March 1917
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continued to be allocated as a differential percentage on factory
cost, but others were allocated as a differential rate per invoice
entry, while those to cover discounts allowed to agents were
allocated as a differential percentage on selling value and those
to cover royalties on all patent Silent Liner Chains as a flat
percentage on selling value. Despite all of the changes, selling
expenses continued to cause problems. Thus, at the Head Office
meeting of 14 April 1916, Dugdale, in charge of the credit and
prices section of the selling department, argued that the table of
selling rates was unnecessarily complicated and argued in favor
of a flat rate charge, but Jackson, who became Sales Director
around this time, objected since, in his opinion, the system cur-
rently being used was more equitable [M501 650.0522 HR910/7].
Incorporating Production Factors Within the Machine Rate: The
composition of the various components of the Renold ‘manufac-
turing rate’ also varied over time. Taking the machine rate as
our example, prior to July 1909 it comprised four items: depre-
ciation, power usage, consumption of tools and gas, and floor
burden (i.e. the machine’s share of the buildings cost based on
the square footage occupied) [M501 657.47 HR 908/4, Revised
Jan 1908 Cost System – reproduced in Vangermeersch, 1988, pp.
26-27]. In July 1909, however, floor burden was moved to gen-
eral works expenses, but this experiment proved “not good”
[ERR 1915, ff. 69-70] and it was restored to the machine rate in
June 1911. Even then, the precise method of including floor
burden in the machine rate was the subject of on-going discus-
sions, in particular, as to whether it should be charged on the
basis of the bare area occupied, this plus a handling area, or
with an addition to cover the space around a group of machines
[see, for example, M501 650.0522 HR910/2, Burnage meeting, 8
May 1912].
Up until 1909, the method of establishing the machine rate
was normal hours, i.e. the number of hours the machine was
expected to run under normal operating conditions. For this
purpose, it would appear that the norm was established at 2,000
hours per year [Renold, 1950, p. 113].12 In 1909, however, a
12 Given this fact, it is somewhat strange that Solomons [1952, p. 42] should
argue that Church’s machine rate was based on the assumption that machines
were worked at their maximum capacity, while it was Whitmore who had the
insight that overheads should be spread on the basis of normal machine usage
rather than maximum usage. 2,000 hours per annum was clearly less than the
maximum possible at Renold, where a 48 hour working week had been intro-
duced in 1896 [Tripp, 1956, p. 74].
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switch was made to using actual hours, a move which helped to
bring to the management’s attention the fact that certain of the
medium and large machines were working only a fraction of the
possible time [ERR, 1915, f. 69]. When the system was revised
again in June 1911, however, while the power and consumption
factors of the machine rate continued to be based on actual
hours, those for machine depreciation and floor burden (now
added back) were based on normal hours [ERR, 1915, f. 71].
One other key change which affected the Renold expense
rate system was the switch to calculating expense rates on the
basis of budgeted rather than actual expenses, which occurred
in January 1915. The benefits to the company of changing to
budgeted figures were claimed to be two-fold:
(a) Calculation of Expense Rates can be commenced
before end of Financial year thereby expediting cal-
culation with consequence of less disruption in
Cost Dept.
(b) The possibility of incorporating anticipated Trade
Policy changes into Expense Rates, thereby reduc-
ing difference between Valuation of Work Done ac-
cording to Expense Rates and Actual Expenses – a
matter of supreme importance [ERR 1915, f. 3].
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE CHANGES
TO THE COSTING SYSTEM
The changes which occurred in Renold’s costing system can
be viewed from two, inter-related perspectives: influences that
were of a much broader nature and impinged on the costing
system from outside, and problems inherent within the costing
system itself. The former includes factors both external to the
firm, such as the activities of competitors, the impact of war,
etc., and factors internal to the firm. In this latter respect it
needs to be recognized that changes to the costing system were
strongly inter-connected with the growth of the business and a
movement towards the development of an organizational struc-
ture, based on committees and departments, broadly in line
with the views of Taylor and other exponents of scientific man-
agement. Although external factors will be touched upon en
passant, in this section we focus our attention on three possible
internal explanations for the changes noted to the costing sys-
tem: organizational developments within Renold; attempts to
develop a system of accounting control; and problems inherent
in the costing system itself.
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The Development of the Organizational Structure: In 1879 Hans
Renold took over a bankrupt concern in Salford making com-
mon chains for textile machinery and, through the invention of
improved products, such as chains suitable for use on bicycles
and in cars, the business was gradually developed. Even when
the business was converted into a limited liability company in
1903, Hans Renold, as Governing Director, retained all the pow-
ers of running the business, including that of hiring and firing
directors. Towards the end of the first decade of the 20th cen-
tury, however, the growth in business size, the need to control
two separately located factories, and problems of a falling rate
of profit on turnover (which Hans Renold blamed on manage-
rial problems [M501 061.51 HR912/20, draft notes for
chairman’s speech to OGM, 15 February 1912]) all contributed
to a re-assessment of the organizational structure of the busi-
ness.
While Urwick [1956, pp. 48-49] has suggested that Hans
Renold was the first businessman in Britain to adopt Taylorism
prior to 1914,13 an equal claim could also be made for his son,
Charles [Boyns, 2001], who was later to become a significant
figure in British management circles from the 1920s through to
the 1950s. On completing his MA in Engineering at Cornell Uni-
versity in the USA, Charles Renold joined Hans Renold Ltd.,
becoming a director of the company in 1906. Together, Charles
and Hans began to develop a new organization structure for the
business, based around committees and the introduction of sci-
entific management techniques, moves that were accompanied
by the development of organization charts.14 Although Hans
Renold clearly recognized the need to devolve power to others
within the organization, he does not appear to have been overly
keen to do so before 1914 and, indeed, retained his powers as
Governing Director until the late 1920s.
The single entrepreneurially controlled business thus began
to be replaced by an organizational structure comprising a com-
mittee style of management from about 1908/09. However, as
13 Hans Renold [1913-14, p. 21] claimed to have met F.W. Taylor on three
occasions, presumably during his numerous visits to the USA.
14 A document [M501 651.01 HR906/3] in Hans Renold’s hand, dated 1908,
shows a sketch of the new organizational structure which was formalized in a
printed chart in November 1909 [M501 651.051 HR913/2 - see Appendix Exhibit
1], predating by eight years what Chandler has claimed to be the first table of
organization in a British company, namely that of British Westinghouse for
1917 [Chandler, 1990, pp. 240-241].
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Charles Renold pointedly remarked on one occasion, the com-
mittees were only advisory to his father [Renold, c.1914, p. 233].
During the second decade of the 20th century, although the
committee structure underwent numerous changes, these were
clearly motivated by the desire to follow largely the principles of
scientific management as espoused by F.W. Taylor.15 In 1912,
Charles Renold and another engineer (possibly Henry W.
Allingham) were sent to the U.S. to investigate scientific man-
agement [Renold, 1950, pp. 109-110], though the company had
already carried out a number of time studies of their own by this
time16 and had been moving towards a functional system of
organization for some time.
The succession of organization charts produced from 1908/
09 (see Appendix Exhibits 1-3) clearly shows the development of
the management structure towards a departmental organization
based initially on functions, though from as early as 1912 there
were discussions about organizing the business according to
product-based departments [M501 650.0522 HR910/2, Head Of-
fice meeting, 16 January 1912]. In the event, such a development
only occurred towards the end of the war, when experience
gained during the war in the organization of the separate Fuse
Department provided a model for subsequent organizational
developments. Having effected major changes to the organi-
zational structure prior to the First World War, further changes
were introduced at the beginning of the war. Thus, between
April 1914 and September 1915, the drawing offices were taken
out of the manufacturing departments, to become a separate
design function, with all manufacturing activity, both of chains
and wheels on the one hand and machines and tools on the
other, being merged into a ‘Making’ Department. By January
1917, however, design had been incorporated as one of four
functions under ‘Making’, together with ‘current work’, ‘in-
spection’ and ‘plant’ (see Appendix Exhibit 2). The most signifi-
cant change effected during 1916 was the appointment of two
15 It is clear from the company’s minutes, however, that they did not always
follow Taylor’s ideas to the letter. Thus, for example, a minute for 30 July 1912
contains diagrams showing how the Burnage organization differed from that
suggested by Taylor [M501 650.0522 HR910/2].
16 The company’s main use of time studies occurred in the aftermath of the
appointment as Production Engineer of Henry W. Allingham in November 1911
but at a Burnage Meeting on 12 June 1911 it is minuted, under the heading of
piece rates, that “Mr. C.G.R. reported that the essential point is the time study
and the setting of times, and this has not been so successfully carried out at
Brook Street as we thought” [M501 650.0522 HR910/1].
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functional directors to oversee the two divisions of the business:
making and selling. ‘Making’ was placed under the control of
Charles Renold, as Works Director, in which function he was
assisted by a Works Council comprising four assistant manag-
ers, while W.H. Jackson (Hans Renold’s son-in-law), as Sales
Director, was placed in charge of selling.17
A further development at the same time was the appoint-
ment of the Finance and Employment Managers, H.G. Jenkins
and H.R. Lloyd respectively, as an Economy Committee, with a
remit to present “independent reports on matters of economy,
either on their own initiative or when specially requested by the
Board” [M501 650.0124 HR903/5, Directors’ Report to 14th
OGM, 22 Aug. 1916]. By July 1920 (see Appendix Exhibit 3),
Charles Renold had taken over the role of managing director
and, in order to free him from day-to-day responsibilities, three
executive directors were in place: R.O. Herford (Hans Renold’s
nephew) as Works Director; W.H. Jackson as Sales Director; and
H.G. Jenkins as Finance Director.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the changes to the company’s or-
ganizational structure were not effected overnight, nor without
some disruption and animosity. Although the company always
prided itself on its labor relations, went to great lengths to in-
volve key personnel in the changes and attempted, through
meetings and lectures, to ‘educate’ all of its workforce about the
nature of the changes taking place, tensions did occasionally run
high, even if strikes were avoided. A particular problem which
arose from time-to-time concerned the precise role and respon-
sibilities of superintendents and it appears that some of them
occasionally opposed the changes in organizational structure
and operated in a way that undermined the effectiveness of such
changes. Part of the problem seems to have been the almost
continuous nature of change, with previous changes being far
from sacrosanct, and sometimes overturned or made redundant
within a short period of time. As Hans Renold often stressed, a
business is a living organism and must therefore be continu-
ously changing, but a question mark can be raised as to whether
the amount of change which was effected at Hans Renold Ltd.
between 1909 and 1918 was totally warranted. A generous inter-
17 The new organizational structure obviously involved a greater devolution
of power than had previously been the case and it may be this, given the all-
embracing nature of Hans Renold’s powers as governing director, that explains
the apparently significant role played by the company’s solicitor, Mr. Dendy, in
relation to organizational changes at this time.
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pretation would be that here was a company striving to find an
ideal organizational structure without a proven blueprint to
guide it. Furthermore, the intervention of war in 1914 clearly
came at an inopportune time for the company, generating its
own forces for change at a time when existing changes had not
been fully worked through. In relation to the changes effected
over the previous ten years or so, the company’s auditor, Joseph
Bell, commented in a report into the organizational structure
drawn up in 1918, that he was “of the opinion that a fetish is
being made of Organization as such without a clear view being
maintained of the part that Organization should bear to the
Business as a whole” [M501 650.05 HR 918/3 ‘Notes on
Organisation’ (December 1918), f. 12]. In Bell’s view, directors
should be so free of detailed management as to concentrate on
policy “and consider the results of the Management (I do not
mean by this financial results alone)” [M501 650.05 HR 918/3
‘Notes on Organisation’ (December 1918), f. 12].
The key element in the changes made to the organizational
structure prior to the outbreak of the First World War was the
attempt to centralize control of the business in a Head Office
Committee, while at the same time providing heads of depart-
ments and superintendents with a high degree of autonomy,
providing scope for them to exercise their own initiative. As
Jackson pointed out in a speech to a meeting of heads of depart-
ments and shareholders following the company’s annual general
meeting held on 24 February 1915, the fundamental aspect of
the centralization policy was the encouragement of individual
initiative without weakening central control of policy [M501
650.0124 HR903/5]. Such a design obviously had implications
both for the accounting and costing systems, which had to make
possible both the exercise of individual initiative and provide for
effective central control of business operations.
Attempts to Develop a System of Accounting Control: The move to
a departmental structure of organization and the devolving of
certain powers, first from Hans Renold to other directors and
then, subsequently, to heads of departments, superintendents,
etc., clearly brought to the fore the issue of control and, with it,
that of responsibility accounting. To help make the new mana-
gerial structure effective clearly required adjustments to the ac-
counting system and alterations of the perception of the ac-
counting function within the overall organization. It also
increasingly brought to the fore the issue of the link between the
costing and the accounting system.
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The precise nature of the links, if any, between the costing
and accounting systems at Renold prior to 1909 is not known.
However, there is abundant evidence that, from that time on-
wards, they became very close and, by 1915 at the latest, appear
to have been fully integrated. As successive organization charts
from 1909 reveal, the costing and accounting functions were
gradually brought under unified control, initially under W.H.
Jackson, Hans Renold’s son-in-law, who was appointed as direc-
tor in charge of the commercial management of the business in
1910. By September 1913 all functions under these heads had
been collected together in a single ‘Costs & Accounts section’,
one of six sections making up ‘General Services’ which, during
1914, was placed under the control of the newly appointed char-
tered accountant, Herbert G. Jenkins, and his assistant, Percy H.
Lightbody.18
More substantive evidence of a coming together of the cost-
ing and accounting systems is provided by two pieces of docu-
mentary evidence. The first is a diagram dated 1 May 1913,
whose original title, ‘Costing System’, has been amended to ‘Sys-
tem of Accounting’, and which shows how items of original in-
formation pass through the system, are analyzed, enter into the
various expense rates, pass through the cost records and gener-
ate either changes in the stock accounts, the equipment inven-
tory or enter into customer invoices [M501 657.47 HR913/1].
The second is a set of accounting charts included in Volume 4 of
the company’s ‘J’ books, which comprised a series of standard
practice instruction manuals [M501 651.02 HR911/4]. These
charts, which initially use numeric codes and subsequently, by
1918, a decimal system of accounts, are suggestive of the use of
a single accounting system from which costing information
could be drawn as appropriate. Indeed, there is much evidence
that information from the accounting system was used to deter-
mine and check the accuracy of the expense rates which formed
the basis of the costing system.
Pressure for greater integration of the costing and ac-
counting systems came from two main sources: the development
of the new organizational structure and the declining profit
18 Little is known of the background of Jenkins, though he remained with
the parent company for 35 years, retiring in 1948 [Tripp, 1956, p. 162].
Lightbody, who had been closely associated with the introduction of the Church
system at Renold, left the company in the 1920s to join A.H. Gledhill, and
subsequently became president of the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants
in 1936-37.
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performance of the company. Concern over the latter also led to
a number of developments within the financial accounting sys-
tem itself. Thus, between July 1910 and June 1911 the company
began to draw up, first, monthly expenditure statements, then
monthly accounts and, subsequently, monthly departmental ac-
counts [M501 650.0522 HR910/1]. In October 1912 it was com-
mented that these last were to be used as part of the routine
being established to calculate and check the accuracy of the
technical and commercial expense rates on a regular basis
[M501 650.0522 HR910/5, Board of Trade meeting, 16 October
1912]. In Spring 1912, the company had begun to consult Jo-
seph Bell on the subject of their accounting system. Bell, who
had indirectly been responsible for introducing Church to Hans
Renold, appears to have introduced his ‘patent’ system of ac-
counting into the company around this time [M501 650.0522
HR910/2, Head Office meeting, 7 May 1912], though possibly
not until after the Manchester firm of auditors in which he was
a partner, Parkinson, Mather & Co., had replaced Handley &
Wilde as auditors of Hans Renold Ltd. at the company’s AGM
held on 5 March 1913. It seems possible that it was Bell who
was responsible for the introduction of the charts of accounts
previously mentioned, though it cannot be ruled out that this
was an innovation attributable to H.G. Jenkins.
The organizational and accounting/costing changes which
occurred during the First World War were clearly interlinked.
The increased centralization of accounting and costing func-
tions led, in particular, to an enhanced role for budgets. Budgets
for expenditure on patents and publicity are referred to in the
company minute books as early as 1911 and, in 1912, a Mr.
Hutchinson was brought in to control expenditure. Following
the appointment of Jenkins as Costing Manager in 1914, how-
ever, the use of budgets for control purposes became more wide-
spread and, in 1915, a significant development was the basing of
expense rates on budgeted rather than actual expenditure fig-
ures (see Table 1). Further developments in 1916 and 1917 not
only led to superintendents being held accountable for the per-
formance of their departments but also the provision of the
monthly financial accounts to assistant managers, in an attempt
to widen their vision, give them a better understanding of what
they were doing and make them “feel that their responsibility
was more real” [M501 650.0522 HR910/9, Head Office meeting,
12 February 1917].
Despite the many innovations introduced by Jenkins and
the closer integration of the accounting and costing systems
37
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200330
during the war, it is clear that Hans Renold was far from happy
with the information being thrown up by the system. In May
1916 he had complained that the current financial reports “were
not that index of the works that he would like” [M501 650.0522
HR910/7, Head Office meeting, 9 May 1916], in part attributing
this to a lack of coordination and understanding between the
engineers and accountants.19 A year later, in July 1917, Hans
complained in particular about the fact that information show-
ing superintendents the effects of output on costs was taking too
long to reach them. Jenkins responded to the implied criticism
of the costing department by blaming the superintendents them-
selves for delays in the provision of the raw data to the cost
office [M501 658.5 HR915/2, Works (‘C’) meeting, 11 July 1917].
Thus, when plans to develop a new scheme of cost and account
keeping were put forward in 1917, one desirable feature was
considered to be a closer cooperation between the costs depart-
ment and the works [M501 650.0522 HR910/9, Head Office
meeting, 14 September 1917].
This new scheme was linked both with moves to re-struc-
ture the business around single product departments and the
dissatisfaction which had been developing for some time with
the Church system of costing. It was particularly desired that
the new system should “provide a quick and reliable index of the
financial position, and at the same time reflect the efficiency of
working” [M501 650.0522 HR910/9, Head Office meeting, 25
September 1917]. To this end, as Jackson put it, “it was impor-
tant to get ahead with the preparation of more direct costs
wherever this was practicable, and dispense altogether with the
use of machine rates &c.” [M501 650.0522 HR910/9, Head Of-
fice meeting, 31 July 1917]. The new system was based around
the drawing up of monthly balance sheets and profit and loss
accounts for each department, with general administrative
charges only being charged to the company profit and loss ac-
count. With superintendents only responsible for direct costs, it
was envisaged that this “will ensure a much livelier interest on
the part of superintendents, in the success of their departments”
[M501 650.0522 HR910/9, Head Office meeting, 25 September
1917]. Six months later the accounts were being reported to
19 The existence of tensions between accountants and engineers as profes-
sional groups, stemming from their different viewpoints, has been commented
on in numerous historical works [e.g. Chatfield, 1977], and Church himself, of
course, was an engineer who, at times, expressed negative views towards ac-
countants.
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Head Office meetings, together with a ‘weekly barometer’.20
Around the same time, during the spring of 1918, the company
also began to experiment with the use of standard costing in the
Shell Department, Jenkins putting forward a scheme for mea-
suring efficiency based on the comparison of ‘actual’ with ‘ideal’
costs, the latter being based on time studies [M501 650.0522
HR910/10, Head Office meeting, 7 May 1918].
Thus, towards the end of the First World War, Hans Renold
Ltd. had begun to abandon the system of expense rates intro-
duced by Church in the early years of the 20th century, and to
replace it by a system which utilized budgets for control pur-
poses and standard costing. Though it was to be several years
before the system was perfected [Boyns et al, 2000], the Church
experiment had effectively run its course prior to the end of the
First World War.
Problems Inherent in the Costing System: The experience of Hans
Renold Ltd. in utilizing Church’s system of ‘scientific machine
rates’ indicates two major problems: how to reconcile actual
costs with those thrown up by the costing system (a problem
which was, in part, linked to the growth in GEC at the com-
pany); and how to generate meaningful figures for decision
making purposes. Let us deal with each of these separately.
Reconciling Actual Costs and those thrown up by the Costing
System: Insofar as they attempted to enable the allocation of
ever more classes of overheads directly to production centers,
the changes made to the Renold expense rate system from 1908
were clearly in accordance with the development of Church’s
views as reflected in his 1909/10 article. Nevertheless, and de-
spite going somewhat further than suggested by Church, includ-
ing the review of rates and their method of calculation on an
increasingly frequent basis [ERR, 1915], there arose an increas-
ing concern within the company that the costs thrown up, or
attributed, by the system often failed to match the actual
20 The use of the term ‘barometer’ possibly implies a link back to Church
who referred to the supplementary rate as a barometer of efficiency. The Hans
Renold Ltd. ‘Business Barometer’ for the first quarter of 1918 contains weekly
figures for outgoings and incomings (both divided into actual and commit-
ments), a statement of the difference between the two, plus data relating to the
number of employees and overtime hours worked and their cost. The data on
wages and the number of employees are divided as between those paid hourly,
weekly and monthly, while incomings are divided into different product groups.
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expenses incurred in the business.21 Even the conversion, in
January 1915, to calculating all rates on the basis of budgeted
rather than actual expenditure failed to solve the problems.
Thus, while it was considered at the time that the changes be-
tween 1908 and 1915 had “considerably purified the calculations
and the resultant costs” and that the overall accomplishments
were expected to “be a considerable help in the future” [ERR
1915, ff. 1-2], in the words of Charles Renold, they simply led to
“confusion worse confounded” [1950, p. 116].
Use of Costs for Decision Making: Problems arose here in
relation to two issues: (1) producing a new product; and (2)
make-or-buy decisions. Let us examine each of these in turn.
(1) Producing a new product. There is clear evidence in the
company’s minute books that the expense rate system created
problems when contemplating the possibility of launching new
products, and that this acted as a spur to changing the system.
An illustration of this is provided by the case of the 21/4-inch
pitch Liner Silent Chain. The minutes of the Head Office meet-
ing on 18 March 1913 indicate a concern on the part of Hans
Renold himself that the company, for commercial reasons con-
nected with the activity of its competitors, needed to produce a
large chain of this type [M501 650.0522 HR910/3]. The minutes
of the Burnage Committee meeting held on 2 April 1913 make it
clear that the problem regarding this chain was that, according
to the cost system, the product appeared to cost too much and
could not be produced profitably [M501 650.0522 HR910/3]. Al-
though ways were discussed as to how cheaper materials and
alternative production methods might be used to reduce the
cost, the discussion ultimately focused on what was seen to be
the fundamental problem, namely the cost system itself. In par-
ticular, the use at the time of the percentage on factory cost
method of calculating the selling rate for allocating technical
and commercial expenses was seen to weigh too heavily on large
chains. Discussions as to how to overcome this problem focused
21 In October 1912, for example, it was noted that there were “big variations
between estimated and actual Technical and Commercial expenses for 1911-12”
[M501 650.0522 HR910/3, Board of Trade Meeting, 16 October 1912]. It was not,
however, the case that the expenses thrown up were necessarily less than those
actually incurred. Indeed, at the meeting of the board held on 3 December 1915,
at which Jenkins submitted the 1915 Expense Rate Report, it was agreed “for the
present, not to calculate new selling rates as it is known that the existing rates
are above actual cost” [M501 650.0522 HR910/6].
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on methods which would reduce the cost thrown up by the
system to such a level as would indicate that the 21/4-inch pitch
Liner Silent Chain could be made profitably, thereby enabling
Hans Renold to keep faith with one of his business dictums,
which he had borrowed from Mr. Sharpe of Messrs. Brown &
Sharpe in the USA, “Never make anything unless it is clear that
there will be a profit” [M501 650.0522 HR910/3, Head Office
meeting, 5 March 1913]. Hans Renold clearly considered that
the company had to make such a chain and was convinced,
whatever the figures generated by the cost system, that his com-
pany should manufacture the product, and could do so profit-
ably. If the cost appeared too high, the fault lay with the cost
system, and it therefore needed to be modified. It was this expe-
rience which led to a more complex arrangement for allocating
selling expenses, based on differential rates according to their
specific nature, being introduced in 1914.
(2) Make-or-buy decisions. For many engineering compa-
nies, the choice between making themselves items such as com-
ponents or tools for their own use, or alternatively purchasing
them from external suppliers, was not always an easy one. Mak-
ing such items could interrupt the flow of finished goods pro-
duction where this required the use of machines which were
normally engaged in such activity, or it might require the pur-
chase of special machines which could remain idle for long peri-
ods of time. The problem of idle machine time was one that
exercised the mind of many cost accountants at the beginning of
the 20th century, but Church’s supplementary rate concept
failed to provide an adequate method of dealing with it. Bunnell
[Vangermeersch, 1988, p. 35], for example, noted that by cover-
ing idle time of a big machine through increasing the rates for
other machines, the loss incurred by a business through keeping
a big machine for occasional jobs was effectively concealed un-
der Church’s system. It was in an attempt to overcome the prob-
lem of ‘hidden’ idle time that a shift to the use of actual, rather
than normal, hours was made in the Renold expense rate system
in July 1909 [ERR, 1915, f. 69].
The use of actual hours, however, was in itself problematic,
since those machines operating only part of the time would con-
sequently have a high machine rate and any product or job
which used that machine would appear more expensive than the
same job taking the same time on a less idle machine with a
lower machine rate. Minutes of the Head Office meeting held on
4 December 1911 indicate a clear concern with the fact that idle
time was generating high machine rates and hence high costs
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[M501 650.0522 HR910/1]. To overcome the problem in relation
to make-or-buy decisions it was suggested that two costs should
be shown: one based on the machine rate, i.e. including charges
for idle time, and the second based on the rate if the machine
had been operating full time. A particular example of such a
problem arising at the company, that of twist drills, is recounted
by Allingham [1921-22]. Initially unable to purchase supplies of
twist drills externally, Hans Renold Ltd. had acquired a machine
capable of their production. Over time, however, sources of
cheap twist drills emerged and, as the company began to pur-
chase outside supplies, the twist drill machine worked less and
less, with the result that its machine rate, based on actual hours
worked, increased dramatically, making it appear ever more
costly for the company to make its own twist drills, and thereby
increasingly favoring outside purchases over internal produc-
tion.
It is clear therefore that several of the changes effected to
the Hans Renold expense rate system were made in the light of
the fact that it was generating figures that were not helpful for
decision making purposes. Nevertheless, the changes did not
always provide beneficial solutions and, in many cases, only
served to complicate the method of operating the system rather
than to improve the quality of the information it produced.
Renold [1950, p. 113] described the problem in the following
manner: “In producing a cost, bits and pieces of every conceiv-
able kind of expense had gone into the pan, and though each
had contributed its flavour, the resulting omelet could not be
unscrambled for examination”.
Ultimately, those in charge at Hans Renold Ltd. came to
realize that for the purposes of studying processes and new
product designs, and making decisions in relation thereto, a sys-
tem which accurately allocated as high a proportion of
overheads as possible by product and processes was not neces-
sary. All that was required was a system which enabled a com-
parison of costs up to producing level. Hence, Hans Renold Ltd.
gradually moved to a system of ‘direct’ costing, that is one which
merely allocated overheads to the company’s overall profit and
loss account, and not to individual departmental accounts
[M501 650.0522 HR910/9, meeting of 25 September 1917].
FIVE PARADOXES AND A CONCLUSION
The experiment with the use of Church’s ‘scientific machine
rate’ system at Hans Renold Ltd. in the first two decades of the
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20th century throws up five main paradoxes. First, although
Church advocated the putting in of appropriate costing systems
prior to the growth of a business, his system palpably failed the
growth test. While it is possible that this may partly reflect the
peculiarities of the manner in which Hans Renold Ltd. ex-
panded between 1901 and 1918, e.g. two-stage move from Brook
Street to Burnage, adoption of scientific management and the
impact of the move over to munitions manufacture during the
First World War, in general it appears to reflect an inability of
the Church system to cope with periods of rapid business
change. Such change renders the expense rates of one period
totally inappropriate in the next period. Thus, while the original
Church system remained operative at Renold between 1901 and
1908, subsequent developments at the company meant that
changes had to be introduced at an increasing rate. The ongoing
nature of change, and the unpredictability of conditions during
the First World War, finally signaled the death-knell of the
Church system. Although Church himself had initially indicated
that his system could cope with growth, it was possibly the
experience of companies like Renold which, ultimately, led him
to recognize that the system could be placed under severe strain
by unforeseen developments. At Renold, Church’s system col-
lapsed, in part, due to the need for almost continual re-calcula-
tion of the increasing number of components that made up the
overall hourly scientific machine rate.
A second paradox relates to the fact that while the Church
system was designed to generate cost figures which were as
accurate as possible, the relevance of the figures which it threw
up for making key decisions, especially in relation to make-or-
buy decisions and the possible profitability of new products,
were increasingly questioned. The changes introduced to try to
make the system work more effectively, some of which went
beyond the recommendations of Church, merely increased the
degree of confusion and, in the circumstances of the First World
War, made the system an increasingly less practicable option.
A third paradox is that while Church was concerned with
administrative control through accounting [Jelinek, 1980], at
Renold, the system failed to provide effective managerial con-
trol. In part, as Vangermeersch [1988, p. 28] has pointed out,
this was undoubtedly due to the fact that while Church’s “phi-
losophy of accounting as a crucial part of overall management
control does come through in his efforts”, he failed to develop
the control or decision making features of his accounting sys-
tems to the same extent [Wells, quoted in Vangermeersch, 1988,
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p. 24]. At Renold, it was only when an alternative technique was
introduced in the Fuse Department that those in charge of the
business found a simple, and effective method of control. The
way forward proved to be the use of budgetary control and stan-
dard costing, techniques which are closely associated with the
development of scientific management, in connection with prod-
uct-based departments [Boyns et al, 2000]. Given his antagonis-
tic attitude towards standard costs, and the fact that he did not
advocate the use of budgets in business until 1923, Church can
hardly have been the source of these developments, though sci-
entific management clearly was. Given the attraction of Hans
and Charles Renold to Taylorism [Boyns, 2001], it is possible
that if the company had never introduced Church’s system, they
may have begun to use standard costing somewhat earlier than
they did.
There is, however, a further paradox here. A number of
writers (e.g. Solomons [1952], Vangermeersch [1988]) have seen
Church’s system as an important precursor of the development
of standard costing but, at Renold, the use of budgetary control
and standard costing developed out of the failures of Church’s
system to cope in a simple and effective manner with the chang-
ing needs of the business. Furthermore, under the new system
implemented after the First World War, the basis of the method
of allocating allowable overhead expenses within the company’s
‘trading program by product’ was that of ‘cost scales’ derived
from special cost studies [M501/ 657.31 HR923/1]. While experi-
ence gained by the company’s costing and accounting staff in
operating the Church system proved beneficial in determining
these scales, under them, overheads were to be “related to the
wage cost of any item of product or process” [M501 920 RCG
921/1, p. 5]. Thus the experiment with the Church system, the
fundamental principle of which was to provide an alternative to
simple methods of allocating overheads based on a single factor,
be it as a percentage of labor or prime costs, failed, only for the
system to be replaced by one in which overheads were allocated
in precisely such a manner.22
22 This finding, therefore, is consistent with that of Johnson and Kaplan
[1987, pp. 127-128] who discerned a retrograde move around the time of the
First World War from sophisticated systems of overhead allocation aimed at
determining the costs, and hence profits, of individual products, to ones which
involved aggregated pools of overheads and direct-labor application thereof.
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A fifth and final paradox concerns the relationship between
the ideas of Church and Taylorism. Although Church’s emphasis
on the use of accounting to improve the efficiency of manage-
ment was in line with Taylor’s concept of the mental revolution,
the use of both Church’s method and Taylorism at Hans Renold
Ltd., at least at first, does not appear to have been totally in
keeping with these ideals. In reflecting on the initial experi-
ments with scientific management some 30 years after the
events, Charles Renold commented that: “It is noteworthy that a
movement which began with attention focussed on speeding up
individual workers ended with attention focussed on manage-
ment and the means of control, coupled with great attention to
the relationship between management and workers” [M501
650.05 HR938/1, f. 5].
It would appear, therefore, that senior management at
Renold did not fully realize the implications of the methods they
were adopting, at the time that they began to use them.23 In this
sense, Church’s warning that new systems would take time to
implement was correct,24 but perhaps for reasons additional to
those that he suggested, including the need for those adopting
them to understand their full implications. Indeed, the full de-
velopment of budgetary control and standard costing at Hans
Renold Ltd. did not occur overnight, and the system was sub-
jected to numerous changes over the succeeding years [Boyns et
al, 2000; Renold, 1950].
Conclusion: This study has shown clearly the problems that can
be faced by a pioneering user of new accounting systems, espe-
cially where the system adopted has not been fully thought
through, particularly in respect of its practical application. Vari-
ous pieces of evidence suggest that Renold may have been the
23 It is also possible that Taylorism may not have been totally applicable at
Renold. Charles Renold indicated that the company had begun to adopt
Taylorist ideas such as standardization, time study, incentive payments systems
c.1910 in the department producing wheels for chain driving, and this had been
extended to other departments between 1911 and 1914 and then during the war
to the production of munitions [M501 650.05 HR938/1, Notes on the develop-
ment of scientific management at Hans Renold Ltd., 24 January 1938, ff. 1-2].
However, Charles went on to note that the method adopted differed between
departments, and that the use of functional foremen had led to chaos, the com-
pany spending the period 1914 to 1921 “reconstructing the conception of man-
agement organisation” [ibid, f. 2].
24 This was also the view expressed by Hans Renold himself just before the
First World War [1913-14, pp. 23-27].
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initial experimental proving ground of Church’s scientific ma-
chine rate system and, if this is so, then the result was a negative
one. At Renold, Church’s system failed to live up to the claims
made for it, a fact which may help to explain why its broader,
long-term impact in the costing field appears to have been less
than that of other systems. It has long been recognized by ac-
countants and accounting historians that Church’s system was
flawed, especially in regard to the supplementary rate concept
[Solomons, 1952, p. 28], but it was also the practical operation
or, more correctly, increasing inoperability of Church’s system
at Renold which led to its replacement by standard costing and
budgetary control. It was not that Renold did not give the sys-
tem a chance. The system was operated for over 15 years, and
attempts were continuously made from 1908 to make the system
work more efficiently, but the rapidly changing circumstances
of the company, exacerbated by the effects of the upheaval to
production generated by the First World War, were beyond the
ability of the system to cope.
Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 128] have suggested that if
those operating the system at Hans Renold Ltd. had had avail-
able to them computers and electronic measuring equipment
then the outcome might have been different. Clearly this would
have eased the problem of the increased number of calculations
that became necessary over time, not least to reflect changing
conditions, but it is our contention that the problems went
deeper than this.25 Some aspects of Church’s system do not seem
to have been fully thought through, e.g. how to deal with selling
expenses, the precise way to allocate certain production factors,
the role of the supplementary rate, etc., and it was this which
led to the breakdown of the system and resulted in calls within
the company for a simpler and more effective costing and ac-
counting control system. It was these demands which gave rise
to the replacement of Church’s system by standard costing and
budgetary control. This move, like that of the development at
Renold of the use of organization charts and decimal charts of
accounts,26 was undoubtedly influenced by the ideas of scientific
management. However, these later developments were put into
25 Indeed, at the heart of the problem with Church’s system is the question
of whether or not there is any way of effectively allocating all overheads to
products in a meaningful manner.
26 At no stage did Church embrace such systems and his idea of an account-
ing chart was a diagram illustrating the flow of information through the various
ledgers and journals (see, for example, Church [1929], Fig. 145).
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effect not by a ‘professional business organizer’ like Church,27
but were developed in-house over “a number of years by men
grown up and engaged in the business during its existence of 34
years” [Renold, 1913-14, p. 29]. Although the trials and tribula-
tions of the First World War clearly played a part in the rise of
standard costing and budgetary control at Renold, it was
through the additional impetus that they gave to methods al-
ready being developed within the firm to overcome already ex-
isting problems and pressures, rather than through any explicit
impact of the costing requirements imposed by the Ministry of
Munitions.28
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Abstract: The relationship between accounting and governmentality,
and the increasing statutory regulation of companies by central gov-
ernment during the 19th century have attracted a great deal of atten-
tion from accounting historians. Conversely, accounting change
within local authorities in this period has attracted far less attention.
The paper examines the consequences of the increase in public ac-
countability of local authorities in England and Wales in the context
of the Newcastle Corporation, the body responsible for collecting and
distributing the town’s wealth. During the first half of the 19th cen-
tury Newcastle Corporation was heavily criticized for neglecting the
improvement of the River Tyne. The paper illustrates how the
Newcastle Corporation and those opposed to it used accounting as a
lobbying tool to promote their interests. Gallhofer and Haslam [2001,
p. 29] showed how, in the late 19th century, “radical political activ-
ists” used accounting data through the medium of the press as an
“emancipatory” practice. In many ways, the case of the improvement
of the River Tyne during the early 19th century also reveals the use of
accounting as an ‘emancipatory’ force by opposition groups. The pa-
per finds that the Corporation used accounting data to justify inac-
tion and the opposition used accounting data to promote its objec-
tives. These contests resulted in the control of the River Tyne being
taken from the Corporation and placed in the hands of a trust in
1850.
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between accounting and governmentality
during the 19th century is a key issue in the accounting lit-
erature. For example, Armstrong [1994, p. 41] describes how a
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“second generation of Foucault-inspired work” has explored the
role of accounting in facilitating governmental “action at a dis-
tance” [see also Callon, 1980; Latour, 1986, 1987; Miller and
O’Leary, 1989; Miller, 1990; Miller and O’Leary, 1990; Miller,
1991; Robson, 1991; Rose, 1991; Preston, 1992]. A more recent
example is Neu’s [1999, p. 79] study of the indigenous people of
Canada in the 19th century, which examined the contribution of
accounting to the British military machinery of empire. Neu
showed that it was only with the aid of accounting that “distant
territories and their occupants” could be governed by the Impe-
rial government in London.
The increasing statutory regulation of company accounts by
central government during the 19th century is another area that
has spawned many studies. Most historians concur with
Edwards et al [1997, p. 4] that “the emergence of the joint stock
company gave rise to the need for published accounting infor-
mation”. An early study by Hein [1978] and a more recent study
by Maltby [1999] examined regulation in the context of the de-
velopment of the accounting profession. Hein stated that it was
through statutory regulation that accounting control has often
been achieved [p. 75]. Maltby [1999] examined the “factors in
the emergence of a new jurisdiction” in relation to the establish-
ment of a statutory framework through the Joint Stock Compa-
nies Act, 1844 which provided the first statutory steps towards
accountability within companies, and the subsequent climb
down in 1856. Storrar and Pratt [2000] enhanced the study of
statutory regulation by considering “the causes of secrecy and
the circumstances in which it [UK company law] came into
conflict with accountability in registered companies in the UK
[1844-1904]” [p. 259]. They concluded that there was an increas-
ing acceptance by directors of the need for accountability to
investors but this often conflicted with the “perceived need for
commercial secrecy” [p. 285]. Jones and Aiken [1995, p. 78],
expanding on an earlier paper by Parker [1990], explained
changes in the statutory framework in the context of a “distinct
cultural evolution”.
Conversely, accounting change within local authorities dur-
ing the 19th century has attracted far less attention. Studies by
the Webbs [1906, 1908] and Fraser [1979] examined local gov-
ernment in Britain from the Glorious Revolution, 1688/9, to the
Municipal Reform Act, 1835, and during the Victorian era re-
spectively, from a distinctly political and economic point of
view. Moreover, the main accounting studies relating to ‘local
government’ have tended to take the form of an overview, some
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more detailed than others, of the statutory and accounting
changes over the century following the 1835 Act. Most notably,
Coombs and Edwards’ [1993, 1996] case studies describe the
accounting methods of several corporations and explain why
accounting changes occurred. They also looked at the account-
ing procedures implemented by the evolving professional bodies
which, by the end of the 19th century, started to form what we
now call public sector accountants. Other studies have been pro-
duced by Edwards [1992] and Jones [1989, 1992].
There have been a handful of studies of particular corpora-
tions. Livock [1965], for example, produced a descriptive analy-
sis focusing on the progress and development of the accounting
system of the Bristol Corporation for the years 1532-1835, but
did not venture beyond the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. There
has been one study of the Newcastle Corporation. Halcrow
[1953] wrote two papers in the “Mr. Treasurer” series in the
Local Government Finance Journal. Her papers provide a de-
scriptive outline of the development of the accounting and ad-
ministrative role of the Common Council from the earliest ex-
tant records to 1835. Halcrow clearly shows that it was the
Common Council who controlled the administration of the
town’s finance by issuing orders “no less than royal charters”
[p. 151]. Again, however, the study did not go beyond the 1835
Act and into what Coombs and Edwards [1993, 1996], Edwards
[1992] and Jones [1989, 1992] would describe as the ‘watershed’
years in the way that local authorities approached accounting.
The current study explores the consequences of the increase
in public accountability of local authorities in England and
Wales in the context of the Newcastle Corporation and the im-
provement of the River Tyne in the first half of the 19th century,
a subject not previously examined. During this period, New-
castle Corporation became increasingly accountable for the river
with the publication of accounting data. This data was exploited
by an ever-expanding opposition who objected to the continuing
neglect of the River Tyne and its port facilities. Even though the
majority of the Corporation’s income came from the river, only
a small amount was expended on its improvement. There had
been pressure amongst traders to improve the river early on, but
it was only with the publication by the Corporation of annual
accounts of receipts and payments that the extent of the neglect
became visible and the opposition, comprising members of the
press, corporation and interested parties from the localities,
gathered forces and change was ultimately achieved.
The study takes the issue of local authority accounting
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further. It illustrates how the municipal reforms that took place
(most importantly during the first half of the 19th century)
allowed both opposition and councils to use accounting as a
lobbying tool to promote their interests. As will be seen, opposi-
tion to the Newcastle Corporation utilized accounting data to
place a great deal of pressure on the Corporation. It did so
through the mediums of public meetings, petitioning and, most
importantly, voicing claims through the press. Newcastle Corpo-
ration, on the other hand, reciprocated by using the accounting
data to justify their inaction over the River Tyne. Therefore, the
study supports the hypothesis that accounts are used to promote
economic interests, irrespective of the explicit purpose for
which that information was prepared [Watts and Zimmermann,
1979; Oldroyd, 2001].
The field research for this study consisted primarily of an
examination of the archival records and minutes relating to the
River Tyne and Newcastle Corporation. These are found in the
Tyne and Wear Archives and in the local studies sections of
Newcastle upon Tyne Central Library and University of
Newcastle upon Tyne Library.
The study is organized as follows. The next section de-
scribes the historical background to the study. The third section
looks at the development of accounting within Newcastle Corpo-
ration and other local authorities in the early part of the 19th
century. Section four explains the Corporation’s reluctance to
improve the River Tyne. The final section draws together the
main arguments and focuses on the Corporation’s use of ac-
counting data to justify inaction, and the opposition’s use of
accounting data in promoting their interests. It is argued that
the outcomes of this conflict were parliamentary bills and ‘Ad-
miralty Enquiries’ in 1849 and the eventual decision to place the
control of the Tyne in the hands of a trust in 1850.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1600, Queen Elizabeth’s “Great Charter” gave monopoly
control over the coal trade and principal council offices in
Newcastle to the Hostmans’ Company1 in return for a shilling
tax on every chaldron (a measurement of coal) of coal shipped
1 Mackenzie [1827, pp. 703-704] traces the Hostmans’ Company’s origin
back to a statute of Henry IV, in 1404 where they “seem to have been a kind of
mediator between buyers and sellers”. They loaded and unloaded the trade, at
this time the bulk of which was coal and stones.
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from the River Tyne. Six years later the Hostmans’ Company
gained the right to exercise Admiralty jurisdiction over the Tyne
and with this came the responsibility to improve and maintain
the river. Trinity House, which was established in London by
royal charter in 1514, had control over the ports in the areas of
London, Newcastle, Hull and Leith. Comprised of masters,
pilots, seamen and merchant navy captains, its role was to regu-
late pilotage on the Tyne as well as act as a general lighthouse
authority and charitable organization for the relief of mariners.
In Newcastle: “The river jury2 (who sat in the Court of Admi-
ralty) was formerly composed of the gentlemen of the trinity-
house, who were by far the fittest men for the purpose . . . the
corporation thwarted the river jury, that the corporation com-
plied with many requests which the river jury had refused to
comply with and that, in consequence of all this, the river jury of
trinity-house gentlemen gave up in disgust . . . then were suc-
ceeded by the cobblers, tailors, saddlers, slaters, smiths and the
like [appointed by the Corporation]” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 17].
During the latter part of the 17th century, political alle-
giance played a large part in the make-up of the Newcastle Cor-
poration. Following the resignation of the brethren of Trinity
House, the Corporation was free to use its ancient electionary
powers to fill the positions available on the river jury with men
from the mysteries and societies3 of Newcastle who favored their
views. Consequently, at the time of Mitchell’s writing, the river
jury was composed of “only two or three . . . [who] know any
better how to conserve the navigation than they know how to
navigate a ship to New Zealand” [ibid, p.12]. As a result, the
River Tyne remained neglected and there was very little change
in the way the Corporation was directed and controlled in
2 This jury was made up of members from the various trades and bye-trades
[see footnote 3]. The majority were not qualified in river matters but made up
the corporation committees by virtue of their position in political society. They
were responsible and Mitchell [1823, p. 18] implies subservient, to the corpora-
tion and for conservatorship of the Tyne.
3 There were 12 Companies called Mysteries, representing groups of traders.
These were Merchants, Mercers, Drapers, Skinners, Tailors, Saddlers, Bakers
and Brewers, Tanners, Cordwainers, Butchers, Smiths, Fullers and Dyers. The
earliest trade incorporated in 1436 (Smiths) and the last in 1621 (Butchers).
There were also 15 societies called Bye-Trades. These were not Mysteries. These
were Mariners, Weavers, Barber Surgeons, Cutlers, Shipwrights, Coopers, House
Carpenters, Masons, Glovers, Joiners, Millers, Curriers, Paviours, Slaters and
Glaziers. The earliest trade incorporated in 1426 (Coopers) and the last in 1656
(Paviours).
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Newcastle until well into the early part of the 19th century when
the political climate started to change.
The Corporation was aware of the navigation problems of
the river as large sums of money were spent on assessing the
conditions of the Tyne. The most significant report was by John
Rennie, canal and river engineer, costing in excess of £2,000.
His report as to “the best mode of improving its navigation”,
produced in 1816, was to be a “benchmark” for the future im-
provement of the Tyne [River Committee, 1836]. However, his
cost estimate for improving the river of £519,320 (more than ten
times their annual total receipts) dominated the Corporation’s
attitude towards carrying out any major improvement for years
to come. It was recently commented: “The cost of his scheme
was of major concern to the city and erring on the side of cau-
tion, the report was accepted but no action taken” [Port of Tyne,
1999, p. 43].
The state of the River Tyne, described as a “cursed horse
pond” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 27] in the late 18th century, worsened
through the inaction of the Corporation. There are numerous
accounts of traders complaining to the Corporation that ships
were running aground and or unable to get into the port due to
the silting up of the river. Damage was being done to ships. The
comment of one trader was typical: “It [is] a most difficult thing
to charter a vessel in the Mediterranean, though coppered . . .
they said they received greater injury to their bottom in the
Tyne, than at any other place they went to; and that its repair
cost more than any addition which was made to the freight”
[Newcastle Town Council Proceedings (NTCP), 1840, p. 9].
Despite such complaints the Newcastle Corporation re-
mained unmoved. As Guthrie [1880, p. 5] explained “The press-
ing necessity for enlarged harbor facilities to meet the require-
ments of modern commerce, and to withstand the competition
of other ports was, apparently, not sufficiently felt. There seems
likewise to have been a . . . great fear that the town’s revenue
would be uselessly squandered in embarking on such an enter-
prise”.
In Newcastle foreign trade started to increase towards the
end of the 1830s when the doors were opened to trade with
India, China and the Levant. Improved shipping technology and
design enabled ships to carry more and at a faster rate, increas-
ing the volume of trade, especially with Germany and Holland.
However, the Tyne was not well placed to take advantage of this.
One councillor commented that “The River did not afford that
accommodation to the increasing commerce and trade of the
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port, which was imperatively demanded” [NTCP, 1839, p. 5]. A
report of the Newcastle Corporation’s Committee on Trade
stated “The most obvious means of increasing the trade of the
port, within the power of the Council, is the improvement of the
River” [ibid]. A comment made in the Tyne Mercury [1833],
shows that rivers were being better managed elsewhere, such as
on the River Clyde where “[River dues] are kept distinct from
the Corporation’s funds, and are laid out in deepening and im-
proving the river and harbour and in discharging the debt of the
trust” [Tyne Mercury, 1833].
Trade figures from Johnson and Aughton [1925, p. 40] show
that greater improvements occurred after 1850, when, by an Act
of Parliament, control of the River Tyne was taken from the
Corporation and given to a body named the Tyne Improvement
Commission purposely created to control the affairs of the river.
The number of foreign vessels trading inwards to the port was
708 in 1843 and 1477 in 1863. The number of foreign vessels
trading outwards from the port was 4088 in 1843 and 8074 in
1863.
What the Corporation did spend money on prior to 1850 in
the name of improvement was called “Pound Foolish” expendi-
ture because it did not improve the River Tyne. For example, the
purchase of a dredger, was described in the press as a “DESPI-
CABLE machine which, at an expense of £3,000 . . . is only fit to
clean out a gentleman’s fish-pond, and perhaps not that” [Tyne
Mercury, 1838]. Mackenzie [1827] tells us that the Corporation
“were so far roused to a sense of their duty” as to employ Rennie
and presumably the same went for Cubbit. Engineers, who were
asked to report on the condition and improvement of the Tyne,
often had little local knowledge and although their engineering
abilities could be applied to any locality their commercial and
financial knowledge could not: “[They] had not sufficient knowl-
edge of the traffic on the river to offer any opinion respecting it”
[NTCP, 1838, p. 6]. These engineers’ estimates for improvement,
based on vastly inflated London prices, created an over-prudent
Corporation and caused it to err on the side of caution. This was
the case in Rennie’s report of 1816 and in Cubitt’s report of
1837:
Extending the quay and applying the dredging machine
to the river . . . the sum [required] would alarm the
Council . . . Mr Cubitt calculated that the works could
not be conducted together at a less annual sum than
10,000l . . . (Councillor Doubleday) and the River Com-
mittee also, were of opinion that the two designs could
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be carried into execution at an annual sum consider-
ably less: and this opinion they grounded on the fact of
having made enquiries of builders and others, as to the
prices of stone, labour etc. in this part of the kingdom
as compared with the prices in London, on which Mr
Cubitt had formed his estimates [NTCP,1837, p. 1].
The River Tyne was seen as requiring huge investment be-
fore any great benefit could be obtained, and the Corporation
prioritized town and other expenses out of their limited funds.
The Corporation often directing whatever expenditure it liked
for the improvement of the town:
It had been proposed to build new Town Courts, Corpo-
rate Offices and Judge’s Lodging House . . . [One coun-
cillor] had been astonished to hear one gentleman say,
that not only might the ground in question be involved
in this expenditure, but that they might expend any
sum they pleased upon it — while the river Tyne, from
which they derived the greatest portion of their rev-
enues, and upon the improvement of which a large por-
tion should consequently be expended, was to be left
entirely out of consideration [NTCP, 1838, p. 22].
Local and resident engineers also produced reports on the
condition and improvement of the River Tyne, but perhaps it
was felt by the Corporation that these men were not of sufficient
standing to arouse opposition to their policy on the river. Conse-
quently, eminent engineers were brought in to survey a river
Tyne which everyone recognized was in need of huge invest-
ment. The scale of the investment required meant that the Cor-
poration would not be able to avoid debt and reduce costs, a
policy they strongly adhered to. All the time and money spent on
engineers’ reports was arguably wasted as, more often than not,
the reports were buried and little, if any, action was taken to
improve this vital artery of commerce.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
IN LOCAL AUTHORITIES
At the beginning of the period of this study “Corporations
were private rather than public institutions, responsible to their
members, the freemen, rather than to the citizens at large and
committed to property interests rather than to the welfare of the
town” [Fraser, 1979, p. 2]. Each corporation had its own ap-
proach to accounting. As far as Newcastle Corporation was con-
cerned, accounting techniques were “firmly established in medi-
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eval times” and the main focus of its financial management was
to avoid debt and minimize costs [Halcrow, 1953, p. 152]. The
state of the accounts prior to 1809 “showed the total receipts,
total payments and the balance at the end of the year in three
lines” [NTCP, 1833, p. 86]. The County Rate Act, 1815 required
local authorities to publish their accounts. Halcrow [1953, p.
200] tells us that it was at this time that pressure was placed on
Newcastle Corporation to publish its accounts: “In the early de-
cades of the 19th century it was recognized that there was room
for improvement in the methods of book-keeping . . . a number
of petitions addressed to the Common Council by the Stewards
of the Incorporated Companies focused attention on the ac-
counts and prepared the way for change”.
Until their publication in pamphlet form by the Newcastle
Corporation from 1818, the accounts could only be inspected by
Companies and Freemen4 and “only a very few copies of the
Corporation accounts are printed annually from a statement
given to the stewards by their auditors” [Mackenzie, 1827, p.
640]. There were 24 auditors in total, two from each of the 12
mysteries. The auditors were often elected by “attending the
election meeting” [ibid, p. 637] rather than according to ability.
They were often the subject of severe criticism:
During many years the auditors placed large sums under
one head, without any proper explanation . . . merely signed the
chamber-clerks general account, as entered into the book, with-
out examining either bills or receipts . . . (a) consequence of this
neglect of duty in the auditors, negligence and corruption began
to creep into the revenue department of the Corporation, until at
length a spirit of dissatisfaction spread through the whole bur-
gesses [ibid].
In 1809 most of the mysteries nominated men who “ap-
peared willing and qualified to fulfil their oath”5 [ibid] and the
unsatisfactory accounting procedures of the past were exposed.
For example, auditors found substantial arrears due to the
Corporation. They also discovered accounts from former years
4 All members of the Newcastle Corporation were Freemen and had vested
interests in the town. They elected the Common Council and monopolised the
powers and offices of town government before the 1835 reform.
5 The role of the auditors as defined by the Town Clerk of Newcastle at the
1834 Municipal Corporation Investigation was as follows: “they audit and com-
pare all accounts with the vouchers, and see that there is an order from the
governing body for each payment. These are their admitted functions; but they
take upon themselves to make recommendations to the common council”.
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that had never been closed and on which it was resolved “that
the whole accounts be laid before us this year, or we will not
sign the book” [1809, Auditors report of proceedings]. After a
short dispute with the Corporation, the auditors obtained the
remaining books and accounts requested and were able to com-
plete the audit. In 1823 “the accounts were published in a pam-
phlet form and all the details clearly arranged under distinct
heads” [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 641]. Cook [1961] adds that “In
1830 the auditors secured the publication in full of the corpora-
tion accounts . . . this was a substantial victory in a battle that
had lasted since 1809” [p. 222].
Accounting reform occurred at different times across the
U.K. Glamorgan Corporation’s accounts were published in the
Bristol Gazette in 1793.6 Nottingham Corporation’s accounts
were available for inspection by local freemen in 1795.
Middlesex Corporation first printed accounts in 1815 and
Liverpool Corporation did so in 1816 “as a result of popular
agitation” [Livock, 1965, p. 100]. The early 19th century saw
increasing resentment that political power in the municipalities
was in the hands of a wealthy few. This sparked the move for a
‘Municipal Investigation’ and new corporations were formed un-
der the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. This Act applied to 184
English and Welsh boroughs and attempted to bring corpora-
tions more in line with the social and demographic changes
brought about by industrial progress and ultimately make them
more accountable to the ratepayers.
Prior to 1835, charge and discharge accounting was widely
used in many boroughs. However, Coombs and Edwards [1996,
p. 48] comment that some boroughs also used double entry
bookkeeping because “Charge/discharge accounting proved in-
adequate to meet the needs of municipal corporations due to the
number, nature and rapidly expanding range of transactions un-
dertaken during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries”.
After a second statute was passed in 1835, the Municipal
Corporations Act, corporations were obliged to produce an an-
nual return of receipts and expenditure and “a full abstract of
his [the Treasurer’s] accounts” to be available for inspection and
purchase by the ratepayers “on payment of a reasonable price
for each copy” [Municipal Corporations Act (MCA) 1835, S.93].
6 It is likely that they were published in Bristol as well as Glamorgan be-
cause Bristol was the main trading centre in the south west of England.
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The Act did not mention the form the abstract should take but
did state that it “should show all monies received . . . and dis-
bursed” [ibid, S.60]. Furthering the accountability of corpora-
tions, ratepayers could also inspect the corporation’s books, ac-
counts and minutes. However, as Edwards [1992, p. 68] tells us
“the amount of financial information these contained varied
considerably from one authority to another”.
One can clearly see from the accounts of the Newcastle
Corporation, [see Figures 1-4], great improvement in the level of
detailed disclosure, rendering the activities of the Corporation
more open to social and political debate. In 1809 [Figure 1] the
accounts, in a receipts and disbursements format, show very
little detail. Most notable is the disbursement title “General Pay-
ments” with a large sum of £16,413 (nearly half the total
amount) and no further explanation. By the time of the first
publication nine years later, of accounts in a “Receipts” and
“Payments” form, there had been some improvement in the level
of disclosure [Figure 2]. In 1833-1835, the accounts were headed
“Charge” and “Discharge” for the first time and the printed cop-
ies contained printed names which acted as a signature of the
accounts for the year ending 1835 [Figure 3]. One noticeable
feature of the accounts is the attention to detail on the “Pay-
ments” side, with added notes of explanation. By the end of the
period of study, the level of disclosure was much greater than in
previous years [Figure 4].
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
As a product of the 1835 Act, the newly formed Newcastle
Corporation consisted of men from a wide range of business
activities — booksellers, tanners, bankers, printers, manufactur-
ers, lawyers, doctors, but only one shipowner. The Corporation
had no representation from other towns located on the River
Tyne. Towns such as South and North Shields and Gateshead
were desperate to see the river improved. Further, the represen-
tation of nautical and trading interests on the Corporation will-
ing to voice concerns about the river was not significant. Most
representatives enjoyed the power they gained from their corpo-
rate position and remained silent on the subject of river im-
provement to remain popular with the rate-paying voters. The
majority of the Newcastle Corporation elect, made up of ‘56
gentlemen’; had substantial property interests in the town and
preferred efficient roadways and local utilities to river improve-
ment: “The Municipal Corporation, which owned and taxed the
63
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200356
F
IG
U
R
E
 1
N
ew
ca
st
le
 C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
 A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 1
8
0
8
/9
S
ou
rc
e:
 [
F
ig
s.
 1
-4
],
 N
ew
ca
st
le
 C
or
p
or
at
io
n
, 1
84
9,
 A
n
 A
cc
ou
n
t 
of
 t
h
e 
gr
os
s 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
n
di
tu
re
 o
f 
th
e 
C
or
po
ra
ti
on
 o
f 
N
ew
ca
st
le
 u
po
n
 T
yn
e 
as
pu
bl
is
h
ed
 a
n
n
u
al
ly
 f
or
 t
h
e 
la
st
 f
or
ty
 y
ea
rs
, N
ew
ca
st
le
: H
u
gh
 M
cC
ol
l.
64
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/11
57Brackenborough: ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise’ System
F
IG
U
R
E
 2
N
ew
ca
st
le
 C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
 A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 1
8
1
7
/8
65
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200358
F
IG
U
R
E
 3
N
ew
ca
st
le
 C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
 A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 1
8
3
4
/5
66
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/11
59Brackenborough: ‘Pound Foolish Penny Wise’ System
F
IG
U
R
E
 4
N
ew
ca
st
le
 C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
 A
cc
o
u
n
ts
 1
8
4
7
/8
67
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 200360
harbour represented none of these interests, and by reason of its
legal rights to devote the proceeds of its petty customs duties for
its own advantage, was even pecuniary biased against them all”
[Webb, 1908, p. 724].
An article in the Tyne Mercury [1833] clearly shows the un-
derlying reason why the Newcastle Corporation adopted a policy
of inaction:
The annual average receipts of the Corporation for the
eighteen years immediately preceding 1827, amounted
to £38,142 while the annual balance in the hutch7 [the
amount left-over at the end of the year] never exceeded
£2,000. Now if nearly one-half their income were cur-
tailed [i.e. to be expended on the improvement of the
river], it is manifest that their power, and various influ-
ence, would be considerably broken down . . . [due to
less revenue available] this is sufficient to explain what
has so long been a paradox to the public, namely, that
many members of the Corporation, who are largely en-
gaged in trade and manufactures, and are fully aware of
the great general benefit that would result from the im-
provement of the river, do, not withstanding, in their
corporate capacity, refuse their concurrence to any very
expensive scheme of amendment, and thus, so far,
counteract their individual private interests. They make
this sacrifice rather than see the pomp and glory of the
Corporation reduced to depend on £20,000 a year, or
that their patronage should be in the least diminished.
PROMOTION OF INTERESTS THROUGH ACCOUNTS
The main argument of the paper is that it was the publica-
tion of accounts that made the neglect of the River Tyne visible
to an emerging opposition (the press, councillors and petitioners
mainly headed by the people of Shields). Further, that responsi-
bility for the improvement of the river was taken from the Cor-
poration and, in 1850, as a result of pressure, was placed in the
hands of the Tyne Improvement Commission. However, the Cor-
poration also used the accounts to justify its own inaction. The
paper now examines these issues under three sub-headings: the
7 “A large chest (that contained the town’s money) with nine separate locks,
each of a different pattern. The mayor and each of the eight chamberlains (they
were elected from amongst the burgesses and assisted the clerks of the chamber)
had a key so that the chest could not be opened unless all nine were present
together” [Halcrow, 1953, p. 152].
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case for change, the defense by the Corporation, and the pro-
ceedings of the Admiralty Enquiry that, ultimately, dealt the
final blow.
The Case for Change: Early accounts of opposition to the
Newcastle Corporation’s reluctance to improve the River Tyne
can be traced to the 17th century when a series of papers titled
“Conservatorship of the River Tyne” appeared [published 1849].
The line of argument centered on the physical condition of the
river. It was Captain Phipps, a well-respected 18th century mari-
ner, who considered the Tyne to be “capable of becoming one of
the finest rivers in the world, but which ignorance, inattention,
and avarice” had converted into what he called a “cursed horse
pond!” [Mitchell, 1823, p. 27]. In another instance, a call was
made for a public general meeting because “the navigation is
likely to sustain much further injury” unless action was taken. It
was intended that “nobility, gentry, merchants, coal owners and
ship owners and all other interested in preserving the navigation
of the river Tyne will attend” [Lawson, 1799].
Publication of annual accounts enhanced the accountability
of the Corporation to the rate-payers. It was during the 1830s
that the financial arguments came to the fore which were to
dominate the battle for the power over the River Tyne. A peti-
tion was made to King William by the free burgesses of
Newcastle upon Tyne in 1832. This was during the election of
the Common Council and a majority of the burgesses8, tired of
the “Toryism in Newcastle” [Cook, 1965, p. 212], were “in favour
of upsetting the controlling power of the Common Council”
[ibid, pp. 225-226]. The petition asked for an enquiry to be es-
tablished into the mismanagement and poor state of the river.
The petition was littered with proofs and references to the pub-
lished annual accounts. For example, an extract from the peti-
tion read:
It appears from the accounts . . . that from the year
1821 to 1831, both years inclusive, a period of 11 years,
the sum of 217,833l. 1s. 83⁄4d. has been received by the
corporation of Newcastle (relating to the river income)
. . . that the paltry sum of 1,265l. 12s. 9d. only, was
during the period, expended in either improving the
navigation of the river, or facilitating shipping, trade,
8 “An inhabitant charged with the defence of the place in which he lived,
and, in return for his military services, was entitled to certain privileges and
immunities” [Mackenzie, 1827, p. 652].
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and commerce, or in deepening the bed of the river or
otherwise . . . [While] a clear revenue of upward of six-
teen thousand pounds is yearly drained from the public
without any check [Macgregor, 1832, p. 4].
The monetary values used in the petition were based on the
authority of Mackenzie’s History of Newcastle [1827] and stated
that: “During the three years preceding 1827, the Corporation
received from the river £74,764 . . . out of which was paid
£22,472 . . . leaving £49,291 . . . or an average annual income of
£17,291 . . . deduct £1,291 . . . for the salaries of the harbour
master and petty officers employed on the river, there will re-
main a sum of £16,000 a year available to the improvement of
the river” [ibid, pp.18-19].
Prior to the 1835 Act the Corporation kept all dues and
revenues in one general account. With the majority of the rev-
enue generated from the Tyne and no distinction in the general
account to the source of this revenue, it was difficult to deter-
mine what funds were generated from the river and less likely to
be returned. This revenue was administered with “cool and in-
exorable partiality” towards the town [Tyne Mercury, 1833].
However, the neglect of the Tyne in favor of the town be-
came even clearer when the new form of keeping the accounts
was made public by the newly reformed Corporation and when
revenues were classified under different heads and in more de-
tail. Extant accounting information showed clearly how reluc-
tant the Corporation was to direct any substantial expenditure
towards the improvement of the River Tyne [see Figures 1-4],
even though there was great pressure from a growing opposition
for them to do so: “We cannot wonder that feelings of the public
should be most sensitive on a port of such vital importance to
the interests of the community at large” [Armstrong, 1836, p. 1]
One of the main activists using the accounting data was
William Mitchell. He wrote during the 1820s and 30s in the Tyne
Mercury under the alias of “Tim Tunbelly” or “Peter Putright”.
The letters of the former were later compiled and published in a
book [Mitchell, 1823]. Mitchell invited comments and promoted
awareness through the medium of the press. Gallhofer and
Haslam, [2001, p. 29] showed how in the late 19th century “radi-
cal political activists” used accounting data through the medium
of the press as an “emancipatory” rather than “repressive . . .
praxis” and they noted “how few studies have [articulated] ac-
counting in the context of social struggle”. In many ways, the
opposition in the case of the River Tyne during the early 19th
century, also used the press as an ‘emancipatory’ force. Cook
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[1965, p. 213] refers to Mitchell as a “Radical journalist” who
was antagonistic towards the Tory regime. Mitchell attempted to
increase public awareness of the state of the Tyne, stimulate
opposition against current practice and thus encourage positive
action to improve the river and benefit Newcastle as a whole.
Mitchell [1823, p. 121] commented that: “The corporation has
received this year [1822] the enormous sum of £19,148.6s.7d.
from dues, &c. from the Tyne. Have they, then, expended a
single farthing on the improvement of that river? There is no
notice of any such expenditure in the accounts!”
The development of the argument for change can be seen
from a petition which was lodged with the Corporation almost
20 years later by 120 of the oldest and most respected mer-
cantile firms, bankers and tradesmen of the borough. They
complained that the large proportion of the Corporation’s rev-
enue derived from the river but was not allocated fairly. The
river was not being improved to enable new trading relations to
prosper. From the published accounts the petitioners found that
the gross revenue from the Tyne during 1837-1839 was
£79,575.6s.4d., and the total expenditure on improvements only
£35,168.9s.7d. This meant that there was on average an excess
of £14,802 each year from the river but which was spent else-
where. The petitioners then examined the level of rates levied on
the town and found that £10,689 was raised but £28,418 ex-
pended on the service of the town, such as improvement, water-
ing, lighting, and scavenging. This meant that on average an
excess of £5,909 each year was spent on the town but not raised
by the town.
Opposition also came from disaffected councilors who were
aware of the the handsome return the Corporation received
from the River Tyne. They pressed hard in Corporation meetings
for further revenues to be voted to the River Committee. These
councillors made liberal reference to the accounts when making
their case. One councillor said:
Let then [the Corporation] take the book of their re-
ceipts and expenditure, and ask themselves where the
revenue which they had to expend came from? In the
balance sheet, the first class of receipts were, port and
harbour dues on coals, ships and boat, goods and mer-
chandise, and for conveying ballast by which 19,975l.
were brought to account. Now that large sum came
directly out of the river. If the river were dried up to-
morrow, not one farthing of that 19,900l. would they
get [NTCP, 1839, p. 8].
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Further, a ‘Statement Respecting the Port of Newcastle
upon Tyne’ by Dyson, Hall and Parkes, Parliamentary Agents,
1840 stated “The complaints made of the present system seem
borne by the statements of the official servants of the Corpora-
tion (who used the accounts) as well as by their published ac-
counts”. Another councillor considered that: “The Council
would not find a safer nor a better investment; and he was not
alone in thinking that it was to the river they must look for
improved commerce and trade in this port; and that they should
be careful to augment the great artery which supplied them with
the larger part of their revenue” [NTCP, 1845, p. 74].
One councillor in particular (Straker), who was a Newcastle
merchant and user of the River Tyne, was a very outspoken
member of the Corporation. He used information in the ac-
counts as a basis for his allegations against certain members of
the Corporation over a number of years and accused the engi-
neer of the river with mismanagement, misconduct, jobbery,
and waste. When altering a road in a field at Walker “which cost
a considerable sum, and no account of it in the engineer’s ac-
counts” the amount was entered in the groins account, i.e. a
river account. Straker held that the alteration had nothing to do
with the groins, and thus the river, but was made for the conve-
nience of a public house and should not be placed in this ac-
count. The River Committee knew nothing about this expendi-
ture supposedly made by them: “It surely cannot be understood,
that when money is given for the river, it is to be wasted in this
matter” [NTCP, 1839, p. 103]. The River Committee itself also
came under heavy fire, it being “were not particular in the ex-
penditure of the money awarded to them. They gave in an esti-
mate for one thing, and spent the money upon another” [NTCP,
1841, p.122]. Further, “the River Committee had all along mis-
managed matters. A great sum had been lost . . . Hunter’s Quay
had been pulled down four times and rebuilt” [NTCP, 1842, p.
122].
Even though these allegations were not proven, the episode,
which was highly publicized at well-attended public meetings
and in the local newspapers, increased the distrust in the
Corporation’s accountability.
Strong opposition also came from interested parties using
the Tyne in areas surrounding Newcastle who did not have a
voice on the Corporation. The towns of the Shields and Gates-
head strongly argued that the river suffered due to the relative
financial advantage of the inhabitants of Newcastle over their
neighbors. The “petty jealousy of sister towns” influenced
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Newcastle councillors who were unwilling to spend what they
saw as Newcastle income on other towns on the river [Mac-
gregor, 1832, p. 117]. It was argued that the seaward boroughs
“just influence in the confederation [be] heartily acknowledged”
and the “incubus of clerical seigniorage put to flight” before any
working agreement could be reached [ibid]. “Down to 1848 all
Custom business for the port had to be transacted at Newcastle,
no matter where the vessel loaded, although North and South
Shields together owned more shipping than Newcastle, and the
greater part of Tyne based vessels loaded and discharges in
Shields harbour” [Hodgson, 1903, p. 199].
It was considered a “great hardship that [the Shields towns]
should be compelled to pay for landing goods at Newcastle
which do not come within ten miles of it” [NTCP, 1834, p. 47].
The relentless petitioning by the people of Shields finally paid
off in 1848 when the Port of Newcastle was split — Port of Tyne
and Port of Shields — and an extra controller was established at
North Shields. A year later the people of Shields petitioned the
House of Commons for total independence from Newcastle on
the basis that: “1st, that this body had mismanaged the river;
2ndly, that it had grossly misappropriated its revenue; and
3rdly, that the powers and authorities by which these deeds had
been committed, should be transferred to new hands” [NTCP,
1849, pp. 50-51].
The Defense of the Corporation: Just as information in the pub-
lished accounts was used to attack the inaction of the Corpora-
tion, the same accounts were utilized by the Corporation to jus-
tify their lack of expenditure on the River Tyne. The accounting
data was used in support of the Corporation’s “Penny Wise”
system of avoiding debt and reducing costs based. One river
engineer, Richardson [1836, p.10], reporting on the Tyne com-
mented that “The first report of the Financial Committee has
been published and shows plainly enough, that any considerable
outlay for the improvement of the River, is wholly impracti-
cable” as the Corporation’s funds were not adequate. However,
in his concluding comments Richardson acknowledged that
“where improvement is practicable, it would be unwise to with-
hold the attempt given any over scrupulous consideration of
expense, for in the preservation, if not the improvement of the
navigation of the Tyne, Newcastle is entirely dependent” [ibid,
p.15].
The Corporation vote, dominated by the purse holders (the
Finance Committee), believed that the river was improved
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enough to accommodate increasing trade. The accounts also
proved that there was no money to fund further improvement. It
was also argued that “They could not borrow money for the
river. It was contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Municipal
Reform Act. They were not to expend capital for outlay over
revenue” [NTCP, 1839, p. 3]. The Municipal Reform Act, 1835
stated that revenues that ought to be applied for the public ad-
vantage should not be diverted from their legitimate use, and
not be squandered for the benefit of individuals. The ‘spirit’ of
the Act refers to corporations using their revenue appropriately
instead of spending it wastefully and making up shortfalls by
borrowing. At a Finance Committee meeting, one councillor
commented that the Corporation “had expended more than their
revenue by 4000l. during the last 4 years, and had run that much
in debt. Now was it not more prudent to pay off a portion of that
balance, than to go on running into more debt?” [NTCP, Dec
1845, p. 60]. This councillor later criticized the River Committee
for continuously over-spending their allocated budget. He also
claimed that the expenditure of the River Committee brought no
benefit: “Why, there was no possibility of binding them down to
their allotted revenue; much less to any intelligible or tangible
plan of expending it upon the river. The Corporation would not
only be condemned, but justly so, if they continued to disburse
enormous sums upon the river, year after year, from which,
after all, no proportionate or substantial benefit was derived”
[ibid, pp. 72-73].
More pressure was placed on the limited funds for river
improvement in 1846. The usual policy of the Finance Commit-
tee of the Newcastle Corporation, was to estimate total revenue,
make allocations for “unavoidable” expenses and divide the re-
mainder (often equally) between the River and Town Improve-
ment Committees. The Corporation was able to justify their
policy of revenue allocation through what was considered a
“more wholesome principle” to their budgeting system, the cre-
ation of a surplus fund of £2,000 to cover any “unexpected calls
upon the corporate funds”, “public improvement” or to “be ap-
plied in the reduction of the debt” [NTCP, 1846, pp. 379-380].
This approach reduced the funds available for river improve-
ment further. However, the policy was overhauled in 1849 due
to the far poorer state of the Corporation finances: “The Finance
Committee do not think it prudent to appropriate more of that
amount than can by possibility be avoided [and so the Commit-
tees were], limited as nearly as possible to the amount of their
fixed charges. . . . The Finance Committee are aware that such a
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limitation would put a stop to all river works” [NTCP, 1849,
p.14]. By the end of the 1840s the Corporation’s inaction in
improving the River Tyne had reached breaking point.
Admiralty Enquiry: Dissatisfaction over the conditions and con-
trol of the river became so acute that in 1849 a parliamentary
bill was deposited by the people of Shields opposed to the
Newcastle Corporation’s inaction. This proposed to take river
dues and control of the Tyne out of the hands of the Corporation
of Newcastle and entrust them to Commissioners elected for the
purpose. The Corporation, seeing the opposition’s bill as a threat
to what they viewed as their “hereditary rights to river dues”,
and fearful of losing the voting power and revenues from the
river to a Commission representing interested parties outside
Newcastle, framed their own bill — The Tyne Improvement Bill,
1849. In the latter it was argued (as before) that under the con-
cept of prudence, there were insufficient funds to increase ex-
penditure on the river and in any case the Corporation were
doing enough. The opposing bills sparked two ‘Admiralty Enqui-
ries’ in 1849. The minutes of Newcastle Corporation during the
time of the first ‘Enquiry’ typically show the Corporation’s atti-
tude:
. . . it is evident that change is going on [to the river] . . .
the assertion that the expenditure upon the river
formed a good investment for money, involved a bad
principle . . . investments should be made advisedly, not
incidentally . . . he believed that [the river would not be
taken from their control] unless the Council became lax
and inattentive [NTCP, 1849, p. 47].
Captain Washington headed the investigation into the man-
agement and condition of the River Tyne. He gave an account of
the various river dues collected by the Corporation and the man-
ner in which they had been expended. Ultimately, it was ac-
counting data that was chiefly drawn on in these investigations.
The enquiry found:
That on average for the past seven years the income
derived from the river has exceeded 26,000l a year,
while the sum laid out in improvements has been less
than 5,000l a year. . . . From an inspection of the
Corporation’s accounts of the last year it seems that the
receipts from the river were 27,907l and the expendi-
ture, including salaries &c. 10,824l, showing a balance
otherwise appropriated of rather more than 17,000l. In
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the column of payments it will be seen that the cost of
watching the borough for the past year was 6,229l,
whereas the rate levied for watching was only 3,774l . . .
thus showing a deficiency of rates of 17,447l [A.E.,
1849, p. 3].
Captain Washington concluded that:
According to an abstract of accounts which had been
put in by the Treasurer to the Corporation, the whole
amount received from the river since 1809 (when the
accounts were first printed) had been 957,973l; whilst
the whole sum laid out on the river; including all
charges for conveying ballast, salaries, management,
&c., during that period, had been 397,719l — the differ-
ence between those two sums, exceeding half a million
of money, having been appropriated to the lightening,
paving, watering and scavenging the streets of
Newcastle [AE, 1849, p. 4].
A report in the North and South Shields Gazette shows the
influence of this investigation on the fate Tyne:
The evidence of gross mismanagement of the River
Tyne and misappropriation of funds levied for its con-
servation was so perfectly astounding to the Admiralty
Court . . . that the conclusion arrived at by the Admi-
ralty was that such evidence had never before been
heard respecting any river, and that this important
harbour and river should not be trifled with any longer
[1850].
Ultimately, it was decided by Parliament that, under the
River Tyne Improvement Act, 1850, the control of the River
should be taken from Newcastle Corporation and placed in the
hands of a trust called the Tyne Improvement Commission. This
Commission “embarked upon a major series of port improve-
ments which enabled the Tyne to survive as a major port”
[McCord, 1979, p. 77]. The Commission successfully controlled
the Tyne over the next 100 years. The Commission’s success can
be seen clearly by the following comment: “One of the most far-
reaching changes in human history took place between 1850
and 1914, when the volume of international trade probably in-
creased ten-fold in this relatively short period . . . [aided by] the
more sophisticated harbour facilities” [Newcastle City Libraries,
1969, p. 1].
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CONCLUSION
The paper has focused on the use of accounting data by
Newcastle Corporation and its opponents in the debate over the
improvement of the River Tyne. Significant municipal reform
took place in early 19th century Britain. Corporations were
made more accountable to the ratepayers of their districts under
the Municipal Reform Act, 1835. The provisions of the Munici-
pal Corporations Act, also of 1835, made the neglect of the River
Tyne clearer when a new form of keeping accounts was adopted
and made public by the newly reformed Corporation. It has
been shown that opposition fuelled by the increasing availability
of accounting data put greater pressure on the Corporation. The
Corporation’s “Pound Foolish, Penny Wise” system was made
visible and was no longer tolerated.
The marginal improvement that the Corporation did make
to the River Tyne was, as one councillor put it in 1845, like
“illustrating the old proverb of putting money into a bag of
holes”. “All the time, labour, and money, bestowed by the Corpo-
ration during this period may be said to have been almost bar-
ren of beneficial results” [Walker, 1905 p. 6]. The published
accounts were used against the Corporation to campaign for
river improvement, and it was with these accounts that the Cor-
poration tried to justify inaction. Gallhofer and Haslam [2001, p.
29] showed how in the late 19th century “radical political activ-
ists” used accounting data by the medium of the press as an
“emancipatory” force. Significantly, a key factor enabling the
opposition’s campaign for the improvement of the Tyne was the
press and the use accounting data in the same ‘emancipatory’
way.
This research into the use of accounting in a single corpora-
tion suggests the potential for further historical investigations.
How the accountability of other corporations changed after the
municipal reform of 1835 would also be useful area of research.
It would be interesting to know if the Newcastle case was excep-
tional and whether the increased accountability through the
publication of accounts placed any other corporations in com-
promising situations where they were stripped of control over
key assets.
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INTERNAL CONTROLS
IN THE TALMUD:
THE JERUSALEM TEMPLE
Abstract: We examine the Hebrew Talmud’s account of internal con-
trols in the ancient Jerusalem Temple (c.823 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.) This
far-reaching enterprise involved an extensive system of sacrificial of-
ferings, management of three annual pilgrimages, a court system and
maintenance of a priestly class. We outline the annual process of
collecting half-shekel and other donations, withdrawals from the
Temple treasury and the sale of libations. The Talmud describes nu-
merous internal controls: donations were segregated according to
their specific purposes and donation chests were shaped with small
openings to prevent theft. When making withdrawals from the
Temple treasury, the priest-treasurer was required to wear specific
clothing to prevent misappropriation of assets. The Treasury chamber
itself had seven seals, requiring the presence of seven different indi-
viduals, including the king, in order to open it. The process of selling
libations and meal offerings required purchasing and then redeeming
different tickets, which were specifically marked to prevent fraud. In
explaining the reasoning for this tight system of internal controls, the
Talmud reveals that an individual “shall be guiltless before G-D and
before Israel” [Numbers 32: 22], so that a sound system of internal
controls prevents both theft and any suspicion of theft, thus establish-
ing the fiscal credibility of the Temple institution in the eyes of its
congregants. Such an approach indicates that accounting did not rep-
resent a profane, secular vocation at odds with the Temple’s mission.
To the contrary, a system of accountability formed integral steps in
the Temple’s ritual processes.
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There are three crowns: the crown of learning, the
crown of priesthood, and the crown of kingship, but the
crown of a good name must be upon each of them
[Mishnah Pirkei Avos, 4: 17].
INTRODUCTION
As it discusses the operations of the ancient Jerusalem
Temple (circa 823 B.C.E. to 70 C.E.), the Hebrew Talmud re-
veals a strict set of accountability mechanisms designed to safe-
guard assets. The Talmud describes a far-reaching institution
overseeing an extensive system of offerings, three annual pil-
grimages, a court system and a priestly class. The needs of this
enterprise — supported almost entirely through voluntary dona-
tions — would have been extraordinary. The focus of this paper
is to examine the nature of the internal controls documented in
the Talmud.
Research about the relationship between accounting and
religion can provide new insights into how organizations use
accounting [Birnberg, Turopolec and Young, 1983] and how
societal needs influence organizations’ accounting [Hop-
wood, 1983; Hopwood and Miller, 1994, Puxty 1998]. Recent
accounting research with respect to the Church of England
[Laughlin, 1994], New England Quakers [Fuglister and Bloom,
1991], a 19th century U.S. religious commune [Flesher and
Flesher, 1979], U.S. churches [Duncan, Flesher and Stocks,
1999], the Australian Church [Lightbody, 1999], Islamic reli-
gious organizations [Abdul-Rahman, 2000], the Iona Commu-
nity of Scotland [Jacobs and Walker, 2001], the Salvation Army
[Irvine, 2002], and Ancient Egypt [Ezzamel, 2002; Mattessich,
2002], suggests increased interest in the interface between ac-
counting and religious institutions. The Hebrew Talmud has
much to contribute to this growing body of research. Its descrip-
tion of the operations within the Jerusalem Temple demon-
strates how a strong system of accounting internal controls
could build and maintain the confidence of religious adherents.
Moreover, such a system would have formed an integral part of
ancient religious ritual.
Using techniques of traditional Talmudic scholarship, we
identify many specific internal control processes discussed in
the Jerusalem Talmud tractate named Shekalim. We also refer to
related passages in other sections of the Talmud. These controls
deal with a national system for collecting contributions, safe-
guarding the Temple treasury, and the sale of libations and meal
offerings.
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One would expect the Talmud to simply rebuke those who
would commit theft — “Thou shalt not steal” Exodus, 20: 13;
Deuteronomy, 5: 17]. Presumably, then, pious people com-
manded not to steal would be deemed trustworthy, so that any
controls instituted within the Temple would be unnecessary and
therefore minimal. However, we find the Talmud to be so con-
cerned with preventing any suspicion of financial malfeasance,
that controls are designed to prevent even any appearance of
theft. Furthermore, the Talmud commends individual families
who went to great lengths to avoid any suspicion that Temple-
owned ingredients were misappropriated. The Talmud’s inclu-
sion of these processes suggests that they would have been
widely studied in their time, reinforcing public confidence in the
Temple’s operations. We conclude with an unexpected insight:
controls not only protect stakeholders’ property, but also protect
the integrity and credibility of those entrusted with stakeholders’
property.
THE ORIGINS OF THE TALMUD
The Talmud consists of oral teachings passed down through
generations of ancient scholars. Jewish tradition holds that
many of these teachings were received by Moses at Mount Sinai,
while others were collected through the ages. In the 3rd century
C.E., Rabbi Yehudah haNassi classified these teachings into the
Mishnah, which consists of 63 tractates (“masechtos”) that were
organized into six orders (“sedarim”).1 To respect the custom
that talmudic law should be transmitted orally, from teacher to
student, the Mishnah included only highly concise summaries of
basic principles, all written in Hebrew. To provide more inten-
sive explanations for the Mishnah, later generations of scholars
redacted two different versions of the Talmud:
1 Beginning in the 3rd century C.E., Rabbi Yochanan
and his disciples redacted the Jerusalem Talmud
(“Talmud Yerushalmi”) in Tiberius, near the Sea of
Galilee);2 and
1 The following two complete English translations of the Mishnah, with com-
mentaries, are available: Blackman (1963) and Kehati (1994). Furthermore,
many tractates of a new translation/commentary are now available, published by
Artscroll/Mesorah Publications of Brooklyn.
2 Jerusalem Publications of Brooklyn, NY, has translated certain tractates of
the Jerusalem Talmud to English, including Shekalim, cited in this paper.
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2 In the 6th century, Rabbi Ashi edited the Babylo-
nian Talmud (“Talmud Bavli” in Babylon, in mod-
ern-day Iraq).3
Neither version of the Talmud was completed, each omit-
ting several tractates of the Mishnah. For example, the Jerusa-
lem Talmud, but not the Babylonian Talmud, explains the
Mishnah to the tractate Shekalim (as cited in this paper). In
response to traditions that Talmudic Law should be learned
orally from a teacher, the two versions of the Talmud were writ-
ten in an extremely concise and cryptic form of ancient Ara-
maic-Hebrew. Critical words and phrases were often omitted
and other terminology was intentionally made to seem ambigu-
ous, so that it would be impossible for the prospective student to
simply read a passage of Talmud and understand it without help
from a teacher.
In this article, we outline certain Temple operations and
illustrate notable examples of internal controls over them, as
described in the Talmud and related commentaries.
INTERNAL CONTROL
Internal control is defined as “a process — effected by an
entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel —
designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achieve-
ment of objectives in the following categories: (a) reliability of
financial reporting, (b) effectiveness and efficiency of opera-
tions, and (c) compliance with laws and regulations.” [Auditing
Standards Board, SAS 55 and 78].4 As such, modern internal
control objectives provide a framework for helping achieve sub-
stantive integrity in meeting these objectives, as well as those
corollary to them, such as protection of the entity’s assets. Mod-
ern organizations employing internal controls benefit not only
from greater assurance that their substantive objectives will be
met, but also from the appearance of credibility afforded them
by the existence of internal controls, conditions necessary for
raising capital from outside investors [Auditing Standards
3 A complete English translation of the Babylonian Talmud is available from
Soncino Press, Brooklyn, NY. Many tractates of two new translation/commen-
taries are available: published by Artscroll/Mesorah Publications, of Brooklyn,
NY, and Random House, NY (Adin Steinsaltz, editor).
4 For purposes of internal control definitions used, we describe Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards, governing the practices of independent certified
public accountants in the United States.
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Board, SAS 1]. This appearance of credibility appears to have
been of primary concern in the Jerusalem Temple.
Prior accounting research describes numerous cases of ac-
counting functions in the ancient world. Hird [1975] hypoth-
esizes that as individuals in prehistoric societies learned to spe-
cialize, they needed to develop some notion of cost in order to
trade different specialist products. The woodcutter and hunter
could establish how many logs of wood were equivalent in value
to one animal carcass. Therefore, as Swanson [1984] asserts,
accounting may have preceded counting and mathematics. The
development of coins created the need for bookkeepers to main-
tain transaction records.
Stevelnick [1985] offers an analysis of ancient accounting
records found in Egypt and Iraq. Similar records are examined
in greater detail by Garbutt [1984], Mattessich [2002] and
Ezzamel [2002]. Costouros [1978] describes an intricate system
of auditors in ancient Greece. Afosa [1985] documents the ac-
counting records kept by the Ashanti tribes in 16th and 17th
century Ghana. Hagerman [1980] cites scriptural passages
which suggested the need for financial accounting, managerial
accounting and internal controls. Mann [1984] quotes Talmudic
passages regarding income tax policies in ancient Hebrew law.
In this paper, we seek to augment this body of research. We
document the integration of “secular” or “profane” controls into
“sacred” ritual, and we identify the importance attached to repu-
tation effects in an ancient religious institution.
INTERNAL CONTROLS IN THE JERUSALEM TEMPLES
According to traditional Talmudic sources, the Israelites
constructed the Tabernacle as a center for their program of of-
ferings, one year after they had left Egypt (1309 B.C.E.). This
Tabernacle, a tent made of wood, metals, tapestries and hides,
was disassembled, moved, and reassembled numerous times as
the Israelites migrated through the desert to the Holy Land. In
830 B.C.E., to permanently replace the Tabernacle, Solomon
began construction of the First Temple in Jerusalem [Reznick,
1994, p. 195]. According to biblical accounts, its construction
was a tremendous undertaking, requiring the services of 10,000
woodcutters in Lebanon, 80,000 stonecutters, 70,000 porters
moving building materials to the site, and 3,300 supervisors [I
Kings, 5: 29]. By 823 B.C.E., the First Temple was completed
and formed a religious, social and judicial center for the Israel-
ite nation. Authorities forbade offerings to be made in any other
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location, and all Israelites were required to make three annual
pilgrimages to the Temple. Furthermore, the Great Sanhedrin, a
national court handling religious and civil matters, met in the
Temple complex.
In 420 B.C.E., armies of the Babylonian Emperor
Nebuchadnezzar destroyed the First Temple. Following the
Babylonian exile, the Second Temple was completed in 346
B.C.E. This was similar to the First, but lacked the Ark of the
Covenant, which could not be located. In 16 B.C.E., Herod en-
larged and rebuilt the Second Temple, which was destroyed by
armies of the Roman General Titus in 70 CE. Figure 1 provides
a floorplan of the Second Temple, as recorded in the Babylonian
FIGURE 1
Floor Plan of the Second Jerusalem Temple5
Holy of Holies
Lishka Tzfon,
where receipts
for offerings
were issued
Probable
location of
collections
chests and
Temple treasury
(according to
Reznick)
Oils Chamber,
where receipts
were redeemed
5 According to Babylonian Talmud Tractate Midos, From Talmud Bavli
(Jerusalem, Israel: Telman). English annotations by the authors.
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Talmud Tractate Midos. Figure 2 offers a photo of a modern
reconstruction of Herod’s Second Temple, as presented at the
World’s Fair in New York, 1939.
The wide-encompassing objectives of the Temple’s opera-
tions necessitated a nationwide fund-raising movement and a
complex system for maintaining and expending Temple assets.
Talmudic sources list many specific internal control processes
over the Temple treasury, including those over collections of
biblically-mandated half-shekel donations, withdrawals from the
Treasury, and distributing offerings, all premised on the idea
that public confidence in the workings of the Temple was sacro-
sanct.
FIGURE 2
Model of the Second Jerusalem Temple6
Holy of Holies Lishka Tzfon,
where receipts
for offerings
were issued
Probable
location of
collections
chests and
Temple treasury
(according to
Reznick)
Oils Chamber,
where receipts
were redeemed
6 by Architect Yakov Yehuda, presented at the 1939 New York World’s Fair.
From “Background on the Daily Daf,” Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof, Israel.
http://www.dafyomi.co.il/meilah/middos04.htm. Annotations at bottom by the
authors.
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Collections of Half-Shekel Donations: The book of Exodus com-
mands every adult male Israelite to contribute exactly one-half
Shekel each year to the Tabernacle [30: 12]. These moneys
would be used to fund communal offerings.7 The Jerusalem Tal-
mud tractate “Shekalim” (literally “shekels”) explains how these
coins were collected, how they were accounted for, and other
aspects of the Temple’s administration. The beginning of the
tractate states that on the first day of the final month of the
year, called Adar, announcements would inform the people that
the annual collection of half-shekel coins was about to com-
mence [p. 2a].8
The Jerusalem Talmud then proceeds to dissect this state-
ment. It first asks why the announcement was made on the first
day of Adar, answering that this announcement would give
people one month to contribute before the moneys would be
expended from the Temple treasury, on the first day of Nissan,
the first month.9 These collections would then fund all public
offerings to be made in the next year, beginning in the month of
Nissan. The Talmud derives that the Temple’s fiscal year begins
on the first day of Nissan by citing a scriptural passage from
Exodus: “And it was in the first month of the second year on the
first of the month, that the Sanctuary was erected” [Exodus, 40:
17].
If the Sanctuary was erected on the first day of the first
month, the Talmud reasons, then this must be the beginning of
the Temple’s fiscal year.
7 Talmudic commentaries differ on the actual weight of a half-shekel coin.
Goldwurm [2000, p. 161] derives that a half-shekel would weigh either the
equivalent of 160 or 192 barley grains, which would translate to 0.256 or 0.215
troy ounces.
8 Unless otherwise indicated, we paraphrase the concise Talmudic passages.
All translations are by the authors. To give the reader a taste of the Talmud’s
style, here is a more literal translation of the above-cited passage: “On the first of
Adar they announce on the shekels” [p. 2a]. In citing Talmudic passages, we use
the name of the Talmud tractate, followed by the page number, as published in
the traditionally-used “Vilna” edition. In situations where the name of the
tractate is already provided the text, we provide only the page number. When
citing Mishnah passages, we provide the chapter and sentence numbers, sepa-
rated by a colon.
9 Today, in traditional Jewish congregations, the Sabbath preceding (or fall-
ing on) the first of the month of Adar is called “Sabbath Shekalim”. On that date,
Exodus 30:11-16 and II Kings 11:17-12:17 are publicly chanted. Two weeks later,
in commemoration of the ancient shekalim collections, congregants donate one-
half unit of the modern-day currency designated for the upkeep of the syna-
gogue.
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The Talmud describes the collection process in detail. On
the 15th of Adar, Temple messengers would arrive in the towns
of ancient Israel, to collect donations and change different types
of currencies. According to Maimonides, the messengers were to
“ask softly” for the half-shekel, but had no authority to coerce
people to pay. On the 25th of Adar, according to the Mishnah,
the messengers sat near the Temple Mount, and were permitted
to seize collateral from people who still had not paid.10 However,
they could not seize collateral from women, slaves, minors un-
der the age of 20, or members of the priestly class. For women,
slaves and minors, the half-shekel donations were optional.
While priests were legally obligated to pay, they were not co-
erced because of the voluntary services they provided to the
Temple [p. 3b].
Procedures were in place in case the half-shekels were lost
or stolen while in the possession of the Temple messengers. The
messenger was required to swear a three-fold oath that (1) he
was not negligent, (2) the objects were not in his possession and
(3) he had not personally used them [p. 5a]. Taking such an oath
would have been a serious matter because its violation would
profane the Third Commandment — “You shall not take the
name of the L-rd your G-D in vain” [Exodus 20: 7 and
Deuteronomy 5: 11].11 Prior to the counting of the Shekels on
the first of Adar (see below), the messenger would take an oath
in the presence of the townspeople, who would then be required
to donate half-shekels for a second time. However, after the first
of Adar, once the half-shekels had been counted, then the lost or
stolen half-shekels were considered to belong to the Temple. The
messenger would take his oath in the presence of the Temple
Treasurer, and the Temple would have to absorb the loss [p. 5a].
10 This raises the question: were half-shekel donations voluntary or manda-
tory? For Israelite males older than 20 years of age, they were mandatory. How-
ever, these half-shekel donations probably represented only a small fraction of
the resources necessary to maintain an extensive system of communal offerings
and to support the priestly classes. Israelites were also required to contribute
t’ruma (tithes) from a percentage of crops grown, first fruits, certain first-born
animals, and other assets to the priestly class. However, the Temple also relied
on private donations in the form of crops, precious metals, coins, land, or other
assets.
11 In Jewish Law, spelling out a Divine name adds sanctity to the document
onto which it is written, requiring that the document not be used or disposed of
disrespectfully. Accordingly, we use the commonly-used convention of abridging
these names with hyphens.
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The messenger could choose to shirk from an oath by contribut-
ing the lost currency without any admission of guilt.
If the missing half-shekels were subsequently found or re-
covered, then they were forwarded to the Temple. Any donations
made in their stead were also kept by the Temple and, the
Mishnah explains, their donors were not given any type of
“credit” toward future donations [p. 5a] because funds originally
designated for offerings in one year could not be used for offer-
ings in a subsequent year [Yoma, 13a].
In the Temple Mount, there were 13 chests, described as
“horns” [Shekalim 15b], labeled for different purposes and ar-
ranged in a circle.12 These chests were labeled for:
1 “New” shekels (donations for the current year’s col-
lection of shekels).
2 “Old” shekels (donations owed from previous
years).
3 Nests (to be spent on dove offerings).
4 Young Pigeon burnt offerings.
5 Wood (to be used for fire on the altar).
6 Frankincense (to be used toward the incense).
7 Gold for the utensils.
8 Remainder of sin offering.
9 Remainder of the guilt offering.
10 Remainder of bird offerings.
11 Remainder of nazirites’ offerings.
12 Remainder of lepers’ offerings.
13 “Donative” offerings (general contributions for of-
ferings to be made when the altar was unoccupied)
[Goldwurm, 2000, p. 116].
Chests 8 through 13 were used to collect surpluses earned
by the Temple from the sale of different types of offerings.13
Like modern collection boxes, each chest was angled to be
narrow on top and wide at the bottom, creating physical con-
trols to prevent theft.
The Mishnah prescribes how to handle coins found between
the chests:
12 These chests were most likely in a chamber outside of the Temple itself,
but within the Temple Mount complex [Reznick, 1994, p. 72]. We contacted
Reznick, who felt that the chests and the Temple treasury were located in a
courtyard north of the Temple, within the Temple Mount complex. See Figures 1
and 2.
13 The Mishnah specifically names only chests 1 through 7. Chests 8 through
13 are enumerated in Maimonides’ commentary to the Mishnah.
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If coins are found between the new shekels chest and
donative offering chest and they are closer to the new
shekels chests, they should be placed into the new shek-
els chests. If they are closer to the donative offering
chests, they should be placed into the donative offering
chests. If they are equidistant between the two, they
should be placed into the donative offering chests. If
coins are found between the wood chest and the frank-
incense chest . . . The general rule is that we decide
where to place fallen coins based on proximity. How-
ever, in a case of equidistance between two chests, we
decide for stringency [where, in the above order, dona-
tive offerings are most stringent and new shekels are
least stringent] [p. 19a].
Withdrawals from the Temple Treasury: Coins were withdrawn
from the Temple treasury three times a year, two weeks before
each of the three major festivals: Pesach (the early spring festival
Passover), Atzeret (the late spring holiday Pentecost) and Chag
(the autumn festival of Tabernacles) [p. 7b].14 Such withdrawals
were made under very tight controls. According to the Mishnah,
the priest-treasurer withdrew three chests, individually labeled
with the first three letters of the Hebrew alphabet, in sequence.
This priest-treasurer could not wear a hemmed garment, shoes,
sandals, phylacteries traditionally worn on the arm and head, an
amulet, or any other garment that could conceal coins [p. 8a].
As the Talmud explains, these controls protect the reputation of
the priest-treasurer. If he one day became poor, it would not be
suspected that his poverty resulted from divine retribution for
stealing from the treasury. On the other hand, if he became
14 The Talmud does not state where the Treasury was located. Perhaps se-
crecy over its location was maintained as a control over theft. However, it is also
possible that the locations of chambers outside the Temple, but within the
Temple Mount, were insufficiently important to be included in the Talmud.
According to Reznick, the Temple treasury was most likely located in a court-
yard north of the Temple, within the Temple Mount complex [telephone inter-
view]. See Figures 1 and 2. Josephus records that Pompey entered the Holy of
Holies, “which no one was permitted to enter but the high priest, and saw what
it contained . . . sacred money totaling 2,000 talents” [1959, p. 47]. This suggests
that some Treasury monies may have been kept in the Holy of Holies. However,
the Holy of Holies could not have also served as the Treasury Chamber referred
to in the Talmud because the treasurer would have been forbidden to enter it.
Rather, surpluses may have been stored in the Holy of Holies, either on a perma-
nent basis or for safekeeping during the Roman siege.
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wealthy, people would not suspect that his wealth came from
the Treasury.
The Talmud goes on to provide scriptural sources for this
principle of avoiding acts that might create suspicion [p. 9a]:
“You shall be clean before G-D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32:
22]. “Find favor and good understanding in the eyes of G-D and
man” [Proverbs, 3: 4].
The first quote includes “Israel,” and the second includes
“man” in order to emphasize that people must not only satisfy
an all-knowing G-D, but also must satisfy “the eyes of man,”
who may suspect the priest-treasurer, or, for that matter, any
person with fiduciary responsibilities, of wrongdoing, even mis-
takenly. On the same folio page, the Jerusalem Talmud again
cites these verses adding a third verse, from Joshua: “L-rd Al-
mighty G-D, He knows, and Israel shall know, if in rebellion, or
if in transgression against the L-rd . . . Let the L-rd himself de-
mand reparation” [Joshua, 22: 22].
The Jerusalem Talmud then recalls that Gamliel Zuga asked
Rabbi Yosi ben Rabbi Bun, which verse is the most relevant of
them all? He answered him, “and you will be guiltless before G-
D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32: 22] [p. 9a]. Rabbi Sirilio,
cited in Rabbi Yaakov Shulman’s translation/commentary, ex-
plains that the quotation from Numbers, “and you will be guilt-
less before G-D and before Israel” best supports this principle
because it refers to financial transactions, while the quotation
from Joshua refers to idolatry, and the verse in Proverbs is a
general admonition [Shulman, 1998, p. 9a(3)].
In reference to the responsibilities of a charity collector, the
Babylonian Talmud cites this same scriptural verse from Num-
bers. If a charity collector collected an excess of funds, but had
no poor recipients to whom to distribute the funds, what should
he do with rust-prone copper coins? He must change them for
silver coins, but may not do so with his own money. Similarly, if
a communal meal for the poor had left-over food, the meal’s
supervisor must sell the excess food to others, and not to him-
self. This is because the scripture states: “And you should be
clean before G-D and before Israel” [Numbers, 32: 22]
[P’sachim, 13a]. One could suspect that the charity collector or
meal supervisor personally profits from communal acts of good-
will. As in the prior examples cited from the Jerusalem Talmud,
the ancient law demands that individuals with fiduciary respon-
sibilities maintain an appearance of propriety.
In what context is the verse “And you should be clean before
G-D and before Israel” written? When the Israelites were wan-
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dering in the desert, the Israelite tribes of Reuben and Gad ap-
proached Moses, asking to settle in Gilead, a territory already
conquered east of the Jordan River, instead of the Land of Israel
proper. Moses, however, expressed concern that the tribes
would subsequently avoid fighting alongside their brethren to
conquer the Land. Therefore, he required that the two tribes
settle in Gilead only after they helped conquer the entire Land of
Israel. Only then could they be “clean before G-D and before
man”. In this sense, the verse directs one to behave in a manner
“beyond reproach” by the standards of both G-D and society.
How could Reuben and Gad reassure the Israelite tribes that
they would not abandon their battles to conquer the Land? By
refusing to settle in their territory until the entire Land was
conquered. Similarly, how could the priest-treasurer reassure
the public that Temple assets were not misappropriated? By
observing a strict system of internal controls. The following
proverb in the Mishnah tractate “Pirkei Avos,” refers to a similar
principle: “[Rabbi Chanina ben Dosa] used to say: He who is
pleasing to his fellows is pleasing also to G-D; and he who is
displeasing to his fellows is displeasing also to G-D” [3: 13].
The Jerusalem Talmud notes additional controls over the
priest-treasurer’s withdrawals, explaining that withdrawals
should not be made by a “kovetz,” defined as a curly-haired
person. Before he could perform the withdrawal, his hair would
have to be untangled to make it more difficult to hide coins, a
physical control to safeguard assets. Alternatively, Maimonides,
in his authoritative redaction of the Talmud called the Mishnah
Torah, states that a kovetz is a poor person who, in order to
avoid suspicion of fraud given his arguably greater temptation
to steal, should not perform the withdrawals. Such controversies
are common in Talmudic literature, and reflect the diversity of
knowledge transmitted through many generations of oral teach-
ings.
In order that he could not store coins in his mouth, the
priest-treasurer making the withdrawal was required to talk dur-
ing the whole withdrawal process — another physical control
over assets. Alternatively, the Jerusalem Talmud suggests that
they could have filled his mouth with water. However, this
would have prevented him from reciting a necessary blessing.
Rabbi Yaakov Wehl, in his 20th Century commentary Ikva
Aharon on Shekalim, indicates another possible way of prevent-
ing theft: one or more witnesses might accompany the priest-
treasurer, an independent check on the performance. This he
rejects, however, reasoning that if the witness became poor,
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people might suspect that his poverty was divine retribution for
stealing from the Treasury, or for assisting in the priest-
treasurer’s fraud. Therefore, witnesses were never allowed into
the Treasury chamber [Shulman, 1998, 9a(2)].
In its organizational structure, the Temple emphasized the
sharing of responsibilities and segregation of controls. For ex-
ample, at any given time at least three treasurers and seven
supervisors were appointed over the Treasury. In general, the
Talmud tells us, any fiduciary responsibilities were assigned
jointly to at least two people [p. 14b].
Other Physical Controls over the Treasury: As an example of these
tight controls, the Jerusalem Talmud explains the process for
opening and sealing the treasury chamber. When sealing the
chamber, the treasurer would affix his seal. Then, the trustee,
the controller, the high priest, and the king would each affix
their seals. When opening the chamber, the king, the high priest,
the controller, the trustee and the treasurer would each examine
his seal to make sure that it had not been tampered with, and
then open it [p. 14b].
A Budget: Furthermore, the Talmud provides a budget detailing
how the Temple’s collections should be expended. First, daily
offerings were purchased followed by additional offerings (with
libations), the Omer offering, the two loaves (offered in the Pen-
tecost festival), the twelve loaves (placed in the Holy of Holies
every Sabbath), and all public offerings. Guards hired by the
Temple to watch over its fields of crops were also paid for their
services [p. 9b]. Furthermore, the red heifer (with other supplies
necessary for its preparation) and the scapegoat offered on the
Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur) were paid for. Any remaining
funds were used to pay for a ramp for transporting the red
heifer, a ramp for the scapegoat, supplies necessary for offering
the scapegoat, maintaining canals running under the Temple,
city walls and towers maintenance, and other needs of the City
of Jerusalem [p. 10b]. Any remaining surplus was spent on
wines, oils and fine flours to be resold by the Temple for use in
offerings, at a profit. In the Talmud Rabbi Akiva disagrees, stat-
ing that the Temple did not invest its own money or that of the
poor [p. 11a]. Rather, any remaining moneys were spent on gold
sheets to plate the Ark in the Holy of Holies [p. 12a].
One scholar cited in the Talmud, Abba Shaul, argues that
the High Priest himself, not the Temple, paid for the ramp used
to transport the red heifer [p. 10b]. Abba Shaul’s argument indi-
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cates that there was an awareness of an entity concept — certain
costs fell within the jurisdiction of the Temple, while others did
not. Maintenance of community property in Jerusalem was con-
sidered to be, in part, the responsibility of the Temple. However
other expenditures, including possibly the red heifer’s ramp,
were the responsibility of others.
Controls over Sales of Libations and Meal Offerings: As outlined
in Numbers [15: 2-10], certain Temple ceremonies required
wine libations and meal offerings made of flour and oil. Accord-
ing to the Mishnah and Jerusalem Talmud, a complex system of
internal controls was instituted to sell and distribute items.
Four types of receipts for the purchase of libations or meal
offerings were available, each inscribed with one of the follow-
ing words: “calf,” “male,” “kid” or “sinner”. Each receipt would
entitle its purchaser to the necessary libations or meal offerings
required for different ceremonies.
First, the Mishnah tells us, a person in need of a libation
would pay Yochanan, the receipts administrator, and receive a
receipt. Yochanan (or one of his predecessors or successors)
could be found in the Receipts Chamber (called Mizrach Tzfon
b’Vais haMoked — See Figures 1 and 2). The person in need of
libation would then walk to Achiyah, the libations administra-
tor, submit his receipt, and receive the appropriate libation or
meal offering. Achiyah would have been located in the Oils
Chamber (called Lishkas Bais haShemanim — See Figures 1 and
2). Separation of functional duties of transaction authorization
from execution was thus achieved. At the end of the day,
Yochanan and Achiyah would meet and count the receipts and
coins collected. The Mishnah literally states that the Temple
would have the “upper hand”. If there were more coins than
receipts, the Temple kept the excess. If, however, there was a
shortage of coins, Yochanan would have to pay the deficiency
out of pocket [p. 15a].
Furthermore, there was a procedure in place in case of a
lost receipt. Each evening, the administrators would count the
coins and receipts. If, corresponding to a claim, there was a
difference between the coins and receipts, Achiya would provide
the claimants with a libation or meal offering. If there was no
corresponding difference, the claimant would receive nothing,
thus achieving “protection of assets” in the spirit of goodwill.
The Jerusalem Talmud explains that, in order to prevent
fraud, each receipt was inscribed with the day of the week, the
name of the week, the month, and the name of the priestly
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rotation on duty that week.15 The Talmud explains that, because
of the low probability of the weekday, week, month and priestly
rotation, the Temple officers were not concerned that a person
could subsequently use an old receipt to purchase libations or
meal offerings [p. 15a].
PROTECTION OF ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS
As commanded in Leviticus [24: 5-6], 12 loaves of bread
(“the showbreads”), requiring specific expertise in baking, were
placed on the table in the Temple each week. Furthermore, Exo-
dus [30: 34-38] prescribes the burning of a uniquely-mixed in-
cense, which could not be appropriated for non-Temple use. It
was deemed essential that these activities be strictly controlled.
The Mishnah assigns responsibility for baking showbreads
to the Garmu family, and the preparation of the incense to the
Avitnas family. Each family practiced certain stringencies to
make sure that others could not suspect them of misappropriat-
ing Temple-owned ingredients. The Jerusalem Talmud praises
the Garmu family, responsible for the Showbreads, because at
home they would not bake with the type of light-colored flour
used by the Temple, so that people should not say that they ate
from the ingredients owned by the Temple [p. 14a]. In order to
avoid suspicion that they misappropriated the showbread flour,
the Garmu family used a different-colored flour when baking
bread for themselves. In this way suspicions were allayed.
Similarly, the Jerusalem Talmud praises the Avitnas family,
which was responsible for the preparation of the incense. The
women of this family did not wear any type of perfume. Further-
more, when a woman married into this family, she would agree,
in writing, as a condition of marriage, not to wear perfume, so
that people should not say that members of the Avitnas family
perfume themselves with the precious ingredients designated for
the Temple incense [p. 14a].
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH IN
ACCOUNTING AND RELIGION
Initially, we expected the Talmud to deem Temple managers
G-D-fearing and trustworthy, requiring minimal internal control
processes over them. However, we found the Talmud to teach
15 Priests were reservists, divided into 24 watches by family, who would each
serve for one weekly period during each 24 week cycle.
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that a tight system of internal controls will protect the integrity
and reputation of the pious, building the integrity of the institu-
tions for which they are responsible. Similar conflicts between
control and trust can be illustrated by financial management in
the modern Church of Australia, as described by Lightbody
[1999]. Lightbody identifies two strategies of guardian behavior
— “storing” and “shielding” — through which religious leaders
set aside and protect funds for their own pet jurisdictional uses.
Such strategies may explain why controls must exist over trust-
worthy, pious individuals. Goal incongruence may encourage
such individuals to focus on their own provinces, even at a cost
to the institution as a whole. The Talmud alludes to religious
institutions’ problems in allocating scarce resources by provid-
ing a list of spending priorities, and describing the system of
charity collection boxes to be found inside the Temple court-
yard.
Recent studies by Ezzamel [2002] and Irvine [2002] explore
later religious institutions’ role in redistributing wealth. Within
the Talmudic tradition, land holdings were linked with wealth.
After Joshua’s conquest, all tribes received land except for Levi
[Joshua, 13: 14]. As part of the tribe of Levi, the priestly class
did not receive any land holdings. Therefore, many sacrificial
offerings were designated for the priestly class, and required
donations of crops and animals were designated for the Levites.
As such, landholders supported the Levites, the priestly class,
and, in as much as the Levites and priests served the Temple,
landholders also supported the Temple’s operations. However,
the half-shekel donations described earlier were designated spe-
cifically for the Temple’s operations.
To further redistribute wealth, agriculturalists were re-
quired to make portions of their fields available for harvesting
by the poor, a system described in the Talmud tractates Pe’ah
and D’mai and illustrated in the book of Ruth [2: 2]. Further-
more, the jubilee year, declared every 50th year, permitted each
family to regain ownership over the land holdings that it
claimed in the time of Joshua alleviating many wealth imbal-
ances.
In his study about the Church of England during the late
20th century, Laughlin [1988] discusses how religion seeks to
distinguish the sacred from the profane, so that sacred institu-
tions establish themselves as strongholds against the profane.
The Talmud makes similar distinctions. For example, Talmudic
law distinguishes individuals by both birthright and ritual pu-
rity. In order to enter the Temple, individuals must be ritually
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pure, being required to avoid contact with leprosy, menses and
the dead for a period of time, and then immersing in a ritual
pool. Furthermore, descendents of the Biblical Aaron and Levi
have special privileges and responsibilities within Temple ritu-
als. Certain crops and livestock were also designated for the
Temple’s operations and were forbidden to be used otherwise.
Even certain ideas, such as those rooted in idolatry, were con-
sidered to be so anathema to the prevalent philosophy that they
would have no role to play in the functioning of the Temple or
the prevailing court system. Accordingly, because ideas of ac-
countability were not explicitly commanded by Scripture, one
might assume that they would be deemed profane or idolatrous,
and unworthy of practice within the Temple’s precincts. To the
contrary, the Talmud’s extended discussion of internal controls
indicates that systems of accountability formed an integral por-
tion of the Temple’s rituals. There was no separation between
secular accounting processes and sacred service, so much so
that actions that might raise suspicion of theft could have been
deemed akin to theft itself. Furthermore, judging from the frag-
mentary nature of the Talmud’s redaction, it is probable that the
tight physical controls described in the Talmud represented only
a small fraction of the controls in place over the Temple’s opera-
tions.
CONCLUSION
In this study we have explored internal controls over the
collection of half-shekel donations, withdrawals from the
Temple treasury, entry to the Treasury, the sale and distribution
of libations and meal offerings, and the protection of ingredients
essential for religious purposes as described in the Jerusalem
Talmud. One would expect the Talmud to admonish its students
against theft, but not to implement minimal controls over a
priestly class deemed pious and trustworthy. To the contrary,
the Talmud describes what appears to have been a tight system
of physical and operational controls. Since the Mishnah and
Jerusalem Talmud are written redactions of teachings passed
down through generations of scholars, and studied during the
times of the Jerusalem Temple, we can presume that these
teachings would have increased peoples’ confidence in the work-
ings of their central religious organization, providing assurance
that donations were expended appropriately.
During our research, we found no mention of record keep-
ing. This does not necessarily indicate that no record keeping
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took place. For example, in The Jewish War, historian Josephus
records specific amounts taken from the Temple treasury:
Pompey and his staff went into the Sanctuary . . . and
saw what it contained . . . sacred money totaling 2,000
talents [p. 47].
For the campaign against the Parthians, Crassus re-
moved all the gold from the Sanctuary in Jerusalem,
including the 2,000 talents Pompey had not touched [p.
51].
As the survivors fled in terror the [Roman] soldiers
swooped on the unguarded treasury of God and carried
off about four hundred talents; what they did not steal
Sabinus collected [p. 125].
However, if Temple records were unavailable to Josephus,
he would have received these counts from the Romans. Further-
more, it is possible that Talmudic material explaining such
record keeping practices may have been lost over the millennia.
However, its apparent omission suggests that record keeping
and reporting was of low priority.16 While the Talmud tells us
how donations should have been spent, it is possible that no
reporting mechanism existed — or was deemed necessary — to
describe how donations were actually spent.
Most surprising, however, in the course of this research, is
our finding that piety may have compelled fiduciaries to accept
stronger, rather than weaker controls over their actions. The
tendency may be to trust the religious person, on the presump-
tion that a G-D-fearing person will not steal. To the contrary, the
Talmud teaches that tight internal controls protect the integrity
and reputation of the pious, and of the institutions for which
they are responsible.
In this study, we have explored one of many links between
Jewish tradition and accountability. Other studies may lead to
interesting insights into the interface between religion and ac-
counting in historical contexts. These include Talmudic systems
of taxation, computation of tithes, explicit accounting records in
the Bible, and philosophies of individual accountability before
the Divine.
16 Financial record keeping was possible given the careful calendar records
mentioned elsewhere in the Talmud.
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Abstract: This paper introduces some significant developments in the
history of the Portuguese accounting profession. It does so with a
view to providing a facilitative foundation of knowledge upon which
further analysis and critique can be undertaken. Five developmental
periods since 1755 are identified: (i) Corporatist Absolute Monarchy
(1755-1820) (ii) Liberal Monarchy (1820-1890) (iii) Waning Liberal-
ism and Rising Corporatism (1891-1926) (iv) Corporatist Dictatorship
(1926-1974) and (v) Emerging Liberal Democracy and Neo-
corporatism (1974 until the present). The accounting profession’s
chequered history is analysed through episodes of regulation and de-
regulation. These episodes are associated with Portugal’s pervading
social, economic and political context and are dichotomised broadly
as either “corporatist” or “liberal”. Relationships between episodes of
regulation and periods of “corporatism” are highlighted, together
with associations between episodes of de-regulation and periods of
“liberalism”. A better understanding emerges of factors instrumental
in the emergence of a well respected and rapidly growing accounting
profession in Portugal.
INTRODUCTION
For much of the period from about the 15th century to the
first half of the 17th century, Portugal was one of the world’s
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great colonial powers and the home of some great merchants
and traders. In recent centuries, Portugal has been overshad-
owed by Spain, France, Holland and Britain, and it has lan-
guished in terms of economic influence and cultural develop-
ment. But now, with the support of European Union [EU]
initiatives, and prudent national economic management, it is
developing at a rapid rate. An instrumental part of the force
currently propelling Portugal has been an accounting profes-
sion1 that has developed considerably in status and perfor-
mance, particularly in recent decades.
Despite the increasing importance of accountants in the
commercial infrastructure of Portugal, there has been little
documentation of how the vocation of accounting has evolved
and matured, and about the significant formative influences in-
volved. This paper aims to fill that void (and provide an exposé
that is intrinsically interesting from an accounting history per-
spective) by reviewing the regulatory development of the voca-
tion of “accountant” in Portugal over the past two and a half
centuries. It is a response, in part, to calls by Carmona and Zan
[2002, pp. 291, 300] to “map” a broader “variety in the history of
accounting . . . by expanding the dimensions of time [beyond the
current emphasis on 1850-1940] and space [to include Africa,
Continental Europe, Islam, Latin America]”. We seek to provide
a foundation upon which further understandings will emerge of
how and why the accounting profession evolved in Portugal;
and, to a lesser extent, of how accounting knowledge was propa-
gated in Portugal. In a sense, we are embarking on “a new voy-
age in search of the profession” [Walker, 1999, p. 1] with a view
to providing part of the map of “the disparate socio-economic,
legal and cultural landscapes through which accountants ar-
rived at destination profession” [Walker, 2002, p. 377].
The reforms in 1755 of the Prime Minister, the Marquis of
Pombal, are taken as an appropriate starting point for our
analysis.2 We divide the period since 1755 into five significant
1 We acknowledge the difficulty in “pinning down” exactly what a profession
is. Carnegie and Edwards [2001, p. 302] have argued that “the point at which
any occupational community genuinely deserves the description of profession is
almost certainly impossible to identify, and is probably of no great significance
per se”. Nonetheless, what we chronicle in this paper, for a large part of the
analysis period, might best be described as a “professionalization process”.
2 In 1755, a devastating earthquake struck Portugal. It destroyed about
10,000 buildings in Lisbon, including the commercial heart of that city and
much of the commercial record-keeping infrastructure in Portugal — for ex-
ample, that maintained in the Customs House (Birmingham 1993, p. 65, Saraiva
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developmental phases, based on the nature of the Portuguese
state, its dominant ideologies and its approaches to decision
making:
• Corporatist Absolute Monarchy (1755 to 1820)
• Liberal Monarchy (1820 to 1890)
• Waning Liberalism and Rising Corporatism (1890 to
1926)
• Corporatist Dictatorship (1926 to 1974) and,
• Emerging Liberal Democracy and Neo-Corporatism (1974
to present).
Our labeling should be non-controversial. The terms used to
describe these periods are consistent with those adopted com-
monly by writers of Portuguese history [for example, Birming-
ham, 1993, Lloyd-Jones 1994a, 1994b, 1994c].3 A chronological
overview, summarizing significant events in the development of
accounting in Portugal is presented in Appendix 1.
Our analysis proceeds by broadly classifying the pervading
mood of Portugal in the period under review as consistent, in
varying degrees, with the principles of “corporatism” or “liberal-
ism”. But first, we wish to enter a caveat. Our “Corporatism/
Liberalism” framework is not developed in exhaustive detail and
requires further development. Nonetheless, it seems useful to
introduce such a classificatory perspective. By doing so, we seek
to demonstrate the insights that can be provided to the ebbs and
flows and phases of development in the processes of profes-
sionalization of accounting over a 250 year period in Portugal.
In settings classified as “corporatist”, we do not analyze the
complexity of arrangements and the dialogue that may have
taken place between the state and bodies representing accoun-
tants. This would require in-depth analysis of archival sources
— a task unmanageable in a single introductory contribution
such as this, and one better suited to exploration in future re-
search papers.
1983, Moreira de Mendonça 1758, p. 129). The Tribunal de Contas (n.d.), Fundo
Antigo, Vol. I, book 2, sheet 62 refers to the losses of “books and papers” and the
“receipts and expenses books, and papers of all treasuries of the Court”.
3 Nonetheless, scholars who have attempted to identify phases in the histori-
cal development of accounting in Portugal have not agreed on an appropriate
classificatory nomenclature. Carvalho et al. (2002), for example, draw upon an
analysis of “the inventory of accounting books published in Portugal since the
eighteenth century” to identify the following three phases: (i) Bookkeeping (until
1929) (ii) Patrimony (1929 to 1977) and (iii) Standardization (1977 to the
present). Other developmental period schemas have been proposed by da Silva
(1984) and Tua Pereda (1995).
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Corporatism: This is a term that “has been characterised by am-
biguity, imprecision, and a liberal, rather undisciplined usage”
[Molina and Rhodes 2002, p. 306). Here, by “corporatism”, we
mean a mode of regulation based on an ideology or a system of
ideas about how to organize an economy by “making profes-
sional and trade corporations the basis of the commonwealth”
[Theimer, 1939, p. 70]. We regard corporatism as seeking “con-
tinuous and structured participation of interest organizations in
policy-making . . . and policy implementation” [Molina and
Rhodes, 2002, p. 307]. As Puxty et al. [1987, p. 284] have pointed
out, a corporatist state:
. . . does not simply license the existence of organised
interest groups but incorporates them into its own
centralised hierarchical system of regulation. In doing
so, the state simultaneously recognises its dependence
upon these associations and seeks to use them as an
instrument in the pursuit and legitimation of its poli-
cies.
Thus, we regard the political apparatus established in 1933
by Portugal’s Prime Minister, António Salazar, as corporatist:
“the upper house or senate was replaced by the Corporative
Chamber, a consultative body in which the main aspects of the
nation’s life were to be represented; economic, professional and
intellectual” [Livermore, 1976, p. 333]. The interests of employ-
ers were to be drawn together in interest groups or associations
known as Federations; employees’ interests were to be brought
together through associations of National Unions; and the inter-
ests of the professions were to be effected through the formation
of Orders of professionals [Livermore, 1976, p. 333].
Schmitter’s4 definition of “corporatism” is instructive, for it
highlights some of the key characteristics (italicized and under-
lined here) of the system of interest representation in a corpo-
ratist state:
 . . . in which the constituent units [including profes-
sional associations] are organised into a limited num-
ber of singular, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered
and functionally differentiated categories, recognised
and licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their re-
4 Schmitter distinguished between three models of organized interest par-
ticipation: “Pluralism”, “Societal corporatism” and “State corporatism” (Lane
and Ersson, 1999). In this paper we focus on “State corporatism”.
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spective categories in exchange for observing certain
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of
demand supports [Schmitter, 1979 cited by Lloyd-
Jones, 1994c, p. 8].
The broad aims of corporatism have often been achieved by
“restrict[ing] competition” [Lloyd-Jones, 1994b, p. 6] and effect-
ing a “community of interest” between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie. In a corporatist state, “truly integrated corpora-
tions”, like professional associations of accountants “perform a
variety of functions, many of them executive ones devolved to
them by the state. For example, the corporations would be re-
sponsible for not only making policy through the state, but also
for enforcing that legislation amongst their members by means
of sanction and reward” [Lloyd-Jones, 1994, p.34, citing
Schmitter, 1979, pp. 34-36].
“Corporatism” has a long tradition in Portugal. Its roots
have been traced from Roman Law and to the concept of society
enunciated by Thomas Aquinas, based on the “. . . idea that gov-
ernment authority should be exercised in the pursuit of the com-
mon good by natural ‘organizations’ within a ‘hierarchical [and]
. . . compartmentalised society’” [Wiarda, 1977, pp. 57-58].5
Liberalism: “Liberalism is a way of thinking about humanity and
politics [and a term that] has seemed impossible to define [be-
cause] it has appeared in various shapes in different times and
places” [Miller, 1991, p. 285]. Nonetheless, by “liberalism” here
we mean an ideology in which belief in individual rights is para-
mount, the merits of unfettered competition and the pursuit of
material wealth are revered, and there is little compassion for
material inequalities in society. Constitutionalism, tolerance of
competing religions and commercial activity are highly re-
garded. Political authority is questioned with a view to reform
rather than evasion [Miller, 1991, pp. 285-289].
Our expectation is that periods of “corporatism” will be
characterized broadly by the regulation of professional en-
deavor, whereas periods of “liberalism” will be characterized
broadly by the de-regulation of professional endeavor. Consistent
with Puxty et al. [1987, p. 274], we regard the development of
5 For further explanation of the operation of corporatism in Portugal see
Robinson [1979, pp. 128-134], and Lloyd-Jones [1994 a,b,c]. For further under-
standing of the nature of corporatism and the professionalization of accounting
within a corporatist regime, see Cooper et al., [1989], Richardson [1989] and
Walker and Shackleton [1995].
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accounting [such as in Portugal] to be “associated with the dis-
tinctive histories and institutional specificities” of Portugal.
CORPORATIST ABSOLUTE MONARCHY (1755-1820)
In this period state initiatives were undertaken to enhance
the pursuit of the common good through advancements in trade
and economic performance. This was to be accomplished, in
part, by a better-trained and more competent cadre of accoun-
tants who would emerge from the state’s establishment of a
School of Commerce (with typically corporatist monopoly pow-
ers) by its Board of Trade.
Although Portugal experienced a period of prosperity in the
15th century, arising from the exploits of Henry the Navigator,
and those of Vasco da Gama (who pioneered the sea route to
India via the Cape of Good Hope in 1498), Portuguese affluence
declined in the reign of Dom João III (King John III) between
1521 and 1557. A major reason for this was that the Portuguese
Inquisition6 prompted many Portuguese Jews to leave the coun-
try, thereby depriving it of much capital and entrepreneurial
skill. Foreigners began to dominate Portuguese commerce. By
the first half of the 18th century there were few Portuguese
merchants: they had little capital, poorly developed business
acumen and low levels of literacy [Azevedo, 1929]. In about
1750, there were few privately owned factories, other than the
one that subsequently became the Royal Silk Factory.7 The view
that Portuguese industry could not be developed successfully
was held widely, especially by foreigners who conducted busi-
ness in Portugal. There were few indigenous accountants. Most
accountants in Portugal were Italian or French.8 The double
entry bookkeeping system was almost unknown to Portuguese
merchants.
6 Permission to conduct an Inquisition was successfully sought from the
Vatican by the Portuguese court in 1531 (Livermore 1976, p. 47). Although
interest in the Inquisition began to decline markedly from about 1682, it was not
formally dis-established until 1821. [Dicionário Enciclopédico da História de Por-
tugal (1990, pp. 345-346), Publicações Alfa, edited by Selecções do Reader’s
Digest, SA].
7 The Royal Silk Factory was established in 1734 as the Companhia da
Fábrica das Sedas (Silk Factory Company). It became Royal property in 1750. In
1757 the Board of Trade assumed responsibility for its administration. It oper-
ated until 1835 [Sousa 1995, pp. 9-10].
8 The first bookkeeper of the Grão-Para e Maranhão Company (1755) was a
Frenchman who later taught the Portuguese who replaced him. In 1756, Italians
were the first general bookkeepers of the Junta do Comércio (Board of Trade)
and the woollen manufacturer of Covilhã [Oliveira, n.d.].
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Drastic measures were needed to address this state of indig-
enous commercial naivety. The driving force in doing so was the
Marquis of Pombal, the Chief Minister of Dom José I (King
Joseph I) between 1750 and 1777. The Marquis of Pombal was a
“canny statesman and diplomat” [Tyson-Ward, 2002, p.21], also
known for his heavy-handed “dictatorial methods” [Birming-
ham, 1993, p.79]. He was a worldly-wise,9 well-traveled man
who had been the Portuguese ambassador to England from
1739 to 1743 [Maxwell, 1995, p.4]. There he witnessed the im-
portant facilitative role played by a nascent English middle class
in the early stirrings of the industrial revolution. The Marquis of
Pombal was aware that the Portuguese economy lagged behind
the economies of other European countries. He attributed much
of Portugal’s economic sluggishness in trade to the absence of a
well-trained cadre of Portuguese technicians who were capable
of managing the commercial affairs of merchants and industrial
concerns. The Marquis of Pombal was an economic protection-
ist and a “patriotic modernizer”. Consistent with corporatist ide-
als, he was eager to develop an “indigenous commercial bour-
geoisie” and a merchant class to “control the country’s own
destiny” [Almodovar and Cardoso, 1998, p. 36; Birmingham,
1993, pp. 80-84].
The Board of Trade and the School of Commerce
The Marquis of Pombal issued a Royal Decree on 30 Sep-
tember 1755 creating a Junta do Comércio (Board of Trade). He
intended this body to foster commercial activity, and in par-
ticular, to improve the management and administration of new
factories [Ratton, 1813]. In a significant initiative on 19 May
1759, the Marquis established the Aula de Comércio (School of
Commerce)10, under the ambit of the Board of Trade.11 The
School of Commerce was Portugal’s first formally constituted
9 Pombal “showed his compatriots a new instrument of table manners: a
fork. It was he, it appears, who for the first time used a fork at a table in
Portugal, where up till then, even at Court, the nobility and gentry had put their
hands in their plates and eaten with their fingers” [Trend, 1957, p. 173].
10 A strict translation of this term would be “Class of Commerce”. In 1759,
the expression “school” was not used widely. But the Aula de Comércio was a
school. In keeping with the preponderance of translations of this term into
English [for example, Maxwell, 1995, p. 77] we have adopted the term “school”.
11 At this time, he was also responsible for significant reforms in higher
education, including reforms in science, mathematics, engineering, medicine
and surgery [Birmingham, 1993, p. 83; Maxwell, 1995, pp. 95-107].
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establishment for professional education. According to Maxwell
[1995, p.77] “this school was to teach Italian double bookkeep-
ing [sic] methods and was to give preference to sons of Portu-
guese businessmen in its three year degree”. In a remarkable
claim, Corrêa [1930, p.113] and Azevedo [1961, p.6] have con-
tended that it was the world’s first official professional technical
establishment specializing in the teaching of accounting.12
By establishing the School of Commerce, the Marquis
sought to provide an educational infrastructure to promote the
commercial astuteness of merchants and potential industrialists.
The hope was that this initiative would help industry to flourish
and make Portugal strong and independent. Prior to the
creation of the School of Commerce there were no specialist
accountants in Portugal. In the first ten courses conducted by
the school (with intakes of students from 1 September 1759 to
10 November 1794) there were approximately 1933 enrolled stu-
dents of whom about 1014 graduated successfully [Santana,
1989; Cardoso, 1984; Rodrigues et al., 2003a, 2003b]. All of those
who attended the School of Commerce were trained to be suc-
cessful merchants, and, importantly, to be proficient in double
entry bookkeeping.13 As a consequence, the number of Portu-
guese who were versed in accounting (both in merchants’ busi-
nesses and public institutions) increased significantly in ensuing
years. The need to rely on foreign accountants diminished.
The Letter of Law of 1770: Over the following decade, some jobs
were preserved exclusively for students who had undertaken
courses offered by the School of Commerce. For example, the
Letter of Law of 30 August 177014 imposed restrictions obliging
the public service to only recruit graduates of the School of
Commerce. This was one of the first regulatory controls on the
occupation of accountancy in Portugal — and it was a monopoly
right consistent with corporatist ideology.
12 This claim is one that has garnered much support in Portugal. Francisco
Felisberto Dias da Costa, for example, writing in French in 1900, has contended
that “Portugal est une des premières nations, sinon la première nation où a été
établi l’enseignement official du commerce”. We are currently investigating this
claim.
13 Statute 15 of the School indicates that it focused on double entry book-
keeping [Estatutos da Aula do Comércio de 10 de Abril de 1759 e Alvará de
Confirmação 19 de Maio de 1759; and see Azevedo, 1961].
14 Copied from the transcription made by PIMENTA, Pedroso — “O Marquez
de Pombal regulamentou as profissões de técnicos de contas”, Revista de
Contabilidade e Comércio, Oporto, Vol. II, No. 8, 1934, pp. 289-295.
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The Letter of Law emphasized the importance of facilitating
commerce and assisting merchants to develop their trading ac-
tivities. For example, Dom José (King Joseph) observed that “for
some years until now there is the absurdity that someone with-
out the requisite knowledge can put himself forward and call
himself a Businessman, without having learnt ethical principles,
mercantile calculations, reading and writing, and ignoring, in
that way, a so necessary and noble profession” [Letter of Law,
30 August 1770].
All merchants, bookkeepers, cashiers, business houses, cor-
porations, and public or private societies were required to be
registered with the Board of Trade (Points 1-4) — a form of
licensing consistent with corporatist ideals. Persons not regis-
tered were to be disbarred from practice and from obtaining
public posts and were to suffer the further indignity of having
all accounts recorded by them rejected in the courts. Points 12
and 13 pre-established a fixed salary per year for the first three
years of activity for each bookkeeper. (First year: 72,000 réis;
second year: 96,000 réis; and third year: 120,000 réis.) Thereaf-
ter, bookkeepers were free to charge whatever they liked for
their services.
Access to diverse public posts was reserved for graduates of
the School of Commerce who possessed an approval letter from
the Board of Trade (Points 5 and 11). These posts included
clerks in naval vessels, army clerks, and officers administering
the Real Fazenda (Royal Finances), bookkeepers and cashiers.
Dom José (King Joseph) acknowledged the positive impact of
the School of Commerce (in the Letter of Law of 30 August
1770) with the self-commendation and observation that “the
three courses to graduate from the School of Commerce have
shown the righteousness of this Royal policy. The large number
of students graduating from the first two courses has been suc-
cessfully employed in several offices of my Royal Civil Service”.
The prestige of the School of Commerce continued into the
19th century. Ferreira Borges, in his Commercial Juridical Dic-
tionary of 1833, makes it clear that to become a bookkeeper one
had to be a graduate of the School of Commerce and be certified
by the Board of Trade [Perdigão, 1950]. The School of Com-
merce continued to be an influential stepping-stone to careers in
commerce in the Portuguese public sector for many years.15
15 It was reformed on 20 September 1844 and affiliated with the Lisbon High
School, where it was known as the Escola de Comércio (School of Commerce) or
Secção Comercial (Commercial Section).
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Cardoso’s [1984] examination of the vocational employment
destinations of graduates of the School’s third and fourth
courses (commencing in 1767 and 1771 respectively) revealed
that of 130 graduates 52% went into “accounting and bookkeep-
ing activities”; 21% were involved with “emigration activities
(Brazil and India)”; 19% were employed in general “commercial
activities”; and 8% were involved in “other” activities (mainly in
military and religious pursuits).
LIBERAL MONARCHY (1820-1890)
Portugal was de-stabilized by the French invasion of 1807,
led by General Junot. The Portuguese court of the Prince Regent
fled to Brazil, diluting the power of the monarchy.16 The French
were expelled by a British military force in 1808 and the British
became military rulers of Portugal until 1820 “when restiveness
at British overrule” prompted a “French-style” revolution that
continued intermittently for 31 years [Birmingham, 1993, p. 96].
Nonetheless, British influence in external affairs, and in the
wine industry, remained very strong. But a significant transfor-
mation in the mood of Portugal, often described as a “liberal
revolution”, commenced about 1820. This mood was reflected in
the Portuguese constitution of 1822, which enunciated support
for individual rights and liberal ideals (e.g., in articles 1 and 27;
Miranda, 1976, p. XIV). French attitudes of laissez faire and
liberalism became popular in some quarters. Portugal, in keep-
ing with much of Europe, was caught up in a tide of liberal
ideas. This was especially the case after the liberal revolutions in
Europe in 1830 and 1848.17 A major effect on commerce was
that, to a large extent (there were exceptions), monopoly privi-
leges, licensing, interest group representation and regulation
were viewed with less favor. Consequently, the period witnessed
some de-regulation of arrangements governing accounting.
The Portuguese Commercial Code of 1833: Intuitively, one might
expect this code to contain de-regulatory manifestations of the
16 The Prince Regent had acted in that role from 1792 after Maria I (Mary I)
was declared insane. He was formally declared Prince Regent in 1799 and be-
came Dom João VI (King John IV) in 1816.
17 Manifestations of liberal ideals were in proposals to tax the nobility and
clergy, undertake agricultural reform, abolish feudal privilege, reform arrange-
ments governing land tenure, institute parliamentary democracy, and broaden
civil rights [Birmingham, 1993, pp. 104-109].
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liberal attitudes that were gaining ground in Portugal — espe-
cially as the code’s principal architect was Ferreira Borges, a
lawyer and economist who was an important figure in the lib-
eral revolution in Oporto18 in August 1820. Ferreira Borges
wrote this Code on his final return from political exile. (He was
exiled, principally in the United Kingdom, from 1823 to 1827
and from 1828 to 1833). But rather than the Code containing
liberalizing de-regulation, it imposed rules on accounting activi-
ties. The books that merchants were required to keep were
specified, as was their mode of organization. The accountant
who prepared the books of a merchant was required to be pub-
licly registered.
The reasons for such seemingly paradoxical, aberrant be-
havior — regulation in a period of liberalism — are not easy to
explain. One seemingly plausible explanation is that the paradox
was a manifestation of the uncertainty, precarious mutability
and volatility of the times. Although the 1820 liberal revolution-
aries (including Ferreira Borges) were, in the main, “large mer-
chants whose interests coincided with the British trade which
they did not want to hinder” [Birmingham, 1993, p. 126], views
on trade and related commercial matters (e.g. accounting regu-
lation) were far from universal in Portugal. Liberal views took
time to gain hold across the country. Many in the farming and
manufacturing sectors in Portugal, for example, wanted non-
liberal “French-style economic nationalism . . . [and] . . . tariff
protection against imports” [Birmingham, 1993, p. 126]. Thus,
the regulations imposed in the 1833 Code could be explained as
a reflection of the heterogeneity of views on trade and com-
merce that were held within a developing liberal state. They
could also have been occasioned by the positive influence that
regulatory developments in the UK had on the Code’s author,
Ferreira Borges, during his exile in London. Another explana-
tion could be that the regulations in the Code provided a frame-
work that would help business to flourish: this could be seen as
liberal behavior, in contrast to other types of regulations that
were clearly intrusive controls.19
18 This is the second largest city in Portugal. It is known in Portuguese as
“Porto”, but in English as “Oporto”. Both of these terms are used interchange-
ably here in referring to this city. The choice of term is dependent on context.
19 We are indebted to Dick Edwards for drawing our attention to the latter
point. Jose Carvalho has conjectured that there was possibly a great difference
between law and practice at this time. That is, that whilst these regulations
existed in a de jure sense, they were not complied with in a de facto sense.
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The Letter of Law of 1838 and the Commercial Code of 1888:
These were two important milestones in the evolution of the
accounting profession in Portugal. Article 9 in the Letter of Law
of 7 April 1838 indicated that certain professions and artisans
were to be subject to a 10% decima (income tax) [Moreira,
1944]. In paragraph 11 of Article 9, bookkeepers are mentioned
specifically as being subject to the tax. The requirement that a
bookkeeper be registered with the Board of Trade or be a gradu-
ate of the School of Commerce was relaxed. This was in keeping
with the [by then] pervading ethos of economic liberalism: the
government believed it unnecessary to interfere with the profes-
sions, with the registration of professional persons, and with the
organization of professional bodies.20
The enactment of the Código Comercial (Commercial Code)
in 1888 provided a clear example of the influence of liberalism
on de-regulation. It allowed all merchants and joint-stock com-
panies to conduct their own accounting, or to authorize (either
expressly or tacitly) any other person to do it, irrespective of that
person’s skills (articles 30 and 38). Thus, all business records
could be kept by either a bookkeeper or a cashier, or merchants
themselves, irrespective of the keeper’s skills, formal training
and official registration [Perdigão, 1950].
WANING LIBERALISM AND RISING CORPORATISM
(1890-1926)
By the beginning of the 1890s it was becoming increasingly
apparent that de-regulation and continued adherence to eco-
nomic liberalism was not in Portugal’s best interests. The Portu-
guese economy, beset by a stagnating wine industry, was too
weak to face free competition from Spain and Britain. There
was a major financial crisis in 1891-1892 when Portugal could
not meet interest payments on foreign loans and was forced to
raise new loans at big discounts and to pledge vital national
assets (such as the tobacco monopoly) as security. In effect, the
country was on the verge of bankruptcy. Public debt ballooned
and the trade deficit worsened [Livermore, 1976, p. 309]. Portu-
gal began to turn to corporatist, protectionist policies to sustain
20 Nonetheless, there were some exceptions, particularly in the public sector.
For example, by article 74 of the decree of 20 September 1884, only those
students with a diploma from the School of Commerce or those who had com-
pleted the correspondence course at Oporto’s Polytechnic Academy [Azevedo,
1961] were eligible for positions in the Public Treasury and Customs House.
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its domestic economy and colonial interests. As a consequence,
there was a gradual accommodation (if not replacement) of
ideas of economic liberalism with centralist corporatist policies.
This was abetted by corporatist advocates like the anti-liberal
Movimento Social Católico (Catholic Social Movement) that be-
lieved in a strong state and a clearly defined hierarchical struc-
ture in society.
The early years of this transition period were ones of con-
ciliation between the two ideologies and hence, some ambiguity.
However, the assassination of Dom Carlos I (King Carlos I) and
his son in Lisbon in 1908 and the establishment of the Republic
in 1910, heralded a hardening of attitudes to liberalism. These
were fuelled by lingering memories of the financial crisis of the
early 1890s and ensuing allegations of business corruption. Atti-
tudes hardened further as the political administration passed
through the hands of 45 governments between 1911 and 1926:
there was a transition from democratic republicanism (for ex-
ample, of Afonso Costa in 1913) to military authoritarianism
(for example, of the corporatist, Sidónio Pais in 1917) [Birming-
ham, 1993, p. 150]. The period was known as the rotativismo
(rotation) period and was characterized by a lack of “any coher-
ent ideology” [Lloyd-Jones, 1994c, p. 3].
Regulation of Joint-stock Companies and Accounting Experts:
Consistent with the renewed popularity of corporatism, it was
not surprising that as joint-stock companies became increas-
ingly important, new mercantile associations appeared and new
regulations were imposed. The most significant regulatory de-
velopments in this period occurred in 1911. Article 35 of a stat-
ute promulgated on 13 April 1911, for example, required joint-
stock companies to submit to official audit and inspection.
Directors were prohibited from serving as bookkeepers of any
company they administered. The concept of mutual liability was
introduced: in the event of any fraudulent acts concealing the
truth of any individual component part of a balance sheet, all
bookkeepers, managers and other participants in the adminis-
tration of joint-stock companies were to be regarded as accom-
plices [Perdigão, 1950].
In 1911, a law dealing with “accounting experts” was intro-
duced, requiring accounting to be undertaken by “capable tech-
nicians” (Government Diary, no 124, 29 May 1911). The provi-
sional government of the Portuguese Republic decreed also that
the Ministry of Justice create two widely-representative Cham-
bers of Accounting Experts, one for the north and one for the
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south of the country (Article 1).21 In the spirit of corporatism,
the Chambers were collegial associations whose main objective
was to supervise the provision of commentary on, and verifica-
tion of, the various balance sheets and accounting reports and
related documents presented to general meetings of companies.
They also examined evidence referred to them from commercial,
criminal and civil trial proceedings.
CORPORATIST DICTATORSHIP (1926-1974)
In 1926, the military, led by General Oscar Carmona, over-
threw the incumbent democratically elected government. In
1932, President Carmona appointed António Salazar as Prime
Minister — a position Salazar held for 36 years. Salazar was a
“dry, humourless, religious, intellectual” [Lloyd-Jones, 1994a, p.
7] who had held academic posts at the University of Coimbra.
His appointment has been described as “Professor of Political
Economy” in 1918 [Robinson, 1979, p. 45]; “Professor of Eco-
nomics” in 1926 [Livermore, 1976, p. 331]; unqualified emer-
gency lecturer in financial law who “wrote articles on national
bookkeeping for the press” [Birmingham, 1993, p. 157]; and also
as a “lecturer in accountancy” [Birmingham, 1993, p. 159].
Salazar’s regime was “totalitarian, police-run, corporative, anti-
liberal, anti-democratic, anti-parliamentary, anti-collectivist,
and disdainful of opponents whom it was willing to eliminate
physically” [Georgel, 1981, p. 302, translated, cited in Birming-
ham, 1993, p. 159, italics applied].
Salazar’s power and Estado Novo (New Estate) regime was
entrenched by the new constitution of 1933, in which Article 5
defined Portugal as a “unitary and corporative republic”. Salazar
sought to “reduce, if not indeed eliminate all popular involve-
ment in the actual process of government” [Lloyd-Jones, 1994a,
p. 3]. But whereas Salazar was a supporter of corporatism, for
several decades the bureaucratic apparatus of his regime was
cumbersome and inefficient in implementing corporatist ideals
effectively. Nonetheless, in the early years of his [and
21 The Chamber for the North was composed of twelve individuals (four each
from the Court of Commerce, the Commercial Association of Oporto, and the
Industrial Association of Oporto). The Chamber for the South was composed of
24 individuals (chosen by the following institutions: Court of Commerce,
Lisbon’s Commercial Association, Portuguese Industrial Association, Lisbon
Shopkeepers’ Association, Portuguese Agricultural Association and the Lawyers’
Association).
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Carmona’s] regime, some important professional organizations
were established by Government Order. There was a Lawyers
Order (1926), an Engineers Order (1936) and a [medical] Doc-
tors Order (1938).22 But it was not until 1972 (under Caetano’s
regime) that another professional association was granted an
“Order”, the Pharmacists Order. In 1968, Salazar suffered a de-
bilitating brain clot. The reins of his administration were taken
up by a like-minded lieutenant, Marcelo Caetano.23
Salazar, intent on centralizing power, took corporatism to
an extreme. He was opposed to free-reigning associations of
individuals with a common purpose, such as professional asso-
ciations and labor unions. He wanted such associations to be
“corporatized” under firm state control. In 1933, he introduced
a National Labor Statute. This banned all free unions and profes-
sional associations, and set up in lieu, a system of “National
Unions” (covering both former professional organizations and
labor unions). These “National Unions” were to be controlled
absolutely by Salazar and his apparatchiks.
In 1934, in keeping with corporatist philosophy, Salazar’s
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture commissioned
a study of how to best regulate bookkeepers and accountants. It
was conducted by a committee comprising representatives of
the Ministry, the Superior Institute of Economic and Finance
Sciences of Lisbon, the Portuguese Industrial Association, the
Merchants’ Association, National Union of Accountants and
Bookkeepers from the Oporto district, and selected graduates
from Accounting Institutes or equivalent courses. The Com-
mission’s report was never published.24
National Union of Accountants and Bookkeepers from the Oporto
District [NUABO]: This body, founded in 1934, sought to guar-
antee correct and strict professional conduct by accountants
and thereby enhance their prestige. NUABO was a “free union”
[as opposed to one of the Salazar state’s “national unions”]. It
sought to advance accounting technique by organizing study
sessions, developing libraries, creating accounting schools, and,
22 The Orders are the most prestigious and elitist corporatist organisations in
Portugal. Other Orders issued since then in Portugal are the Architects Order in
1998, the Economists Order in 1998 and the Auditors Order in 1999.
23 Salazar died without recovering his powers, in July 1970 [Livermore,
1976, p. 358].
24 Our knowledge is obtained from an article by Pedroso Pimenta [1950], a
Professor of the Commercial Institute of Lisbon.
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in other ways, promoting the professional interests of members.
It quickly became influential. On 28 June 1936, the Ministry of
Corporations and Social Welfare, consistent with corporatist
philosophy, prohibited owners of businesses in Portugal from
employing accountants and bookkeepers who did not belong to
NUABO or who did not possess an accrediting “professional
letter” from it (Article 2, Edit n0 23712). Thus, the “Professional
Letter” from NUABO became essential as a licensing credential
for persons wanting to practice as accountants and bookkeep-
ers. At this time, NUABO was the only accounting organization
of a corporate character in Portugal [Sousa, 1933].25 Hence, it
fulfilled a national, rather than a regional, responsibility. Its
important role in defending and promoting the interests of the
profession was strengthened further by subsequent government
decrees.26
Proposals for the Regulation of the Accounting Profession by the
Academic Association of the Commercial Institute of Oporto:
These proposals, put forward on 8 November 1940, although
never implemented, are important indicators of the corporatist
mood of the time. They categorized “accounting technicians”
variously in the hierarchy of “bookkeeper”, “accountant” or “ac-
countant expert” (Part I). A bookkeeper was regarded to be a
technician who executes recording operations. An accountant
was defined as a technician who supervises, organizes, guides
and conducts the services of accounting and the administration
of a public or private organization. An accountant expert was
defined to be a technician responsible for inspecting and verify-
ing the accounting and management facts of economic organiza-
tions.
Part II of the proposals related to the use of titles by mem-
bers of NUABO. The designation bookkeeper was available to
individuals of either gender, who were at least 19 years old, had
a degree from an accepted course of commerce offered by an
25 In 1942, the Lisbon District intended also to have a similar “Accounting
Union”. But the State Secretary of Corporations refused to allow its formation,
arguing that NUABO was an error, and that errors must not be repeated. In
other Portuguese districts, accountants were included in unions of Office Clerks.
NUABO was the only organization of its type representing accountants.
26 For example, Edit 28220, 24 November 1937, included “accountant expert”
in the Chart of Liberal Professions. Edit 29931, 15 September 1939, considered
the “professional letter” given by NUABO to be compulsory for those wanting to
practise the profession.
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Institute of Commerce (or official equivalent courses recognized
by law), and at least two years of experience using a double
entry bookkeeping system. The designation accountant was
available to individuals of either gender, who were at least 21
years old, graduate accountants with a degree from the Insti-
tutes of Commerce (or equivalent courses recognized by law),
and with at least one year of experience in accounting using
double entry bookkeeping.27 The title accounting expert was
available to individuals of either gender who were over 25 years
of age, graduates in accounting from an Institute of Commerce
(or equivalent courses recognized by law) and with at least six
years experience using double entry accounting. Joint-stock
companies, banks, autonomous state organizations with private
accounting, and administrative corporations with revenue and
expense movements larger than two thousand escudos were re-
quired to have an accountant supervising and conducting their
accounting (Part III).
In Part IV, accounting technicians were to be held liable if
they signed balance sheets that did not follow the “rules and
principles of accounting”;28 made accounting entries that were
not properly justified or were contrary to established legal prin-
ciples; signed any page that did not correspond to what they
examined; did not comply with appropriate standards of profes-
sional ethics; or failed to comply with the law. Part V estab-
lished the Conselho Superior dos Técnicos de Contabilidade (Su-
perior Board of Accounting Technicians) to administer,
discipline and supervise the affairs of accounting technicians.29
Responsibility for monitoring the use of titles and the practice
of the profession of bookkeepers, accountants and expert ac-
countants was given to the national unions in Part IV.
In June 1943 there was a setback to the progress of
the regulatory development of an accounting profession. The
27 Individuals who, at the date of the promulgation of the regulation, had
been in charge of accounting in any bank, limited company or public
organisation, could also request to use the title “accountant”.
28 There were no accounting standards at the time to offer guidance. The
principal point of reference for accountants was to the theoretical principles and
operating rules that were promoted as good practice in accounting texts and
educational curricula.
29 It was composed of a President, together with a teacher of accounting
from each of the Superior Institute of Economic and Finance Sciences, the
Intermediate Institutes of Commerce, the Professional Schools of Commerce,
together with one expert accountant, one graduate accountant and one graduate
bookkeeper elected by the National Union of Accounting Technicians.
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Ministry of Corporations and the Welfare State dissolved the
“free union” NUABO [Bulletin of the National Institute of Work
and Providence, no. 11, 15 June 1943, Decree No 23050, 23 Sep-
tember 1943]. Accountants and bookkeepers were forced to join
a heterogeneous union controlled by the Salazar regime, the
National Union of Office Clerks. There was thought to be no
need for a private professional union of accountants and book-
keepers.
The NUABO episode (1934-1943) seems likely to provide
rich fare for more detailed archival analysis of the dialogue be-
tween an emerging professional association and the bureau-
cracy of a corporatist state. (See further comment on this point
in the “Discussion” section).
The Portuguese Accounting Society: On 28 January 1945 the Por-
tuguese Accounting Society [PAS] was founded to advance
knowledge of the “science of accounts”. The PAS promoted con-
ferences, disseminated accounting know-how, published the
Boletim da Sociedade Portuguesa de Contabilidade (Bulletin of
the Portuguese Accounting Society), established libraries, pro-
vided research facilities, and awarded scholarships and prizes.
Members of the society were classified as “effective”, “affiliated”,
“honorary” and “correspondent”. Effective members were gradu-
ates of an accounting course provided by the Commercial Insti-
tutes (or equivalent intermediate courses). They could also be
eminent individuals who had produced works of recognized
value in the field of accounting, or accounting technicians occu-
pying high posts in industry and commerce. Affiliated members
were foreign graduates living in Portugal who had qualifications
from teaching establishments deemed to be of equivalent status.
Honorary members were national or foreign individuals who had
provided valuable service to the society, or who were famous for
other work in accounting. Correspondent members were nation-
als or foreigners who, whilst out of Portugal, had distinguished
themselves by studies in accounting or by important service to
society.
The PAS fought strongly for the reform of technical teach-
ing and for the regulation of accounting technicians. In 1946 it
introduced a proposal into the Câmara Corporativa (Corporative
Chamber) for the reform of accounting. Principally, it sought to
harmonize and improve the teaching of accounting. Three levels
of teaching were proposed “professional”, “complementary” and
“superior”. (The proposal is reproduced in Sociedade Portuguesa
de Contabilidade, 1946, pp. 261-274). In 1949, the PAS also pro-
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moted a series of lectures titled: “The Advantages for Accounting
from the Professional Regulation of Accounting Technicians”. In
one of these lectures, a prominent lawyer, Azevedo Perdigão
[1950], argued that regulation was needed to protect the inter-
ests of all users of accounting information. Not surprisingly, one
of the major users of accounting information (the Tax Adminis-
tration) prompted the next major milestone in the evolution of
the accounting profession in Portugal.
Industrial Tax Code of 1963: A Código de Contribuição Industrial
(Industrial Tax Code) of 1963 placed a tax on entity profits that
had been calculated by accounting systems. Consequently, the
implementation of this tax reform required rigorous accounting,
performed by an approved accounting technician — one who
was over 21 years of age, of good character, and who possessed
an approved accounting degree or similar credential.30 Those
who had practiced as an accountant or bookkeeper for five
years, but who did not have an accounting degree or similar
credential, could obtain temporary registration as an “accounts
technician” and be formally recognized as a full member after
passing a qualifying exam.31 The Industrial Tax Code led to a
significant increase in the importance assigned to professional
accounting skills.
Two government orders [No. 20317, 14 January 1964; and
No. 21247, 27 April 1965] enabling the implementation of the
Industrial Tax Code were significant because they formally in-
troduced the expression Técnicos de Contas (Accounts Techni-
cian). These orders made accountants responsible for account-
ing in enterprises, and enhanced their dignity, legitimacy and
respect. These developments led to the establishment of a “pro-
fessional nucleus” of accounting technicians within the hetero-
geneous [state-run] National Union of Professional Office Clerks
to lobby for the interests of accountants.
30 These included holders of a degree in either Finance or Economics or an
approved course in Commercial Administration or Finance offered by the Supe-
rior Institute of Economic and Finance Sciences; graduates with a degree in
Economics from Oporto’s Economics Faculty; and graduates from other courses
offered by the Superior Institutes of Commerce.
31 From the inception of the Industrial Tax Code in 1963 through to until
1995 approximately 45,000 accountants have been registered [Carqueja, 2001].
Professional entry exams were made mandatory by government authorities in
1979.
121
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 2003, Vol. 30, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 2003
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2003114
The Commission Established by the Ministry of Corporations and
Welfare, 1964: In December 1964, the Ministry of Corporations
and Welfare established a commission (which had no formal
title) to study professional qualifications, and how best to regu-
late and legally constitute a profession of accounting techni-
cians.32 The commission presented its report to the ministry in
October 1970.33 Generally, its proposals were considered to be
reasonable, sensible and dignified. The commission was mindful
of the sensitivities of the many accounting professionals who
did hold degrees. One of its most significant recommendations
was to propose that the term Técnicos de Contas (Accounts
Technicians) be changed to Técnicos de Contabilidade (Account-
ing Technicians). The intent was to create an official, compul-
sory designation for practicing accountants, that of “accounting
technician”. This was to be conferred principally on professional
persons who had practiced bookkeeping, accounting or auditing
for more than five years. Prior to 1970, the majority of regis-
tered accounts technicians were members of a variety of na-
tional, centrally controlled labor unions in banking, insurance,
administrative services and other clerical pursuits. The commis-
sion regarded such widespread membership as inappropriate for
effective professional development. It proposed that all account-
ing technicians be registered in a mooted National Union of
Accounting Technicians — a professional union rather than a
labor union.
Although the Commission’s recommendations were pio-
neering, their significance did not emerge for some years
[Fernandes Ferreira, 1995, p. 296]. This attempt to enhance
regulation did not produce the desired progress in the profes-
sion. Implementation of the recommendations was slow, partly
because of the distractions of the wars Portugal was fighting in
32 Government Order No. 20691. The commission was made up of one repre-
sentative each of the DGCI; National Education Ministry; Work Corporations
Head Quarters (President); Social Security Services of the Ministry of Corpora-
tions and Providence; Working Development Fund; National Union Federations
of Offices’ Clerks, together with a graduate in economics; and an accountant-
expert.
33 In the meantime, in 1968, the Jornal do Técnico de Contas e da Empresa
(Accounts Technician and Enterprise Journal) was founded. This journal and
the Revista de Contabilidade e Comércio (Accounting and Commerce Review)
(published from 1933 to 1986 and from 1992 to the present) made important
contributions to the evolution of accounting in Portugal. The “Accounting and
Commerce Review” was founded by José Henriques Garcia and Francisco
Caetano Dias (Professors of Accounting in Lisbon).
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its colonies (especially in Angola), the notorious “snail’s pace” of
Portuguese bureaucracy, and political vacillation by the Caetano
regime following the demise of Salazar. Nonetheless, a signifi-
cant positive evolution in accounting and auditing regulations
emerged in 1972, when a Governmental Order formally recog-
nized an auditing profession — but not through an official Or-
der. Auditors were designated as Revisores Oficiais de Contas
(Official Accounts Revisers). They were to operate under the
umbrella of a Câmara dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas (Official
Accounts Revisers Chamber). In 1999, the Auditors Chamber
was granted an official Auditors Order. Its official designation
was Ordem dos Revisores Oficiais de Contas (Official Accounts
Reviser [or Auditor] Order).
EMERGING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND
NEO-CORPORATISM (1974 TO PRESENT)
Following the overthrow of Caetano’s government (1968-74)
in the Revolução dos Cravos (Carnations Revolution) in 1974,
General Spínola was unable or unwilling to shake off the legacy
of four decades of Salazarian corporatism. Gradually, a series of
democratically elected governments, variously moderate social-
ist or moderate social democrat, came to power. They were pre-
pared to share political power, with grace, in a pluralist fashion,
in accordance with the will of the electorate, and to recognize
the basic human rights of citizens. Gradually, there was a transi-
tion to more liberal economic policies (such as privatization,
agrarian reform and free trade), especially under Prime Minister
Cavaco Silva. Portugal began to emerge as a liberal democracy.34
Proposals by Accounts Technicians of the Office Clerks’ Union
(Lisbon) Concerning the Regulation of Accounting:35 In October
34 Portugal was facing developmental trends similar to those experienced
elsewhere in Europe. Carrera et al. [2001, p. 803] describe how, in Spain for the
period 1942-88, “the environment of the Spanish audit profession witnessed the
peaceful transition from a dictatorship to a fully-fledged democracy as well as
the emergence of a free market economy from a system characterized by stiff
economic autarchy and an overriding intervention of the state in the economy”.
Caramanis [1997] outlines the impact of “liberalization” on auditor behavior in
Greece after 1992.
35 The details of these proposals were published in the Jornal do Técnicos de
Contas, March 1975, pp. 74-77; April 1975, pp. 109-111; May 1975, pp. 143-145;
June 1975, pp. 192-196; November 1975, pp. 342-344; December 1975, pp. 376-
378; and February 1976, pp. 39-40.
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1974, the Accounts Technicians in the Office Clerks’ Union
(Lisbon) [ATOCU], proposed to the Finance Ministry that the
conduct of accounting in companies should be performed by a
person with “proper” qualifications, such as an “accounts tech-
nician”. The proposals advocated reserving the practice of ac-
counting to legally qualified individuals, in order to guarantee
technical competency.
ATOCU considered that neither a government “Professional
Order” nor a labor union was the appropriate body to represent
the interests of accountants. A professional “Order” was re-
garded as too elitist because it would tend to represent only
accountants with tertiary educational qualifications. Although
labor unions would have the advantages of accommodating in-
dividuals with different education levels, it was felt that they
would be unsuitable structures for developing and enforcing
deontological principles, professional disciplinary mechanisms
and compulsory registration procedures. Accordingly, in March
1977, ATOCU established a non-official Câmara dos Técnicos de
Contas (Chamber of Accounts Technicians) to represent the in-
terests of accounts technicians. It was composed of a General
Assembly, Fiscal Board, Disciplinary Board and Technical
Board and had effective, honorary and merit members. Merit and
honorary members were those who served in the Chamber. Ef-
fective members were account technicians who were proposed
by the board and whose membership was approved by a General
Assembly.
ATOCU campaigned for legal regulation of accounts techni-
cians and for official recognition to be accorded to its Chamber.
ATOCU rejected the expression guarda-livros (bookkeepers) as
the generic label for accountants, on the grounds that it con-
jured an outdated, negative, inaccurate and demeaning image of
accountants as tedious, menial, procedurally-focused, procrasti-
nating, bureaucrats. The title “accountant” was also rejected. It
was deemed too “academic” and prone to arouse resentment
from those not possessing tertiary educational qualifications.
The designation, “accounts technician”, was preferred over “ac-
counting technician” because the former term had been used in
Portugal since the enactment of the Industrial Tax Code in 1963.
Portuguese Accounting Association and the Portuguese Associa-
tion of Accounts Technicians: The revolution on 25 April 1974
and the ensuing growth in personal freedom and democracy
unleashed a pent up desire by the average Portuguese (who had
been ‘silenced’ by four decades of Salazarism) to participate in
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the decision processes of modern Portuguese society. There was
a keen espírito associativista (associative spirit) at the time,
which encouraged the growth of organizations representing a
wide variety of social and professional interests. Several profes-
sions (such as doctors, lawyers and engineers) were already rep-
resented by professional bodies formally recognized by govern-
ment through “professional orders”. The ambient mood of the
time prompted economists and architects to seek similar recog-
nition. Two major professional associations in accounting were
soon formed.
On 3 March 1975, the Associação Portuguesa de Cont-
abilidade (Portuguese Accounting Association) was founded.
Membership was restricted to graduates of Institutos Superiores
de Contabilidade (Superior Schools of Accounting). The associa-
tion sought to defend the exclusive right of members to use
professional titles; to promote professional updating and cul-
tural development among members by means of colloquia, con-
ferences, seminars, and publications of interest; to foster cre-
ativity and innovation among its associates; to stimulate
research in accounting; and to participate in the teaching of
accounting at all levels. In 1976, the Portuguese Accounting As-
sociation contributed strongly to developing intermediate ac-
counting schools into superior accounting schools. In March
1986 the Portuguese Accounting Association was instrumental
in establishing Courses of Specialized Higher Studies, thereby
elevating the intermediate accounting diploma to a bachelor’s
degree.36
1977 was an important year in the development of the pro-
fession. In March of that year, the Associação Portuguesa dos
Técnicos de Contas (Portuguese Association of Accounts Techni-
cians) [APOTEC] was created, free of the yoke of state control,
and with membership open to all accounts technicians.
APOTEC sought to raise widespread awareness of the impor-
tance of accounting and its technicians; and to improve the
skills, knowledge and efficiency of accounting technicians. In
April 1977, APOTEC37 commenced publication of its monthly
36 In December 1997 the association changed its name to Associação
Portuguesa de Peritos Contabilistas (Portuguese Accounting Experts’ Associa-
tion). It did so, to harmonize with the European professional designation,
Fedération des Experts Comptables Européens.
37 In 2000, APOTEC had 8311 effective associate members. Also noteworthy
is its establishment of a Center for the Study of the History of Accounting. See
website www.apotec.pt (last visited 6 June 2002).
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bulletin, Jornal de Contabilidade (Accounting Journal) — a jour-
nal still in publication. 1977 also saw the approval of the Plano
Oficial de Contabilidade (Official Accounting Plan). Gradually,
the regulatory accoutrements and paraphernalia of a mature
accounting profession began to be put in place. In 1983, a
Commissão de Normalização Contabilística (Accounting Stan-
dards Board) was established.
Portugal was accorded “a badge of democratic respect” [Bir-
mingham, 1993, p. 190] by its admittance to the European Com-
munity (now the European Union) in 1986. Portugal’s entry re-
quired it to be “bound by European accounting directives,
common education and training requirements, compulsory mu-
tual recognition of qualifications and more” [Harding, 2000, p.
593] and also indicated clear affirmation of its preparedness to
accept liberal principles of free competition.
Tax Reforms of 1989: These reforms were implemented through
significant new codes covering personal income tax and profit-
based taxes for business entities (Código do Imposto sobre o
Rendimento de Pessoas Colectivas and Código do Imposto sobre o
Rendimento das Pessoas Singulares) and were prompted, in part,
by Portugal’s entry into the EU. Although the Industrial Tax
Code of 1963 was revoked, accounting-based profit remained
the critical measure upon which tax was levied. Somewhat para-
doxically, due to an apparent legislative oversight [Carqueja,
2001] or perhaps due to the subtle, implicit, conditioning effects
of an emerging and an engulfing liberalism, it was no longer
compulsory (as it had been since 1963) to have the signature of
an accounting professional in tax declarations.38 Consequently,
the importance of the accounts technician for businesses was
diminished.
Statutes of Official Accounts Technicians, 1995: The Fiscal Re-
forms in 1989 were a response to the new competitive demands
of the European single market and the urgent need to rein in
public deficits. This prompted the Portuguese state to begin an-
other flirtation or dalliance with corporatism, as Molina and
Rhodes [2002, p. 309, italics applied] have noted:
. . . at the same time, older, traditional corporatist struc-
tures and relationships were being adapted, rather than
38 Nonetheless, the legal apparatus supporting the fiscal system recognized
this oversight. Between 1 January 1989 and 17 October 1995 it required that
“organized accounting” be the direct responsibility of an “accounts technician.”
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abandoned, in those countries where they were always
most important [ . . . ] To varying degrees, the Nether-
lands, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain have imple-
mented social pacts, based on peak-level concertation,
to adapt to new economic policy challenges.
One such adaptation involved recognition of the importance
of a professional cadre of state licensed chartered accountants
to assist in achieving economic and monetary union objectives.
In 1995 the Statutes of Official Accounts Technicians were is-
sued. These statutes required all business entities to have an
official accounts technician. Entities were to be taxed on their
profits, calculated in accordance with Portuguese GAAP — prin-
cipally comprised of a Plano Oficial de Contabilidade (Official
Accounting Plan) and specific Directrizes Contabilisticas (ac-
counting directives and standards) issued by the Comissão de
Normalização Contabilistica (Portuguese Accounting Standards
Board). Because they were obliged to have contabilidade
organizada (organized accounting), accounts technicians were
not dispensable. The activities of accounts technicians were of a
public nature and their regulation became an important public
matter.
The statute led to the establishment of an Associação dos
Técnicos Oficiais de Contas (Association of Official Accounts
Technicians) [ATOC]. Persons eligible to become an “official ac-
counts technician” principally were those with a bachelor’s de-
gree in one of accounting, administration, business, manage-
ment, finance and economics, from teaching institutions at
superior level, either private or public, recognized by the Minis-
try of Education. But study of cost accounting, Portuguese taxa-
tion and financial accounting was to have been completed suc-
cessfully.39
The objectives of ATOC were to defend the dignity and pres-
tige of the accounting function, to promote respect for ethical
principles; to defend the interests, rights and prerogatives of
members; and to promote and improve professional training,
principally through the organization of courses and colloquia.
With one or two minor exceptions after the creation of ATOC, a
bachelor’s degree became the minimum level of scholarly prepa-
ration required. ATOC changed its name in November 1999 to
39 Also eligible were those individuals with a minimum of three years work
experience in accounting services who had a secondary education and who had
completed a designated qualification course.
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Câmara dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas (CTOC). The English
translation of this name on the “international version” of the
official CTOC website (www.ctoc.pt/intver/associacao.html, last
visited August 9, 2002) is “Chamber of Chartered Accoun-
tants”.40
1999 was also a significant year in that the Auditors’ Cham-
ber was granted an official Auditors Order, part of the parapher-
nalia of a corporatist state, thereby reflecting Portugal’s mood of
affection for neo-corporatism.
The Contemporary Picture: Commencing in March 2003, regis-
tration as an effective, permanent member of CTOC will depend
not only on appropriate academic skills, but also on a profes-
sional internship, and an exam. The website of CTOC
(www.ctoc.pt last visited August 9, 2002), cites various legal
codes and ordinances which emphasize the public nature of the
profession of accountant, and the role of accountants as “privi-
leged interlocutors’ between taxpayers and the Tax Administra-
tion and ‘ordinary guarantors’ of the ‘tributary truth’”. It also
stresses that accountants must perform their duties with “tech-
nical strictness, ethical capacity and total independence”.
Currently, the specific subjects of scholarly preparation re-
quired for CTOC accreditation have been regulated. CTOC has
pre-established 11 subject areas that are regarded as a funda-
mental base of knowledge. These are partitioned into key sub-
jects and instrumental subjects. The key subjects, requiring a
minimum total of 300 hours study are: Financial Accounting
(120 hours), Cost and Management Accounting (90 hours) and
Portuguese Taxation Law (60 hours). The instrumental subjects,
requiring a minimum total of 360 hours study, include a choice
of five of eight defined subjects: Other laws, Auditing, Financial
Analysis/Business Finance, Business Organization and Manage-
ment, Economics, Computing and Information Systems, Statis-
tics, and Financial Matters/Financial Calculation.
The creation of CTOC and the introduction of the designa-
tion “chartered accountant” have been important steps in ad-
vancing the profession. In 2002, CTOC was by far the largest
40 The similarity of names (in Portuguese as least) between the private
organisation, Câmara dos Técnicos de Contas (Chamber of Accounts Techni-
cians) and this newly established Câmara dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas (Cham-
ber of Chartered Accountants), an official entity, prompted the private organiza-
tion to change its name to Instituto de Apoio ao Técnico Oficial de Contas
(Institute of Support to the Official Accounts Technicians).
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Portuguese professional accounting body: it had 71,509 mem-
bers (42% of whom were female and 69% of whom held a
bachelor’s degree).41 There is a growing presence of accounting
in the Universities too.42 A general feeling is emerging in the
ranks of the profession that finally accountants are beginning to
be accorded the mantle of dignity, prestige and social impor-
tance they deserve.
DISCUSSION
In the last quarter of the 20th century accounting began to
emerge as a mature profession in Portugal, on a par with its
international counterparts. The implementation of the Official
Accounting Plan in 1977, together with the creation of the Ac-
counting Standards Board in 1983, and admittance to the EU in
1986, were all instrumental in providing the necessary condi-
tions that led to the Statute of Official Accounts Technicians in
1995 and to the establishment of CTOC in 1999.
The first term used to designate accounting professionals in
Portugal was “bookkeeper”. But attempts to regulate the profes-
sion through the years have found favor with the broader desig-
nation of “accounts technician” — a generic term which in early
times included “bookkeeper”, “accountant” and “expert accoun-
tant”. In recent years the Portuguese equivalent of the term
“chartered accountant” has become popular.
There have been at least four major spurs to the emergence
of a mature accounting profession in Portugal. First, there were
the professional regulations arising from reforms instituted by
the Marquis of Pombal in the 1750s and the impetus provided
by the establishment, in 1759, of the School of Commerce. Many
of these professional regulations were undone by the tide of
liberalism that engulfed Portugal in the nineteenth century. Sec-
ond, there was the interest in professional regulation during the
corporatist regime of Salazar. Third, there were the require-
ments of tax administration and neo-corporatist politics in the
latter half of the 20th century. These required entity accounts
41 This information was supplied by the national headquarters of CTOC in
June, 2002.
42 In 2002, specialist undergraduate degrees in accounting are offered only
by the polytechnic institutes. However, accounting remains a major stream of
study in undergraduate degrees in Economics and Management in most Portu-
guese universities. Three universities (Aberta, ISCTE, Minho) offer specialist
post-graduate courses in accounting.
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(upon which tax was levied) to be prepared by a qualified ac-
countant. Fourth, there have been the “flow on” effects of
Portugal’s entry into the EU in 1986.
The Portuguese experience sets the stage for further re-
search. There is ample scope to draw upon the analysis provided
here in an explicitly comparative study, similar perhaps to that
conducted by Baker et al. [2001]. Additionally, Portugal provides
an excellent setting for enquiry into the facilitative role of ac-
counting in state domination. How was accounting and the ac-
counting profession implicated in the Salazar regime’s social
control? What would a review of articles published in the Ac-
counting and Commerce Review from 1933 reveal about
Portugal’s accounting and the use of accounting as a means of
social domination? An excellent opportunity to pursue such
lines of enquiry is provided by the operations of NUABO, 1934-
1943. Analysis of archival records of the dialogue between
NUABO (an association representing accountants) and the Min-
istry of Corporations and Social Welfare seems likely to enhance
understanding of NUABO’s legitimacy, its willingness to accept
monopoly control, the policy objectives the State sought to
achieve by tolerating the existence of NUABO, and the extent to
which NUABO influenced State policy. Such research could
draw strength from the study by Walker and Shackleton [1998]
of relationships between the accountancy profession and the
state in the UK between 1957 and 1970.
The development of accounting in Portugal since 1755 has
been characterized by episodes of regulatory advancement lo-
cated in periods where corporatist state ideals were popular.
These periods have been interspersed with episodes of de-regu-
lation at times when liberal ideals were in vogue. (For a sum-
mary, see Appendix 1). Many potential insights to accounting
professionalism and its history seem likely to be gained by fur-
ther investigation of the developmental episodes outlined above.
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APPENDIX 1
A Chronology of Some Significant Events in the
Development of Accounting in Portugal Since 1755
Date Event Significance
Corporatist Absolute Monarchy
1755 Major Earthquake in Lisbon Destruction of many commercial
records
1755 Board of Trade [BoT] established by Fostered commercial activity and
Marquis of Pombal improved business education
1759 School of Commerce [SoC] Portugal’s first formal educational
established institution offering instruction in
accounting
1770 First regulations governing the Some public service posts in
accounting profession accounting-related fields to be
available only to SoC graduates
Liberal Monarchy
1833 First Portuguese Commercial Code Merchants’ bookkeepers to be registered
and to be graduates of the SoC, certified
by BoT
1838 Profession of “bookkeeper” recognized Requirements for “bookkeepers” to be
in tax laws SoC graduates, certified by the BoT
were eased, although some public posts
were restricted to SoC graduates.
1888 Commercial Code Permits merchants and companies to
have anyone, irrespective of skill,
complete their accounting.
Liberalism and Corporatism
1910 The Republic of Portugal declared in Portugal implemented measures to
Lisbon. Constitution approved on become a modern state and to restore
20 August 1911. its economy.
April Joint stock companies were required The concept of “mutual liability”
1911 to submit their accounts for official introduced in respect of “fraudulent
inspection. Directors prohibited from accounting acts”.
serving as bookkeepers.
May Decree requiring accounting by Return to corporatism
1911 “capable technicians”. Two “Chambers
of Accounting Experts” established to
verify accounting reports and examine
accounting evidence.
Corporatist Dictatorship
1933 New Constitution of the Portuguese Portugal implemented measures to
Republic become a modern state and to restore
its economy
1933 National Statute of Labour introduced All free unions and professional
associations were banned and replaced
by a system of “National Unions”
controlled by the State.
1933 “Accounting and Commerce Review”
first published
1934 Government establishes commission The need for sound state regulation of
to study the regulation of bookkeepers bookkeepers and accountants
and accountants recognized by Salazar.
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Date Event Significance
1934 National Union of Accountants and A free union that sought to enhance the
Book-keepers from Oporto [NUABO] prestige of accountants and
founded. bookkeepers.
1936 Business owners prohibited from This “professional letter” became
employing accountants or bookkeepers essential for practicing as an
not possessing a “Professional Letter” accountant.
from NUABO.
1940 Proposals for regulation of the These proposed regulations were
emerging accounting profession by important indicators of the ambient
the Academic Association of the corporatist mood.
Commercial Institute of Oporto.
1943 Government dissolves NUABO. Salazar’s control of unions damaged
Interests of accountants to be the interests of accountants.
assumed by the National Union
of Office Clerks.
1945 Portuguese Accounting Society
founded
1963 Introduction of Industrial Tax Code, Need for more rigorous accounting,
requiring tax to be based on entity performed by “accounting technicians”
profits calculated according to GAAP. (a new term). Led to formation of a
“Nucleus of Accounting Technicians”
in the National Union of Professional
 Clerks.
1968 “Accounts Technician and Enterprise
Journal” first published
1970 Report of the commission established Recommended change in designation
by the Ministry of Corporations and from “Accounts Technician” to
Social Welfare to study “Accounting Technician”. Required
professionalization arrangements registration in a newly established
in accounting “National Union of Accounting
Technicians”
1972 Government recognition of the Accounting experts and the auditors to
auditing profession, but not through be organized in a separate Chamber.
a formal Order
Apr Revolutionary overthrow of the regime
1974 of Caetano (Salazar’s successor)
Emerging Liberal Democracy and
Neo-corporatism
1974 Proposals from the Office Clerks Union Recommended that company
 (Lisbon). accounting be conducted by persons
(such as “accounts technicians”) with
technical competence and “proper”
qualifications.
Mar  “Portuguese Accounting Association”
1975 founded
Mar “Portuguese Association of Accounts Active advocate and lobbyist, seeking to
1977 Technicians” [APOTEC] founded. raise professionalism and respect for
accountants.
Mar Chamber of Accounts Technicians Campaigned vigorously for the legal
1977 established by the Clerks’ Union regulation of accounting
Apr APOTEC commences publication of
1977 its monthly “Accounting Journal”
1977 Official Accounting Plan approved Compulsory for all companies except
those in banking, insurance or with
specific accounting plans
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1980 Accounting Standards Board Issues accounting standards and
established guidelines in accord with EU directives
 and International Accounting
Standards
1986 Admitted to the EU Adoption of 4th and 7th Directives
implied adoption of a new Official
Accounting Plan in 1989
March Commencement of “Courses of
1986 Specialized Higher Studies” in
accounting
1989 Fiscal reforms introduced new tax Paradoxically, it was no longer
codes, requiring profits-based tax compulsory for accounting
for business entities. professionals to attest to fiscal
declarations. The profession of
“accounts technician” disappeared.
1995 Statute of Official Accounts Businesses, taxed on profits,
Technicians required to have an “official accounts
technician” and “organized accounting”.
Led to establishment of ATOC,
“Association of Official Accounts
Technicians”, use of the term “chartered
accountant”, and compulsory
registration to practice as an accountant
1999 Auditors Order granted First official “Order” recognizing the
auditing profession
Nov ATOC changes its name to “Chamber
1999 of Chartered Accountants” [CTOC].
Date Event Significance
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Abstract: This paper examines the experience of Chinese accountants
transforming themselves into a profession during the early 20th cen-
tury. It delineates how the experience was shaped by an intersection
of economic development, the political culture and the nationalist
movement in semi-colonial Shanghai. Chinese accountants responded
to the daily manifestations of these larger historical forces by combin-
ing their professional self-interests with a nationalist agenda and by
adapting to the changing political environment. The history and
legacy of this experience provides a point of reference for observing
the re-emergence of the accounting profession in China since the end
of the Maoist era.
INTRODUCTION
After forced de-professionalization during the Maoist era
(1949-1976), the accounting profession, along with the legal pro-
fession and other professions, re-emerged in China with in-
creasing social and economic significance. Long before, and es-
pecially after, the entry of China to the WTO in 2001, the
Chinese government emphasized the imperative of conforming
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to international norms in economic fields. This offered profes-
sions an increasingly important role to play. An underlying need
for Chinese accountants was to commit themselves to profes-
sionalism. Profession and professionalism are not entirely new
concepts in China. They were present in early 20th century
China and contributed to the development of the accounting
profession at that time. Unfortunately, due to political and ideo-
logical suppression during the Maoist era, the legacy of the ac-
counting profession in the Republican era (1912-1949) has been
largely forgotten in China and has received little attention from
historians. Based on primary sources in the Chinese language
and through historical interpretation, this paper seeks to un-
earth that history and explore the professionalization of Chinese
accountants in the early 20th century. Our primary interest is
not in the development of accounting techniques, but the way in
which notions of profession were conceived and actualized at
that time by Chinese accountants in the pursuit of a
professionalization project.
PROFESSION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION
IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT
‘Profession’ and ‘professionalization’ are contested concepts
whose definition involves much sociological debate. For work-
ing purposes here, we will define ‘profession’ simply as an occu-
pational group that is recognized by the state and the public as
having special knowledge and expertise in a particular field. We
take ‘professionalization’ as the process by which such a group
obtains status and the privileges of a profession. Behind these
working definitions, of course, lies a large body of literature on
professions. Of this we can only give a very brief review.
The early paradigm that dominated the study of profession
and professionalization in the West was the ‘taxonomic ap-
proach’. This had two variants — the trait model and the func-
tionalist model [Saks, 1983]. Under these models, the claims of
certain occupational groups, such as their knowledge and exper-
tise, public-serving ethics, and self-regulation, were taken as ‘at-
tributes’ or ‘traits’ and applied to defining professions and speci-
fying their roles in society. In response to the taxonomic
paradigm, a ‘process model’ or ‘power analysis model’ emerged.
This model emphasized the analysis of professionalization as
the process by which occupational groups strive to gain power,
status, and privilege and to monopolize the market of their ser-
vices. The process was mediated by the class structure, the role
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of the state, and the acquisition and use of power by professions
[Povalko, 1988, pp.19-29].
The new process/power analysis paradigm led to a number
of approaches that were action/agency oriented rather than
structure/function oriented, including neo-Marxian, neo-
Weberian and critical approaches. The critical approach signifi-
cantly revised our understanding of how professional organiza-
tions, such as those of accountants, were motivated, established
and sustained [Willmott, 1986; Walker, 1991, 1995]. The notion
of ‘professionalization project’ or ‘professional project’ contains
a neo-Weberian thrust by stressing the ways in which certain
occupational groups built up a monopoly of a special body of
knowledge and the services based on it through the mechanism
of social closure [Macdonald, 1995, pp. 1-35]. But closure and
monopoly were often more the intention or strategy of profes-
sional actors as opposed to the results they achieved [Chua and
Poullaos, 1998]. The history of the Chinese accounting profes-
sion is to be examined in light of such a theoretical framework.
Most studies of professions based on the process model
have been biased towards Anglo-American experiences. Scholars
tended to discount the experiences of professional groups in
continental European countries [Larson, 1977, pp. xvii-xviii;
Freidson, 1983, p. 26; 1986, pp. 30-38]. Recent scholarship on
professionalization has corrected this bias. As one authority has
conceded “there was and there is more than one model of
professionalization” [Larson, 1990, p. 29] Indeed, more recent
studies such as those by Macdonald [1995] attempts a compara-
tive approach, considering professions and professionalization
in France and Germany as well as in Britain and the United
States. Studies on the accounting professions in countries such
as Australia, Canada, South Africa [Chua and Poullaos, 1993,
1998, 2002] have been augmented by research into locations
such as Spain [Carrera, Guiterrez and Carmona, 2001] and
China [Hao, 1999]. It is in these different cultural and historical
environments that manifold issues relating to professionali-
zation — such as the role of the state, class structure, class
formation, social closure, social stratification, stratification
within professions, bureaucracy and professions, nationalism,
and gender — have been profitably explored and analyzed.
Of all these issues, the role of the state is probably the most
crucial, even though it would come in various way, shape, and
form in different cultural and historical environments. None of
the other issues can be fully understood without an analysis of
the role of the state. Even in the Anglo-American context recent
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scholarship has found evidence of professions using state power
to reinforce their monopoly of services and control of the mar-
ket [McClelland, 1991, p. 7; Lee, 1996]. In other contexts a pat-
tern of negotiation and cooperation between professions and the
state has been identified [Willmott, 1986; Macdonald, 1995;
Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998].
With regard to China, it has been pointed out that a symbi-
otic relationship existed between the state and the emerging
legal and medical professions during the Republican period
(1912-1949). The Chinese state actively promoted and regulated
the legal and medical professions, thus bringing public recogni-
tion to those occupations while placing them under state super-
vision and control to serve modernization objectives [Xu, 2001].
The present study will show that the same relationship was
present in the case of the Chinese accounting profession. In a
recent study, applying the model of interaction among state,
market and community (profession), Hao [1999] argued that the
state was the most important factor in the rise of the accounting
profession in post-Mao China (1976-). The emergence of the
Chinese accounting profession in the early 20th century, on
which this study will focus, analyzes an antecedent to Hao’s
case, and relates the very different set of domestic and interna-
tional circumstances under which professional development
took place.
Accountancy as a profession grew directly out of the ‘mod-
ern’ sector of China’s economy. Shanghai was the pre-eminent
center of industry, banking and financial services in early 20th
century China. Chinese accountants, who were relatively fewer
in number than their counterparts in the U.S., Britain and even
Japan, were concentrated in Shanghai. Focusing on Chinese ac-
countants in Shanghai (to be called ‘Shanghai accountants’
hereafter), we seek to examine the features of accounting
professionalization in China and the historical conditions under
which it occurred in the period 1912-1937.
Broadly speaking, the first important condition for the rise
of the accounting profession was the development of modern
industry, banking, finance and education. The second was the
dominant foreign presence in semi-colonial Shanghai which
provided both a model and a source of competition for Shang-
hai accountants. The third condition was the promotion and
regulation of the professions by the state. This provided both
opportunities and pressures on Shanghai accountants. The ways
in which Shanghai accountants responded to these conditions
in their strive for professional status may be summarized as
140
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/11
133Xu and Xu: Chinese Accountants in Early 20th Century Shanghai
follows. Shanghai accountants consciously formed a profes-
sional association which emulated overseas accountants as well
as the Shanghai Bar Association. Accountants both contributed
to and utilized the nationalist sentiment against foreign privi-
leges in China, particularly where this impacted on their profes-
sional self-interest. Accountants participated in certain episodes
of the contemporary nationalist movement. They negotiated
with the government to establish terms under which they would
operate independently as apolitical professionals. In the follow-
ing sections we detail these developments.
CHINESE ACCOUNTANCY AND THE SHANGHAI
ACCOUNTANTS’ ASSOCIATION
Long before Western accounting (double entry method) was
introduced to China in the second half of the 19th century, na-
tive bookkeeping methods had been used. From the 15th to the
18th centuries, the Chinese gradually developed double entry
bookkeeping [Gao, 1985; Lin, 1992]. Yet, before the introduction
of Western accounting methods, most small and medium sized
Chinese firms as well as traditional Chinese banks, continued to
use single entry bookkeeping. Only a limited number of large
commercial firms used more elaborate Chinese double entry
bookkeeping [Gao, 1985; Gardella1992]. During the second half
of the 19th century even the presence of foreign commercial
firms and the Chinese-owned modern enterprises in treaty ports
such as Shanghai failed to encourage the widespread use of
Western accounting in China. However, following the founding
of the Chinese Republic in 1912 Chinese firms and modern
banks did adopt Western-style accounting [Gao, 1985; Chen,
1998]. Throughout the Republican period both the Chinese
methods of bookkeeping and the Western type of accounting
were practiced in different enterprises [Gardella, 1992].
This persistence of traditional Chinese bookkeeping meth-
ods and their relative simplicity ensured that bookkeeping was
regarded as a job that did not require higher education. Thou-
sands of bookkeepers in Chinese businesses, traditionally called
‘men of account office’, had not attended schools of business.
They were able to handle their tasks by virtue of being function-
ally literate (able to read and write about 2,000 Chinese charac-
ters) and by practicing as apprentices first. This pattern contin-
ued to hold true in small and less modernized Chinese
businesses throughout the Republican period.
On the other hand, in the 1910s and 1920s, a number of
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Chinese schools of business were established following Western
and Japanese models. There were also Chinese accountants who
had been trained abroad or worked in organizations which prac-
ticed Western-type accounting. The first person who used the
title of ‘accountant’ (kuaijishi, literally accounting master) was
Xie Lin, the Chief Accountant of the Bank of China, who intro-
duced Western-style accounting from Japan [Xu, 1933; Gao,
1985]. During the 1910s the Chinese accountants who practiced
Western-style accounting were, however, few and were not a
visible group of professionals. Ordinary people did not know the
difference between this new type of accountant and the tradi-
tional ‘man of account office’. Neither was there official recogni-
tion of the existence of an accounting profession [Xu, 1933].
Not until September 1918 did the Chinese government take
notice of the emergence of accountants. In that year the Minis-
try of Agriculture and Commerce enacted Provisional Regula-
tions on Accountants which recognized and regulated the ac-
counting profession for the first time. Under the regulations it
was established that an accountant should be at least 30 years
old. He should either be a graduate of a Chinese or foreign
university or of a specialized school having followed a three-year
program which included accounting as major courses. Alterna-
tively, an accountant could have work experience as a chief ac-
countant for at least five years in a bank or firm with assets of at
least 500,000 yuan (Chinese currency). Accountants were re-
quired to register with and be licensed by the Ministry [FD,
1924, p. 1170]. The action of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce was significant. It clearly showed that the govern-
ment was instrumental in bringing about the professional iden-
tity of Chinese accountants by regulating and thus recognizing
the occupation.
In spite of official recognition, the accounting profession
grew slowly. In Shanghai there were no public accounting firms
until 1921. As late as 1926 licensed accountants in the country
numbered 183, and 54 of them worked in Shanghai [SKGN,
1926, pp. 115-122]. By 1933 the number of accountants in the
country reached around 1,800 of whom half operated in Shang-
hai [Xu, 1933]. Only licensed accountants were called kuaijishi.
These often established or worked for independent public ac-
counting firms. Those who did not register as licensed accoun-
tants but performed accounting and bookkeeping in business
enterprises or government agencies were still called ‘men of ac-
count office’ or ‘men of keeping books’. They made up the ma-
jority of the 1,434 ‘accountants’ identified by the census of the
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Shanghai Municipal Council of the International Settlement in
1935 [ARSMC, 1935].
Although Shanghai accountants were a small group com-
pared with other occupations, they developed a strong sense of
professional identity and community in a relatively short period
of time. This was manifested in the formation in 1925 of the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of the Chinese Republic,
which later changed its name to the Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants of Shanghai (ICAS) (the English translation was used
by the organization at the time). The idea of founding the asso-
ciation originated one year earlier. On 20 July 1924, 23 founders
gathered for a preparatory meeting in a restaurant. Nine were
elected as preparatory officers [SB, July 22, 1924, p. 6]. One
week later the group sent the Ministry of Agriculture and Com-
merce a request for permission to found the association and
submitted draft by-laws for approval. In the accompanying cor-
respondence they explained the purpose and significance of the
proposed association as follows:
The system of accounting is the product of economic
evolution. As business organizations are getting ever
more complex in this age of industrial and commercial
growth, the design of starting [a business], the regular
audit, and the liquidation at the foreclosure, all depend
upon the work and advise of accountants. Like lawyers
and doctors, they appear where needed and are in a
detached position with an independent spirit to verify
the true conditions of the financial world, to build
society’s confidence, and to provide service to the pub-
lic . . . One must have three indispensable qualifications
to become an accountant. The first is knowledge; the
second is experience; and the third is ethics. [The mea-
surement of] knowledge and experience are regulated
by the government and by the law, but personal ethics
can not be maintained by the law only. This is why
besides the regulations on accountants, there has to be
a trade association to work with. The regulations lay
down the general principle and the bylaws of the asso-
ciation detail the specifics. The combination of both
will result in all benefits for pursuing [the goals] [SB,
July 28, 1924, p. 5; SKGN, 1926, pp. 3-4]
The use of the term “trade association” indicates that at this
point Shanghai accountants had not considered it important to
differentiate themselves from the terminology applied to this
more traditional form of occupational association. Yet, they
clearly perceived themselves as a professional community in the
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same category as doctors and lawyers. The above statement em-
phasized two points: one was the importance and integrity of
accountants as professionals, which implied a special status of
the profession; and the other the necessity of a professional
association, which claimed the legitimate autonomy of the asso-
ciation in self-regulation. This represented a serious effort by
Shanghai accountants to elevate their professional status and
earn public recognition by organizing a professional association.
After demanding some minor revisions in its draft by-laws,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce granted permission
for the establishment of the ICAS [SB, August 4, 1924, p. 5]. The
association went into operation immediately, but it was not un-
til 15 March 1925 that its founding meeting was formally held
[SB, March 16, 1925, p. 3]. Under its by-laws, the ICAS was an
organization of accountants practicing in and around Shanghai.
Its mission was to foster mutual affection, exchange knowledge,
seek the enhancement of accountants’ status, and to promote
the healthy development of China’s economy. The by-laws
limited membership to those accountants who were licensed by
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and set a one-time
admission fee of 30 yuan and annual membership dues of 24
yuan. The by-laws also contained provisions for the professional
conduct of accountants, such as a prohibition on purchasing
any firms one was auditing or acting as accountant for, collect-
ing excessive fees, and disclosing confidential information with-
out the client’s consent [SKGN, 1926, pp. 5-13].
One institutional feature of the ICAS was its dinner gather-
ings. In October 1925, five months after the ICAS was founded,
three members proposed the practice. It was felt that formal
meetings were too limiting. To foster mutual affection and ex-
change of knowledge, as the ICAS’s by-laws prescribed, the
members required more opportunities to socialize. It was pro-
posed that the members gather for a dinner once a month and
members took turns, two each time, to act as host [SKGN,
1926]. The proposal was well received. Beginning in November
1925 the monthly dinners became part of the ICAS’s regular
activities. Many issues were raised and discussed at dinners and
the board of directors often took action in accordance with the
opinions expressed there. The proceedings of these gatherings
were recorded just as those of formal meetings. Not all members
of the association attended the gatherings, however. Those who
regularly participated were the most active members of the asso-
ciation, including most members of the board of directors
[SKGN, 1928]. This practice indicated how a ‘modern’ profes-
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sional organization would continue to operate with some tradi-
tional cultural trappings in the Chinese context.
Soon after its founding the ICAS began to express its dis-
satisfaction with the Provisional Regulations on Accountants. In
March 1925 Xu Yongzuo, a well-known accountant and leading
member of the ICAS, proposed that the regulations be revised to
toughen the qualifications for licensed accountants and to in-
clude more specific provisions on professional conduct. Upon
the proposal, the ICAS appointed a committee to study the issue
which decided to petition the Ministry of Agriculture and Com-
merce for a revision of the regulations. In the proposed version
of the revised regulations written by Xu Yongzuo, a licensed
accountant would have to pass an examination administered by
the Ministry. Those eligible to take the examination would be
graduates majoring in business or economics from Chinese or
foreign universities or specialized schools with two-years’ work
experience in accounting firms or three-years’ experience in
business enterprises and government agencies. An accountant
could not practice until he had received a license from the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Commerce and been registered in the
general directory of accountants kept by the Minister. Accoun-
tants could not assume public office or other paid public duties
except as members of the parliament or provincial and local
assemblies, or as faculty in government-supported schools. Ac-
countants’ associations should be established in various areas
and accountants could practice only as members of such an
association [SKGN, 1926]. In short, the general thrust of the
proposed revision was to raise the qualifications for entering the
profession, to strengthen the self-regulating mechanism within
the profession, and to codify professional conduct. All repre-
sented essential aspects of professionalization.
Of the provisions in this proposed revision, two were quite
controversial among accountants. One was the requirement for
an accountant to join an association to practice, and the other
was the prohibition against owning a business while practicing
as accountant. In March 1926 the ICAS general meeting dis-
cussed the proposed revision and voted to adopt both provi-
sions, but modified the second by suggesting that accountants
be allowed to own a commercial firm if it did not conflict with
one’s accounting duties [SB, March 16, 1926, p. 3]. The contro-
versy on the second point reflected the fact that some accoun-
tants were not full-time professionals and engaged in other busi-
nesses. The proposed revision took into consideration their
interests while pushing for further elements of professionali-
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zation. The central government, the Beiyang regime (1912-1927)
did not act on the proposal before it was replaced by the
Guomingdang (GMD) regime. Yet, most of the provisions put
forward by the ICAS in 1925 were to be included in the new
regulations on accountants enacted under the GMD government.
PURSUING PROFESSIONAL STATUS
IN THE PUBLIC ARENA
In early 20th century China the political culture was such
that the status of an organization as a public association was
related to the role it played in the political arena (Xu, 2001, pp.
12-13). The recognition of an organization’s role in the public
arena could be taken as an indication of its legitimacy. In the
mid-1920s accountants were recognized as experts in business
affairs, but they did not succeed immediately in establishing
themselves as a profession or a public body in society at large.
As a newcomer to the public arena, their association was not
taken seriously as a significant player unlike other organizations
such as the Shanghai Bar Association, the Shanghai General
Chamber of Commerce and many trade associations. Since its
political role was associated with public perception of its profes-
sional stature, during the years following its founding, the ICAS
made strenuous efforts to ensure that as a legitimate profes-
sional association, its voice on political issues be heard. In the
1920s the association took public stands on political issues on
several occasions, and in each instance it was motivated by the
desire to enhance accountants’ public profile and thus profes-
sional stature.
The mid-1920s was a period of political turbulence and war-
lord fighting in China. Following the fraudulent election of a
president in October 1923 and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang War in Sep-
tember 1924, the second Zhili-Fengtian War broke out in the
same month. In October 1924 General Feng of the Zhili clique
mutinied and occupied Beijing and as a result the Zhili forces
disintegrated at the front. In the interest of national unification,
Feng and his rivals jointly asked General Duan, another warlord,
to act as the executive of a provisional government. Feng also
invited Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Guomindang (Nationalist
Party), based in Guangzhou, to go to Beijing for a discussion on
peace and unification. In his ‘Manifesto on Going to the North’,
issued on 10 November 1924, Sun Yat-sen proposed to convene
a national congress to work out a plan for national unification.
The country responded with enthusiasm and various voluntary
associations took an active part in preparing for the congress.
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They hoped that it would give them an opportunity to partici-
pate in ending the political chaos of the country [Lai, 1983].
The ICAS was deeply disappointed, however, that the orga-
nizational regulations of the proposed national congress did not
provide seats for representatives of the accounting profession. In
early 1925, before the ICAS was formally founded, its leaders
had telegraphed the government in Beijing, demanding that ac-
countants as government-licensed professionals and their orga-
nization as a professional association, have a place at the con-
gress [SB, February 25, 1925, p. 3; March 10, 1925, p. 3]. Shortly
after its establishment on 15 March 1925, the association sent
another telegram to Beijing for the same purpose. The proposed
congress, it argued, was to design a fundamental plan for na-
tional reconstruction by collecting wisdom and opinions from
all classes in the country. The profession of accountants was
sanctioned by the government according to the law and was
regulated by codified qualifications, and thus it was part of the
intellectual class. The exclusion of legally established accoun-
tants was not only unreasonable but also contradictory to the
purpose of the congress. Since the strength or weakness of the
country depended on its economic system and since accoun-
tants were most familiar with concrete economic problems, they
should be given a formal role in the congress and contribute to
national reconstruction [SB, March 27, 1925, p. 3]. Because of
Sun Yat-sen’s untimely death on 12 March 1925, and of General
Duan’s resistance to the idea, the national congress was never
convened. But in demanding to be heard on this occasion,
Shanghai accountants displayed not only their professional
identity but also a sense of their public role as professionals.
In its efforts to earn recognition as a profession and a voice
on political issues, the ICAS sought to equate the professional
status of accountants with that of lawyers. In the mid-1920s the
Shanghai Bar Association (SBA) was already a well-established
professional association with visibility and high reputation.
When the ICAS appeared, there was some dispute with the law-
yers over the boundary between the two professions. In 1923,
for instance, a member of the Shanghai Bar accused an accoun-
tant of usurping the privilege of lawyers by acting as a witness
to contracts [SB, February 25, 1925, p. 3; March 10, 1925, p. 3].
In spite of such friction, Shanghai accountants generally looked
to the SBA as a professional model. They consciously emulated
the SBA and sought the same status. This was evident in the
ICAS’s 1924 correspondence to the Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce quoted earlier, in which it likened accountants to
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lawyers and doctors. It was also a major motive behind ICAS’s
quest in 1925 for a voice at the national congress. Other in-
stances would follow.
In 1924-1926 the SBA and its political arm, the Society for
Promoting the Rule of Law, championed the drive to promul-
gate a provincial constitution as the solution to the political
chaos in the country [Xu, 2001, pp. 245-249]. In early 1926 the
movement was revived and a Jiangsu provincial congress was
planned for drawing-up the constitution. The SBA elected two
members as delegates to the congress. Other local bar associa-
tions and professional groups such as journalists and doctors
were also included as invitees to the congress. However, once
again the ICAS was left out due to the neglect of the Preparation
Committee of the congress. On 16 April the ICAS sent a protest
to the committee. The ICAS argued that the provincial congress
on the constitution was organized by all provincial and county
assemblies and legally established professional associations. The
accounting profession, and its association as one of the legally
established professional associations, should have the right to
send delegates to the congress. The ICAS demanded that the
committee should respect the association’s civil rights and give
equal treatment to all professional associations. However, like
the proposed national congress of 1925, the provincial constitu-
tional congress did not materialize. In the fluid political situa-
tion brought forth by the Northern Expedition that started in
July 1926 and aimed at national unification, the movement for a
provincial constitution died out. But the ICAS once again dem-
onstrated its commitment to the pursuit of a professional status
that was no less than that of the SBA.
The ICAS not only emulated the SBA in seeking the recogni-
tion of its professional status, but also echoed views of the SBA
on some important political issues of the day. This not only
encouraged good relations with the SBA but, more importantly,
reflected shared interests between the two professions, as will be
seen below.
ADVANCING PROFESSIONAL INTERESTS
THROUGH A NATIONALIST CAUSE
In asserting their professional status and identity, Shanghai
accountants not only had to win over the Chinese public, they
also had to contend with the dominance of foreign interests in
Shanghai that presented both a model and a source of competi-
tion. When Chinese accountants came into being, they con-
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sciously followed the example of their western counterparts in
pursuing a professional project. Xu Yongzuo stated in 1933 that
CPAs in the United States and chartered accountants in Great
Britain were licensed only after strict examinations and a period
of practice:
On the surface they seem to be senior accountants em-
ployed by commercial firms, but their status is vastly
different [from other employees]. They are not solely
employed by any particular stores or companies, but
are entrusted by society and the public. Occupying an
independent position, they are not restricted by outside
influences. Although they are paid for their services,
they freely perform their duties with fairness. That is
where the word “public” comes from [Xu, 1933, p. 144].
Such was the model for Shanghai accountants. Institutionally,
the ICAS was also a duplication of professional associations of
accountants in the West and its by-laws were largely copied
from the same sources. The English translation of the associ-
ation’s name was also a copy of its counterparts in Great Brit-
ain. The purpose was to make the association sound ‘profes-
sional’ to the Chinese and, more importantly, to foreigners, as
Chinese accountants competed keenly with foreign accountants
in Shanghai. The competition was such that even the British
government felt compelled to intervene in a seemingly trivial
matter. In April 1925 the British representative in Beijing sent
an official note to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, say-
ing that to use ‘chartered accountant’ as the translation of the
Chinese term ‘kuaijishi’ was confusing and inappropriate, be-
cause the accountants in Britain were called ‘chartered accoun-
tants’ with strict standards. He asked for rectification of the
situation. It may be assumed that this action was in response to
lobbying by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England
and Wales, in view of how that organization jealously guarded
its privileges in the British colonies (Chua and Poullaos, 2002).
Scottish chartered accountants were also anxious to defend
their monopoly of the credentials ‘CA’ (see Walker, 1991).
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred the matter
to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and the latter in
turn sent the message to the ICAS. The ICAS forcefully defended
its right to use the name. In its reply to the Ministry, the ICAS
refuted the British objection and argued its case with skill and
logic. First, Chinese accountants were licensed by the govern-
ment according to established qualifications, which were
roughly equivalent to those of the chartered accountants in
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Great Britain. The term ‘chartered accountant’ was the best
translation of kuaijishi; otherwise, why did British chartered ac-
countants in China call themselves kuaijishi in Chinese? Second,
it was argued that it had already become customary for ‘char-
tered accountants’ to refer to those Chinese accountants li-
censed by the government, while other terms such as ‘public
accountant’ or ‘registered accountant’ did not have that connota-
tion. To use the latter alternatives would be more confusing, the
ICAS argued. Besides, if the American term ‘Certified Public
Accountant’ was adopted, the American government might ob-
ject for the same reason as the British had done. There would be
no end to the controversy. Third, the term ‘chartered accoun-
tant’ was not a monopoly of the members of the Institute of
Chartered Accountant in England and Wales, but was used by
other associations of accountants in Britain, Canada, and
France. Why did the British only intervene in the case of the
Chinese? Fourth, even if British law prohibited other people
from using the term ‘chartered accountant’, the law only applied
in Britain and had no force in China. The association asked the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain these points to the British
government [SB, May 8, 1925, p. 4]. Although there were no
immediate responses to this communication, the revised by-laws
of the association in 1930 changed the English translation of its
name to The Chinese Chartered Accountants Association of
Shanghai (we continue to refer to the organization as ICAS)
[KZ, 1,1 (1933), pp. 140-151].
The ICAS’s arguments on this occasion are worth citing, not
only because these points were well argued, but they also dem-
onstrated very clearly the organization’s intention to keep their
professional status visible. They wanted to make it known to all
that they were kuaijishi, accountants licensed by the central gov-
ernment, as distinguished from those unlicensed ‘men of ac-
count office’ or ‘men of keeping books’. They also wanted to
make sure that foreigners were aware of that difference too.
Their point was that they were as qualified as foreign accoun-
tants to do accounting work in Chinese business firms in
Shanghai’s foreign concessions. This competition with foreign
accountants would also explain the active participation of the
ICAS in the movement to recover the Mixed Courts.
For the period from 1844 to 1943 Shanghai was a divided
city in terms of administration. The International Settlement
and the French Concession were under foreign administrations
independent of the Chinese authorities which controlled only
the Chinese sections of the city. The Mixed Courts were foreign-
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dominated judicial institutions in the two foreign concessions.
They resulted partly from the semi-colonial structure of the
treaty port and partly from an extra-legal usurpation by the for-
eign authorities of the concessions. These courts tried all cases
occurring in the concessions which involved the Chinese or for-
eigners and their final decisions were not subject to appeal. Af-
ter the founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912, successive
Chinese governments tried and failed several times to bring the
Mixed Courts back into the Chinese judicial system. In early
1926 the SBA and the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce
spearheaded the initiative for the Jiangsu provincial government
to negotiate with foreign consuls in Shanghai in order to effect a
swift return of the Mixed Court in the International Settlement
to Chinese jurisdiction (Xu, 2001, pp. 232-234).
On 20 May 1926, the ICAS’s board of directors held a meet-
ing to discuss the issue and decided to telegraph the central
government and the Jiangsu provincial government in support
of the proposed local negotiations. In the association’s view,
under the 1868 treaty the Mixed Court was within the jurisdic-
tion of Shanghai prefecture and its administrative superior was
the Jiangsu provincial government, it was therefore appropriate
for the Jiangsu provincial government to take up the negotia-
tions. Some related issues that had to be settled by the central
government could be reserved for later resolution after the court
was returned. The ICAS urged that when public opinion was in
favor of the return of the courts and foreigners were conscious
of the situation, the provincial government should seize the mo-
ment to proceed aggressively. The ICAS specifically pointed out
that on this issue it was in agreement with the SBA and other
organizations [SB, May 21, 1926, p. 3; SKGN, 1928].
When, in mid-July 1926, the draft agreement on the return
of the Mixed Court in the International Settlement prompted
foreign lawyers in Shanghai to launch a campaign opposing the
agreement , the ICAS joined the SBA to counter foreign lawyers’
attack on China’s government and judicial system. At a dinner
on 18 July the ICAS members discussed the American Far East
Bar Association’s statement opposing the return of the Mixed
Court and decided to issue a public refutation. In a declaration
published on 21 July, the ICAS summarized the history of the
Mixed Court and reiterated the justice of returning the court. It
pointed out that the negotiations had been productive in that
the foreign governments recognized that the will of the Chinese
people could not be ignored and that opposition from foreign
lawyers was motivated by a concern over their jobs. The ICAS
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declared that it could not remain silent about the American
lawyers’ statement; its preposterous language, its insults to Chi-
nese government officials, its interference with China’s adminis-
tration, and its opposition to the return of the court, all of which
infringed upon China’s sovereignty. The ICAS also telegraphed
the associations of accountants in Beijing and Tianjin, asking
them to make their views known to foreign ministers in Beijing
and help assure the signing of the agreement. On 29 July the
ICAS sent a telegram to the State Council and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Beijing and urged the government to protest
over foreign lawyers’ interference with China’s domestic politics
[SKGN, 1928].
Shanghai accountants took a strong position on this issue
along with the SBA because they too had a stake in it. The SBA’s
interest was to see foreign lawyers driven out of practice in
Chinese lawsuits. Similarly, Shanghai accountants wanted to ex-
clude foreign accountants from Chinese businesses in Shanghai,
particularly those within the foreign concessions where the ma-
jority of residents were Chinese and both foreign-owned and
Chinese-owned businesses were concentrated. Since foreign ac-
countants resided and operated in the concessions long before
the emergence of the Chinese accounting profession, they were
able to take and hold the market of auditing for not only foreign
but also Chinese businesses there. In addition, because the
Mixed Court of the International Settlement was under foreign
control, British accountants monopolized the position of Foren-
sic Auditor for the Court, a situation Shanghai accountants
wanted, above all, to change.
The association of accountants in Beijing and Tianjin first
suggested to the ICAS that the issue of foreigners illegally usurp-
ing the privilege of Chinese accountants be presented to the
government so that it might be settled with the return of the
Mixed Court. The ICAS held a discussion on 15 August 1926 and
decided to take action. In a telegram sent to the Jiangsu provin-
cial officials, the association noted that the Mixed Court always
appointed a foreigner to examine accounts in lawsuits and the
job was prone to irregularities. If foreigners were still in charge
of this and other duties after the return of the court, there would
be problems. The ICAS wanted the authorities to ensure three
things with the return of the Mixed Court: 1) the court should
appoint auditors from among Chinese accountants, 2) the court
should not appoint non-licensed accountants as the court audi-
tor, 3) court decisions in all civil and criminal cases between the
Chinese that involved auditing should have no legal effect unless
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they were handled by Chinese accountants [SB, August 17, 1926,
p. 3; SKGN, 1928]. These demands spelled out the professional
interests of Shanghai accountants in the return of the Mixed
Court and best explained why they got actively involved in the
matter.
The appeal to the government on this issue brought positive
responses. On 19 August 1926 the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Of-
fice replied to the ICAS that its three demands of 15 August had
merit and would be taken into consideration [SKGN, 1928]. The
ICAS then began to lobby the Shanghai General Chamber of
Commerce to enlist support. On 24 September the ICAS sent a
letter to the Chamber as well as to the provincial and municipal
governments. It criticized the current practice of appointing for-
eigners to examine accounts in lawsuits and proposed two mea-
sures to establish a new set of procedures to increase the role of
the ICAS [SKGN, 1928].
The Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce came to the
aid of the ICAS and pressed the government on behalf of the
latter. In late October, through the Jiangsu Department of In-
dustry, the Chamber of Commerce received a directive from the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce reporting the response of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this matter. According to the
latter, there was no way to prohibit foreign accountants from
practicing in the foreign concessions. But if Chinese law prohib-
ited foreigners from working for Chinese businesses outside the
concessions, judicial and administrative agencies should take
action to stop them. There was no need to raise the issue with
foreign ministers in Beijing, it added, and whether the issue was
related to the return of the Mixed Court would be determined by
the Jiangsu Foreign Affairs Officer’s investigation and dealt with
accordingly [SB, October 25, 1926, p. 4]. The ICAS continued to
keep close watch over the negotiations on the return of the
Mixed Court and constantly engaged with the Foreign Affairs
Officer, the General Chamber of Commerce, and other voluntary
associations over this issue. Such discussions were in turn re-
ported at the ICAS’s dinners and formal meetings where new
courses of action were hammered out [SB, December 16, 1926,
p. 7; SKGN, 1928].
After the Mixed Court was returned and reorganized as the
Provisional Court on 1 January 1927, the ICAS expected the
exclusion of foreign accountants to be carried out immediately.
It was not to be that easy, however. On 13 January a civil case
involving a bankrupt furniture store was tried at the court and
the judge allowed a foreign accountant to examine the accounts
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in question and give testimony. Upon hearing the news of this
event, the ICAS petitioned the Ministry of Agriculture and Com-
merce as well as the Provisional Court. In its view, the earlier
directives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expressed the
government’s willingness to prohibit foreign accountants from
practicing, but Chinese authorities lacked the means to enforce
this in the foreign concessions because the Mixed Court had not
been returned. Now that the court was returned and reorganized
under the jurisdiction of Chinese authorities and the Chinese
law was applied in the court, the prohibition of foreign accoun-
tants from acting in the court did not need further investigation
or decision and should have been enforced immediately. The
ICAS warned that the judge’s conduct in the above-mentioned
case set a bad precedent, damaging not only the accounting
profession but also China’s national sovereignty and its judicial
system. It demanded that the Ministries of Justice and of For-
eign Affairs order the Provisional Court and the Foreign Affairs
Offices to: 1) enforce the earlier directives, 2) invalidate testimo-
nies given by foreign accountants, and 3) appoint ICAS mem-
bers to act in the court so as to uphold China’s judicial rights
[SKGN, 1928].
The persistence of the ICAS paid off. The Ministry of Agri-
culture and Commerce ordered that Chinese business firms and
factories not to hire foreign accountants. Meanwhile the Minis-
tries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs ordered courts and foreign
affairs offices to enforce the prohibition. In March 1927 the
ICAS followed up these measures by sending correspondence to
all trade associations in Shanghai to inform them of the prohibi-
tion. This stated that all Chinese business establishments should
hire Chinese accountants only, to upheld the nation’s sover-
eignty [SB, March 4, 1927, p. 6; March 10, 1927, p. 6]. It is
conceivable that given the lax enforcement by the authorities,
not all foreign accountants were subsequently driven out of Chi-
nese businesses, but they did lose the right to act in court in
cases involving Chinese business. The ICAS’s efforts on this is-
sue had met with success.
DEALING WITH POLITICAL CONTROL AND
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
March 1927 was a turning point in the history of the ICAS.
With the GMD regime settling down in Shanghai, the ICAS and
other urban voluntary associations entered a different era. The
GMD was bent on controlling all social organizations and sup-
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pressing political dissent (Xu, 2001, pp. 95-105). In order to
preserve its gains in the new political environment, the ICAS
needed to make itself politically acceptable to the regime.
On 25 April 1927, at a regular dinner of the ICAS, one ac-
countant revealed that someone from the GMD Shanghai Mu-
nicipal Party Headquarters (MPH) had approached an accoun-
tant to invite members of the association to join the party. The
accountant was then asked to provide details. “Since Shanghai
is now under the rule of the Nationalist Government,” said the
accountant, “accountants serving the country and society should
be directed by the party-state. Currently the MPH is planning to
invite members of this association to join the party, so as to
unite our comrades, foster participation in the revolution, help
the party to rake out and punish evil gentry and local bullies,
and carry out the Three Principles of the People”. Upon hearing
these words, all those who were not GMD members reportedly
expressed their immediate readiness to join the party [SB, April
26, 1927, p. 7]. The speaking accountant was probably a GMD
member, judging from the political jargon he used. But it is not
known how many Shanghai accountants did subsequently join
the GMD. It seems that the GMD was consciously trying to get a
hold on the professionals whose services were important to the
functioning of the state. Also clear is the willingness of the ICAS
to accommodate and not offend the new regime.
Under the GMD government political control and profes-
sional regulation went hand in hand. On 22 August 1927, the
GMD government enacted the Regulations on the Registration
of Accountants. The new regulations were more detailed than
the regulations enacted in 1918. It stipulated the duties, qualifi-
cations, licensing procedures, disciplinary measures, rights and
obligations of accountants. Under the regulations, accountants’
associations were to be established in areas where there were 20
or more accountants and accountants were required to join an
association to practice. The accounting profession was to be
subject to supervision by the Ministry of Finance. The new regu-
lations lowered the age requirement for accountants from 30 to
25. The categories of persons to be disqualified included those
who committed ‘reactionary deeds’. Yet by far the most remark-
able provision in the regulations was that one should be a GMD
member to qualify as accountant. Not until October 1927, after
the ICAS petitioned the Ministry of Finance, was this provision
dropped, which may be an indication that not many ICAS mem-
bers joined the GMD as they had promised [SKGN, 1928].
Despite its reservations, the ICAS duly reorganized itself in
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accordance with the regulations. The major organizational
change was the replacement of the board of directors by an
executive committee [SB, November 1, 1927, p. 5]. In early 1928
the Ministry of Finance ordered a re-evaluation of accountants’
credentials and re-licensing of the profession. After repeated re-
quests from the ICAS, the deadline for submitting credentials
was extended twice to 15 March 1929 [SB, December 17, 1928,
p. 6].
In January 1930 the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
enacted a new set of Regulations on Accountants to supersede
the Ministry of Finance’s regulations. The accounting profession
now came under the supervision of this ministry. The new provi-
sions were almost identical to the old ones. They did not require
GMD membership as a qualification for licensing but still dis-
qualified anyone convicted of ‘reactionary deeds’. The regula-
tions were soon followed by four sets of detailed rules on their
implementation [GZG, Nos. 380-381 (January 1930)].
During these years the ICAS moved further towards the self-
regulation of the accountancy profession. In October 1928 the
association issued a standard schedule of fees for accountants
for the first time. Under the schedule, the rate for accountants’
work was ten yuan per hour and 30 yuan per day (time exceed-
ing four hours be counted as one day). If fees were paid by case,
the minimum was 100 yuan per case. It also set the rates for
contingent fees, the minimum for consulting fees, and travel and
meal allowances for accountants. Public accounting firms in
Shanghai adopted this schedule as their standard for charging
clients [Xu, 1933; LKSG, 1932]. But our sources are silent on
whether all accountants followed the fee schedule in their prac-
tices.
The services provided by public accounting firms and indi-
vidual licensed accountants were wide ranging. According to the
publication of the Lixin Accounting Firm, the practice would, on
behalf of public agencies, firms or individuals: 1) design, man-
age, verify, investigate, straighten, liquidate, authenticate, and
testify various accounts; 2) serve as auditor, liquidation execu-
tor, bankruptcy property supervisor, will executor, and other
entrusted persons; and 3) handle tax payment and registration
and prepare financial and other business documents for clients
[LKSG, 1932]. All these services were authorized by the Regula-
tions on Accountants. Xu Yongzuo noted in 1933 that some of
these services would be provided by lawyers in the U.S. and by
chartered secretaries in England [Xu, 1933, pp. 149-150]. It was
the provision of this wide range of essential services that al-
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lowed Chinese accountants to perceive themselves as important
participants in the nation’s economic reconstruction.
During the same period the ICAS’s membership grew
steadily. In 1928 the association had 75 members. By January
1932 the membership had risen to 216. Within one year the
number increased to 262 [SKGH, 1928]. Thereafter the member-
ship of the ICAS showed only small increases. As of January
1936 the association had 272 members [ShB, January 19, 1936,
p. 14]. To put the number in a comparative perspective, accord-
ing to the ‘Journal of Accounting’ (kuaiji zazhi) published in
Shanghai, licensed accountants in Japan numbered 6,644 in
1935 [KZ, 7,1 (1936), p. 126].
Another development in Chinese accountancy was the
founding in Nanjing, the national capital, of the China Account-
ing Research Society (CARS) in 1934, with the blessing of the
GMD government [KZ, 5,1 (1935), pp. 125-135]. Three leading
members of the ICAS, Xu Yongzuo, Wen Yiyou, and Pan Xulun,
were elected to the nine-member board of directors of the
CARS, a national organization. The difference between the new
organization and the ICAS and other accountants’ associations
in China was that the CARS was explicitly described as a “purely
scholarly association” as opposed to the ICAS which was a pro-
fessional association. The mission of the CARS was “to promote
accounting scholarship, improve accounting practices, and fos-
ter the character of accountants” [KZ, 5,1 (1935), p. 130]. This
event represented further official recognition of accountancy as
a field of knowledge and expertise that required specialized re-
search. It also indicated the GMD government’s willingness to
orient Chinese accountants towards professional and academic
pursuit and the country’s economic development.
During the 1930s the ICAS’s activities were largely oriented
towards professional rather than political issues. On only a few
occasions did it join the national salvation movement brought
forth by the Japanese aggression. During the Sino-Japanese hos-
tilities in Shanghai in early 1932, for instance, the ICAS decided
to donate 3,000 yuan to Chinese troops fighting the Japanese. It
asked its members to donate money and materials too. Its del-
egates participated in the anti-Japanese rallies organized by
other urban associations in Shanghai [ShB, February 1, 1932, p.
8]. In June 1932, after a cease-fire between Chinese troops and
the Japanese took place in Shanghai, the ICAS issued a declara-
tion demanding that the government ask Japan to compensate
the Chinese people in Shanghai for economic loss suffered dur-
ing the hostilities [ShB, June 26, 1932, p. 8].
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Between 1932 and 1935 the ICAS was relatively quiet. It did
not rejoin other voluntary associations to issue public state-
ments until the height of the national salvation movement in
1936-37. It chose not to play the prominent role it had taken in
the return of the Mixed Court in 1926. On the other hand, the
ICAS did play along with GMD-sponsored political campaigns to
show its conformity. In 1936, for example, it urged its members
to participate in the so-called civic training organized by the
GMD supposedly in preparation for the promised constitutional
government [ShB, May 29, 1936, p. 11]. In May 1937 the ICAS
belatedly organized its New Life Movement Committee, al-
though the movement sponsored by the GMD government was
already three years old [ShB, May 26, 1937, p. 13].
Shanghai accountant’s more limited political activity indi-
cated the success of their professionalization. By the early 1930s
Shanghai accountants and their professional association had es-
tablished their position in society and vis-a-vis the state. They no
longer needed of campaign for their professional status by act-
ing on political issues in the public arena. Nor did they want to
jeopardize their professional position by active participation in
political movements. In other words, they appear to have hid
behind their professional pursuits to avoid any political confron-
tation with an authoritarian government, the GMD regime,
which was keen to suppress real or perceived political dissent.
Another factor is that Shanghai accountants perceived them-
selves as practitioners of national salvation through industry.
Unlike lawyers, in their daily work accountants were not con-
fronted with political issues. In short, if the ICAS’s relative si-
lence on public issues in the 1930s reflected a different political
culture under the GMD party-state, in a sense it also reflected
the success of Shanghai accountants in achieving professionali-
zation and their satisfaction with the social and professional
status they enjoyed.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the professionalization of Chinese accoun-
tants was shaped by historical conditions of the early 20th cen-
tury. The trend towards modernization entailed an economic
transformation which encouraged the advance of accountants.
The foreign presence and dominance in semi-colonial Shanghai
provided a professional model and a source of competition for
Chinese accountants. The state promotion and regulation of
professions provided both opportunities and pressures. Chinese
accountants acted in that complex economic, social, and politi-
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cal environment to increase the identity, status, and standards
of their profession by negotiating and utilizing the conditions
they encountered.
The story of Shanghai accountants in the early 20th century
provides a meaningful comparison with the history of account-
ing professionalization in the West. An inescapable conclusion
is that although the historical conditions were rather different,
the broad outline of professionalization projects are essentially
similar in the Chinese and Western cases. As we have seen, the
ICAS proved to be the kind of political body that Willmott
(1986) analyzed in tracing the accounting profession in Britain.
That is, it functioned to advance the self-interests of practitio-
ners by identifying its goals with public interests, by responding
to market opportunities and by negotiating with the state. The
profession in Shanghai sought to enshrine conditions for entry
to the profession and draw the line between licensed and unli-
censed accountants. It pursued a closure strategy based on
credentialism that was familiar in the Western context (e.g.
Walker, 1991). It would ride on political tides to pursue the
agenda of elevating its public profile and therefore enhancing its
image as a professional community. In particular, it would uti-
lize nationalism to its advantage in competing with foreign ac-
countants in Shanghai and in interacting with the state: a strat-
egy also seen in the rise of accounting organizations in Scotland
in the mid-19th century (Walker, 1995). One can only speculate
as to whether Chinese accountants would have pursued their
professionalization project in the same way without the pres-
ence and influence of their Western counterparts inside and out-
side China. Nevertheless, the comparison is revealing and in-
structive.
Inasmuch as accountancy was a new field of professional
endeavor and represented a new orientation of the educated
Chinese towards a pursuit of technical expertise, the experience
of Shanghai accountants illustrates a profound historical change
in the role of the educated in China’s social-economic transfor-
mation of the early 20th century. While other educated Chinese
were trying to find their place in China’s modernization and
national salvation and seeking to balance their political and pro-
fessional roles, accountants seem to have resolved that issue by
the 1930s. They determined that their best contribution to na-
tional wellbeing was the pursuit of their profession and thereby
working for economic recovery and industrial development. The
success story of the Chinese accounting profession was for the
most part interrupted by the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945,
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the Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949, and the Maoist era of 1949-
1976. The re-emergence of the Chinese accounting profession in
the post-Mao era has resumed the pattern of a state-profession
negotiation and cooperation for mutual benefit (Hao, 1999). The
way in which Chinese accountants seek to revive professionali-
zation under the radically altered economic, social, and political
environment of the early 21st century will be intriguing.
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AN ACCOUNTANT’S EDUCATION
Abstract: This is a review of how various experiences in my career
have contributed to my understanding of accounting. I recall the cir-
cumstances surrounding several of my efforts towards the develop-
ment of accounting theories, viz. (1) decision-usefulness theory, (2)
activity costing, and (3) market simulation accounting, as well as my
excursion into (4) market association research in seeking to validate
decision-usefulness theory and (5) a search for the effects of firms’
economic environments on the development of enterprise accounting
in the 2nd millennium, C.E. I give my impressions of several of the
important players in the evolution of accounting thought in the 20th
century with whom I was closely associated, such as Vatter, Moonitz,
Chambers, and Sterling, as well as other prominent figures in the
broad field of accounting. Some of my gains from associations with
three institutions—the American Accounting Association, The Univer-
sity of Chicago, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board—are
identified. I conclude with a few summary thoughts on what I have
learned.
Education is a life-long process—and includes learning that
clichés can be useful—but waiting until the end to write about it
does not seem to be a sensible plan. So I shall prepare an in-
terim report, not in the belief that my experience is to be recom-
mended, but in the hope that the preparation of such a report
will yield a modest increment to that life-long process. I might
learn something from this exercise.
Much of my teaching and research can be thought of as
pieces of my education. I developed the decision-usefulness
theory of accounting because I did not know how to account to
investors successfully. I embarked on my lonely and frustrating
quest for empirical evidence of useful accounting information in
a search for answers to several accounting questions raised by
decision-usefulness theory. Activity costing was the product of
my concern that I did not know how to produce decision-useful
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cost information. Later on, market simulation accounting grew
out of a search for a concise theory of accounting measurement
in the context of generally accepted accounting principles. Eco-
nomic Influences on the Development of Accounting in Firms
[1996] is the product of a senior academic’s search for an under-
standing of how accounting got to be what it is. All of it has
been educational—for me. Other scholars have become inter-
ested in several of those quests.
In this report, I shall review the development of my thinking
in those five subject areas as well as lessons from my associa-
tions with a few great figures in the 20th century history of
accounting (Wixon, Vatter, Moonitz, Chambers, Sprouse, Ster-
ling, Gellein, and Carsberg) and with several important institu-
tions: the University of Chicago, the American Accounting Asso-
ciation, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
IN THE BEGINING
My “formal” education commenced inauspiciously: in a
one-room country school in northern Missouri, where I skipped
the third grade for questionable reasons. High school was lim-
ited, too: no foreign language, emphasis on vocational agricul-
ture, and poor results in “freshman algebra”. When I graduated
from high school, I did not have a very good base for higher
education and I was too young (barely 16) for university. The
fifth (postgraduate) year was more productive, including chem-
istry, bookkeeping, and a flourishing social life, for a change.
Then, after a one-year delay, my university undergraduate years
started (by courtesy of the U. S. Navy—during “the war”) with
two semesters of fairly general required courses, followed by
four semesters of business-oriented courses, including consider-
able accounting (in which I gradually lost interest). In my last
(post-navy) undergraduate year, several chance events turned
me towards an academic career: an economics of transportation
course that turned out to be technical microeconomics because
the graduate student instructor was interested in the latter and
unprepared to teach transportation; an interesting course in
what is now called organization theory from a professor who
gave me my first academic appointment, as a paper grader in
another course; a public finance course by a stimulating eco-
nomics professor in which I wrote my first analytical paper (on
the incidence of a general sales tax); and a tip by a former navy
roommate that led to a full-time teaching appointment (after
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one quarter of graduate work). That, in a nutshell, describes my
first 16 years of organized education—to the point where I be-
gan to learn by teaching.
The University of Buffalo (now State University of New
York—Buffalo) was the scene of my first teaching effort. Hired
as a full-time, full-charge instructor at the age of 21 armed with
a Bachelor’s degree, a new level in my education began. I seri-
ously question what my students got from me during my two
years at Buffalo, but I can say that I got a good start on my
higher education. Rufus Wixon was the new young chairman,
straight from William A. Paton’s program at Michigan. “Wix”
subsequently moved to Wharton for a long career. All of the
young instructors took his year-long seminar and learned ac-
counting theory according to Paton. Paton and Littleton’s An
Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards [1940] was Wix’s
bible but it was completely new to me. Matching costs and rev-
enues made sense, and costs surely should be attached to the
asset to which they were applied. I even understood the differ-
ence between expired and unexpired costs—for a while; later I
dismissed it [1987]. I don’t think I was nearly as clear about
revenues as the product of the enterprise and rejected that no-
tion when I got to my dissertation. Indeed, over the next ten
years or so I relaxed my firm embrace of Paton and Littleton,
relegating it to the status of one of my old friends. Wix also
taught us price level adjustments. My biggest disappointment
came on the final exam in the second semester: a young lady
whom I thought understood less than I did trounced me in that
exam. I was discouraged, but found a good solution the follow-
ing year: “If you can’t beat them, join them”. Sarah and I have
now been married long enough for me to learn a great deal from
her, including some accounting.
Meanwhile, I spent three summers in the University of Chi-
cago MBA program with excellent instruction by Cletus Chizek
and Kullervo Louhi in the customary advanced practical ac-
counting courses, including some repetition of material I sup-
posedly had covered in my undergraduate courses. Clete was a
partner in Crowe, Chizek and Co. in South Bend, Indiana who
took the train into Chicago on his teaching days. Kullervo was
the best all-around unpublished faculty member I have ever
known, who soon moved to Michigan State and quickly became
the dean there. Unfortunately, his poor health was to cut his life
short.
In retrospect, I see that my education to this point could be
characterized as haphazard, much of it not consciously chosen
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by me, but with a gradually increasing sense of direction on my
part. My interests were beginning to take shape.
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1949-1952
Approaching the end of my second year at Buffalo, I visited
Chicago in connection with my application for the Ph.D. pro-
gram. William J. Vatter was the de facto leader of the accounting
faculty who introduced me to various colleagues, the most
memorable of whom was Willard Graham. After listening to my
background, which took about ten seconds, Willard exclaimed:
“Green as hell, huh?” I acknowledged the accuracy of his obser-
vation, and we got along fine thereafter, although I did not see
much of him. One relationship involved technical discussions
when Willard was chairman of an American Accounting Asso-
ciation committee on price-level adjusted accounting, a subject
that I knew well, thanks to Wixon’s instruction at Buffalo.
Willard’s main job during my time in the Ph.D. program was
managing the Executive Program; I never had a course from
him. Later, he moved to North Carolina and became president
of the AAA.
The accounting group on the third floor of Haskell Hall
was a friendly bunch. David Green and I, as students and in-
structors, mixed well with Paul Kircher, Kullervo Louhi and
Bill Vatter. I shared an office with Paul, who came from Michi-
gan and went on to UCLA, and took his Accounting Theory
course. My main paper for that course was my first publication:
“Payments for the Use of Capital and the Matching Process,”
The Accounting Review [1952]. Paton and Littleton and Wixon
had taught me that costs (which, from my residual equity point
of view, included interest) attach and should be matched with
revenues, a view that I stuck to right through my work on capi-
talization of interest at the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) and in Activity Costing and Input-Output Ac-
counting [1971]. Bill Vatter was the intellectual stimulus,
Kullervo Louhi the reliable master of all relevant trades whose
solutions to the dozens of major “accounting problems” that we
taught in the advanced problems courses as well as in manage-
rial accounting were treated as of biblical origin by the rest of
us. We gathered in Bill’s office every afternoon to share the
coffee that he made and for wide-ranging conversations that
always included Bill’s strong views, whatever the topic. That
close knit group—only five since Willard Graham spent most of
his time in his downtown office and his campus office two
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floors below us—worked as a team and excelled in intragroup
communication, a learning opportunity that was never matched
at the University of California.
Vatter and Managerial Accounting: The most exciting develop-
ments in accounting thought in that setting were encompassed
in Bill Vatter’s managerial accounting. We saw Bill bang away
at his old manual typewriter for hours in the morning, typing
directly onto Ditto masters as he composed his thoughts. Then,
five minutes before his class time he dashed into the adjacent
closet and cranked out enough copies on the Ditto machine to
provide one for each student, distributing them sans collation.
A Prentice-Hall editor got wind of this development and talked
Bill into permitting the printing of a “temporary edition” of
Managerial Accounting [1950]. As it happened, Bill and his wife,
Rose, were in our student apartment for dinner one night when
I asked him, “Well, how do you like the looks of the book?”
“What book?” “Managerial Accounting.” “I haven’t seen it”. So I
showed him my copy. It was probably the most influential
textbook ever published in accounting—at least since 1494.
Other books sold many more copies, of course, but I doubt if
any other book in managerial accounting could be considered
seminal. It marked the birth of the subject—and the withering
of cost accounting as a course title. Over the next few decades,
managerial accounting, or management accounting took over.
Managerial Accounting was dropped by Prentice-Hall and Vatter
after 17 printings—presumably a record for a temporary
edition—without ever being revised as a permanent, cloth-
bound book. Bill could not be bothered to dress it up for the
occasion.
The heredity of managerial accounting at Chicago—“man-
agement accounting” in many other places—is worth noting. J.
O. McKinsey, a prolific author on accounting, management,
and managerial accounting subjects in the 1920s, and head of a
growing consulting firm, was the University of Chicago ac-
counting professor who introduced some of the ideas; others
came through the well-known Chicago economist, J. M. Clark,
whose Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs [1923]
especially Chapter IX, the title of which included the phrase
“Different Costs for Different Purposes,” continues to be recog-
nized as an early milestone in managerial accounting. Vatter’s
book was especially important as “the teacher’s book” in the
1950s; it was too difficult to be popular with students. The task
of making managerial accounting readily accessible was picked
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up by Charles T. Horngren, whose Cost Accounting: A Manage-
rial Emphasis [1962], must be familiar to virtually every person
teaching in that area in the U.S. today, or who has taught the
subject in the last 40 years, as well as most teachers in other
English-speaking countries. Chuck, the great communicator,
took my desk as a new Ph.D. student and instructor when I left
Chicago in 1952, so he had the benefit of five years of intimate
association with Vatter until Bill moved to Berkeley in 1957. He
has always acknowledged his debt to Bill. Indeed, when I un-
dertook to raise money for a Vatter Room in Berkeley’s new
business school building in the early 1990s, Chuck, long dedi-
cated to Berkeley’s archrival in sports, Stanford, was the largest
contributor.
My Activity Costing and Input-Output Accounting [1971]
might also be recognized as a minor step in the development of
the Chicago School of managerial accounting—possibly the
most practically significant development of accounting thought
in the 20th century.
Prior to Managerial Accounting, popular cost accounting
textbooks were focused on the calculation of unit product costs
in job order, process and standard cost systems. Those cost
numbers were visualized as necessary for the preparation of
financial statements and, secondarily, for control. Bill painted a
different picture in his Chapter 5, “The Nature of Managerial
Accounting.” “The other view—with which we are here con-
cerned—is that accounting data and procedures are intimately
connected with the processes of operation and management of
the business enterprise; that accounting is a part of management.
The data upon which a large part of the fact-finding associated
with managerial decisions is based are largely accounting data;
policies, strategies, and other plans are seldom established with-
out some reference to accounting records” [p. 97, emphasis
added]. And [p. 102]: “(T)he decisions of management are al-
ways forward-looking in the sense that history is irrelevant ex-
cept in so far as it may be a basis for forecasting”. It follows that
ad hoc cost calculations—different costs for different pur-
poses—were a major part of managerial accounting. He gave a
great deal of emphasis to management’s need for information
about parts of a business entity, and he saw the accountant as
part of the management team, not as an adversary residing in an
ivory tower. This view is well understood now, but it was not
before Bill Vatter came along.
I think it was clear to those of us working with Bill in the
early 1950s that his greater interest and his strength lay in
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managerial accounting. Yet, his interest in and contributions to
external reporting were also noteworthy. To many—scholars not
working in managerial or cost accounting, such as Maurice
Moonitz—his Fund Theory [1947] was Bill’s most important
work, and one that graced the reading lists of most “Accounting
Theory” courses in the third quarter of the 20th century. I think
I shall never see a more eloquent case for theory than its first
paragraph:
Every science, methodology, or other body of knowl-
edge is oriented to some conceptual structure—a pat-
tern of ideas brought together to form a consistent
whole or a frame of reference to which is related the
operational content of that field. Without some such
integrating structure, procedures are but senseless ritu-
als without reason or substance; progress is but a fortu-
nate combination of circumstances; research is but
fumbling in the dark; and the dissemination of knowl-
edge is a cumbersome process, if indeed there is any
knowledge to convey [p. 1].
The absence of such a conceptual structure has driven me for
half a century.
Bill also introduced the “Direct Method for Preparation of
Funds Statements” [1946] which, over succeeding decades (ac-
counting has never been accused of rushing, except by vested
interests resisting changes in GAAP), gradually became a popu-
lar working paper approach for preparation of funds and cash
flow statements. I am sure that today’s students and practitio-
ners have no idea how much they owe Bill Vatter for that inge-
nious, now obvious, practical invention. Another illustration of
the man’s breadth was his monograph on tax planning for The
Controllership Foundation [1951], the first such work to be pub-
lished, to my knowledge. I had the privilege of working as a
research assistant on that project, which certainly gave me an
appreciation for the importance of tax planning.
Bill’s hobbies were wide ranging, starting with his choice of
music as a career. He studied string instruments and French
Horn at the Cincinnati Conservatory of Music (while studying
other subjects at the University of Cincinnati) but the only in-
strument I heard him play was the piano. By contrast, he loved
to work on his cars, which included a Lincoln and a Packard,
among others, at different times. He did not collect them. His
travels included driving to Alaska from Chicago and a Fulbright
Award to Australia, where he was commissioned to advise on
education for careers in accounting. His life has been reviewed
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more carefully by Chuck Horngren [1991] and Rodney Rogers
[1993].
Bill was firm in his convictions about accounting and never
hesitated to disagree with views that seemed wrong. He was not
always diplomatic, was sometimes blunt, and could be obsti-
nate, as Maurice Moonitz found him in an AAA committee meet-
ing. He was a modest man with no exalted opinion of his own
work. As chairman of the accounting group at Berkeley when
Bill reached the mandatory retirement age in 1972, I wanted to
have some sort of celebration of his career. Recognizing that Bill
was associated with Chicago more than with Berkeley, I asked
Chicago’s Sidney Davidson to cooperate; he, of course, was quite
willing. Then I sought Bill’s cooperation when he and his wife,
Rose, were at our home one evening. He complained that no one
would be interested: “I know what they’ll say. What did that old
Vatter ever do anyhow?” Sarah and I were incredulous. I pushed
on, describing the type of conference that Sidney and I had in
mind. Bill’s definitive response was: “I won’t come. And if you
trick me into it I’ll walk out”. After some more pleading, Rose
said: “I think he means it, George.” So it never happened. Bill
retired, moved to southern California near their daughter and
family, taught one semester at The University of Southern Cali-
fornia, wrote a substantial review article for The Accounting Re-
view [1979], and died September 15, 1990. He received the AAA
Outstanding Accounting Educator award in 1984. The William
J. Vatter Conference Room in the Haas School of Business, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley is a modest monument to his
memory.
At this point in my life, my education had made a lot of
progress. I had been exposed very substantially to the Chicago
philosophy: the Great Books and Robert Hutchins and Mortimer
Adler approach to liberal education, the value of breadth and of
freedom of thought, and the role of an educator as taught by
Paul Klapper, a former president of Queens College, in a cam-
pus-wide, year-long seminar for future academics. For better or
for worse, the University of Chicago was by far the most impor-
tant of the five institutions of higher education that I attended in
shaping my approach to teaching and research, including the
fundamental ideas that teaching and research should reinforce
each other, that asking the right questions can be productive,
and that major contributions must be heretical. Without that
training, I don’t see how I could have had even the modestly
successful academic career I have had.
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THE DECISION-USEFULNESS THEORY OF ACCOUNTING
Many episodes in the development of the decision-
usefulness theory have been noted elsewhere [Staubus, 2000].
These include its origin in a draft of my dissertation [1954];
rejection of much of it by my dissertation committee; articles
in The Accounting Review in the 1950s presenting parts of it
[1958, 1959]; numerous revisions of the whole; and a lengthy
struggle for publication (1956-60). Eventually it was published
under the title A Theory of Accounting to Investors [1961]; was
developed further [1970, 1971, 1972]; was presented in its most
complete form as Making Accounting Decisions [1977]; and
eventually was accepted around the world by English-speaking
accounting standards setters and academics (but not by
preparers of financial reports). These are the milestones that are
matters of fact.
Here I offer a few more speculative observations and some
personal opinions. Acceptance of new theories in social sciences
typically is a slow process. I once wrote [1975, p. 164] that
publishing a new theory in accounting is like dropping a rose
petal into the Grand Canyon and waiting for the echo. An early
start and good health increase the chances of seeing results in
one’s lifetime. Like many other ideas in the broad field of eco-
nomics, decision-usefulness theory may be seen as “no big deal”
because it is so obvious. I must say, however, that when I was
seeking a conceptual base for a serious study of revenue in 1951,
the complete absence of an objective of accounting in the litera-
ture struck me as a major handicap—one that I must overcome.
Feeling the need for a general objective led me to the idea that
financial information should be useful in making decisions. I
am not sure I would have reached that point in my thinking in
any environment other than that of The University of Chicago.
Accounting did have objectives before 1951, but they were,
according to my search, never made explicit. Even the so-called
stewardship objective did not appear in the literature until later,
and it was never used as a basis for a theory. If anyone had
analyzed it or tried to build a theory on the stewardship objec-
tive, both the objective and the GAAP tied to it surely would
have been found seriously deficient. For example, GAAP mea-
surements were easily “gamed” by managements bent on ma-
nipulating earnings—a deficiency that remains substantially in-
tact to this day. Stewardship cannot be evaluated using
out-of-date measurements at both the beginning and end of the
reporting period.
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A study of the history of accounting with an eye to inducing
objectives suggests that one of the first reasons for recording
aspects of economic events was to aid the human memory; a
merchant needed to keep track of who owed him how much, of
how much he owed specific creditors, etc. Perhaps one reason
for closing the loop with a genuine equation was a business-
man’s interest in his own wealth and his success in enhancing it
over time. When partners were added, the entity’s income had to
be known before it could be divided. With branches and other
delegations of managerial responsibility, accounting’s contribu-
tions to control must have been valued. Later, the roles of finan-
cial statements in bank financing and taxation became impor-
tant. But by 1951 the uses of financial reports by absentee
investors—both creditors and owners—could no longer be ne-
glected if the profession were to serve the public to anywhere
near its potential. These various reasons for accounting were
occasionally identified, but they had never been consolidated
and used as a base for a theory. The decision-usefulness objec-
tive encompasses all of them, brings uses by investors to the
fore, and builds on the core objective: to provide information
useful in making a wide range of decisions.
Once I had come up with that objective, building a coherent
theory based on it was an exciting activity to me—one on which
I concentrated for several years and returned to from time to
time for 25 years, before I felt it was substantially complete. In
the 1950s, editors were not easy to convince, so publications
came slowly. Roughly speaking, ten years elapsed between the
time I hit on the decision-usefulness objective and the publica-
tion of A Theory of Accounting to Investors. In the meantime,
parts of the theory, especially the beginning point—the state-
ment of the objective of accounting—appeared in my disserta-
tion and in two articles in The Accounting Review [1958, 1959].
But its influence in the literature was almost nil.
There were, however, two cases of recognition of the deci-
sion-usefulness objective during the decade of my struggles,
both published in 1955. One was Ray Chambers’ “Blueprint for
a Theory of Accounting” in which he explicitly stated the deci-
sion-usefulness objective but did not proceed to review users’
needs, the focus on residual equity holders, their interest in cash
flows to themselves and to the firm, etc—a gap that, in my
opinion, was the fundamental reason for the divergence between
his conclusions and mine in the measurement area, in which he
was deeply interested. (See below for more on our differences.)
The other was the AAA’s Supplementary Statement No. 8. That
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statement gave decision usefulness a central role in disclosure
but did not apply it to accounting measurement. I wish I had
inquired regarding how the decision-usefulness objective got
into that disclosure statement. To my knowledge, none of the
committee members had exhibited any recognition of or interest
in that objective prior to publication of the committee report or
soon thereafter. I am left with the speculation—perhaps a long
shot—that the chairman, Tom Hill from the Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, had gotten interested in it from my inter-
view presentation on his campus in 1952. Neither Chambers nor
any AAA group built a coherent theory on the basis of that
objective in the 1950s.
The real turning point was the publication by the AAA of A
Statement of Basic Accounting Theory in 1966. It was mailed to
all Association members, had the prestige of the Association
behind it, was brief and well written, and seems to have been
well-timed. That document contributed immensely to the accep-
tance of the decision-usefulness theory for two reasons, in my
judgment. First, it included significant components of the
theory—five of the most basic of the 20 that I include in my
diagrammatic outline [2000, p. 9]. Secondly, it was widely dis-
tributed. All of a sudden, nearly everyone writing on any topic in
the general area of financial accounting theory explicitly or im-
plicitly accepted the decision-usefulness objective. Key compo-
nents of the remainder of the theory quickly became familiar to
readers of academic accounting journals.
I have no first-hand information to explain why the AAA
committee suddenly adopted the decision-usefulness theory. I
should have made enquiries at the time; now it’s too late. Look-
ing at the make-up of the committee, I see that none of them
had written on the subject, but I find two members that surely
had some familiarity with the theory. My colleague, Lawrence
Vance, had to have some knowledge of my work after 14 years
of association in such matters as curriculum discussions, work-
shops, and my candidacy for promotion. The committee mem-
ber most certainly acquainted with decision-usefulness theory
was George Sorter, who had reviewed A Theory of Accounting to
Investors for The Accounting Review and who, as a Ph.D. student
at Chicago under my chairman (Vatter) might have read my
dissertation. Indeed, his own dissertation and his interest in
classification of accounting events appear to have been influ-
enced by my detailed classification of accounting events in
Chapter IV of both my dissertation [1954, 1980] and A Theory of
Accounting to Investors. Furthermore, George’s powers of per-
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suasion and articulation of his thoughts have long been recog-
nized by acquaintances as unsurpassed. Therefore, I speculate
that he deserves much credit for the Committee’s adoption of
decision-usefulness theory. (Unfortunately, the committee re-
port shows no literature search and no references to previous
literature.)
After 1966, there seemed to be no resistance in academic
circles to the decision-usefulness theory. Meanwhile, the Ac-
counting Principles Board (APB) of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) had foundered in the mar-
ketable securities sea and other dangerous waters and a new
approach to establishing and changing GAAP was sought. The
first step towards a new conceptual basis for establishing ac-
counting standards was an enquiry into accounting objectives
by the Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements,
chaired by Robert Trueblood and assisted by George Sorter as
research director. Again, I suspect, George’s persuasive powers
had their effect, but the voting members of the committee had
minds of their own and included men who had been deeply
involved in the accounting issues of the time, such as Oscar
Gellein of Haskins & Sells, Frank Weston of Arthur Young and
The University of Chicago’s Sidney Davidson, as well as
Trueblood himself. I am confident that they believed in the deci-
sion-usefulness objective. Furthermore, I have heard Martin
Gans, the study group’s administrative director, say, in an inter-
view with Stephen Zeff, that the finance man in the group, Reed
Parker of Duff, Anderson & Clark, pushed strongly for the future
cash flow orientation—a key step in decision-usefulness theory.
By that point in history (1971-1973), with the APB’s troubles in
everyone’s mind, the time was ripe for a progressive-minded
body of practitioners to follow the lead of the academics. Stew-
ardship and historical cost were no longer acceptable to those
few thought leaders who had been asked to apply themselves to
the issue. The result was that the decision-usefulness theory was
presented to a much wider readership. The report, like the
AAA’s, shows no evidence of a literature search, although my
Australian study, Objectives and Concepts of Financial State-
ments (with John Kenley, [1972]) was mentioned, along with
four other works, in the background section. By that time, the
original hard-to-find, hard-to-read works on decision-usefulness
theory were indirect sources. The Group’s objectives became the
starting point for the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
“conceptual framework project” which carried through with
much of the theory—until it got to the measurement part—but
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acceptance across the entire profession has still not been
achieved.
After acceptance of A Theory of Accounting to Investors for
publication in 1959, I turned my attention to a number of more
limited topics that fit the D-U paradigm. My serious return to
the theory came in 1969-70 at the University of Kansas. Bob
Sterling had invited me to fill the Arthur Young Chair as a visi-
tor and to participate in the “Kansas Conference” where my role
was to make a case for present value measurements alongside
Yuji Ijiri (historical cost), Philip Bell (current replacement cost),
and Ray Chambers (exit value)—to my mind, very exalted com-
pany. Oscar Gellein was asked to discuss my lengthy paper—an
assignment that may have resulted in his subsequent support of
my appointment at the FASB and tied into his leadership role in
the development and promulgation of the FASB’s conceptual
framework. David Solomons—the right person for the job—
played the role of appraiser of the alternatives. (I am sure I
beamed when David said, as he launched into his evaluation of
the ideas presented: “I suspect that from here on I’m going to
sound a lot like George Staubus”). And from then on, I was
more confident of the future of my theory.
As so many authors do, I interpreted my Kansas Conference
assignment broadly. My paper included much further develop-
ment of both the set of measurement methods available to ac-
countants and the criteria for choosing among them. In A
Theory of Accounting to Investors I ranked the various measure-
ment methods on the relevance criterion, and I pointed out the
need for other criteria (reliability, cost), but here I developed the
“multiple criteria” approach to choosing a measurement method
much more fully. The Kansas paper also developed the role of
types of evidence of value and the linkages in the surrogate
chain: the economic reasoning that permits net realizable value
to be substituted for present value, replacement cost to be sub-
stituted for net realizable value, and historical cost to be substi-
tuted for replacement cost. The supply adjustment (what differ-
ence will it make?) approach to the cost of using a resource,
which features so prominently in Activity Costing [1971, p. 17],
was also started in that paper. I was pleased with the results of
the conference; it gave me confidence that the D-U theory would
eventually prevail. The paper was published in two parts: Abacus
[Staubus, 1970] and the conference volume edited by Sterling
[Staubus, 1971a].
I continued to develop decision-usefulness theory in various
journal articles until 1975 and in the monograph I did for the
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Australian Accountancy Research Foundation in 1972 (with
John Kenley). Then I saw that a lot had been added since 1959,
so I wrote a completely updated version of decision-usefulness
theory, including a substantial collection of reprinted works and
study questions, because I felt I (and perhaps others) needed a
book that could serve graduate students better. (Making Ac-
counting Decisions [1977]).
One of the building blocks of decision-usefulness theory
that got a lot of attention in the 1970s was “inflation account-
ing”. I had just barely managed to keep in my dissertation the
reporting of gains and losses on net monetary assets or liabili-
ties and the real gain or loss on nonmonetary assets, an innova-
tion that was not widely recognized until the 1970s. Inflation
and specific price changes were treated more fully in A Theory of
Accounting to Investors and they got a lot of attention during the
inflationary period in the U.S.—1972-1981—during which time I
was deeply involved in those areas at the FASB. If I was “expert”
on anything while at the FASB it was accounting for changing
prices and I had a great deal of success in convincing the Board
on much of the content of Statement 33. (I return to this subject
below.)
The increasing acceptance of the decision-usefulness objec-
tive in the 1960s and 1970s was gratifying. It became generally
accepted among academics, then among standards setters—
folks who have reasons to think about that sort of thing. I also
observed a few auditors working with standards setting bodies
who seemed to accept it. However, the general failure of corpo-
rate managers and their sympathizers in the auditing profession
to apply the decision-usefulness objective in practice has been
disappointing; perhaps I should have foreseen it by trying to put
myself in their positions. When I try to think about how I would
look at reporting on my own performance, I can see that it is
fanciful to expect managers to be objective. And when I recog-
nize that auditors spend much of their work time and social
time making friends with client’s management personnel, it is
clear that they, too, should be expected to lack objectivity. In
this context, the few rogues that we see should not surprise us;
the surprising phenomenon is the majority of conscientious ac-
countants in preparer and auditor roles. It is easy to stand on
principle when dealing with strangers; to do so against the per-
ceived interests of your friends takes courage.
It has long been clear that the myth of auditor indepen-
dence has been a weak link in the financial reporting chain. The
three-party system in which managers hire friendly auditors to
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report to external, unknown investors should not be expected to
serve the latter well. In present-day corporate America, there is a
strong tendency for managers to control the board of directors
and the auditors, instead of the shareholders controlling the
auditors and the board and thereby, indirectly, the managers.
The classic model of the corporation—shareholders over board
over management—is hard to find in public companies in
America at this time. Corporate governance is in a sad state. I
am not optimistic about the near-term futures of corporate gov-
ernance and corporate reporting in America.
Finally, I have no favorable comments about those jour-
nalists and politicians who fail to distinguish between the vast
body of dutiful accountants and auditors, the few genuinely
rogue accountants and auditors, and the mix of helpful and
unhelpful rules that make up generally accepted accounting
principles. Let us be specific in handing out praise and criticism
of “accounting”. Is it the whole body of accountants, the few
rogues, accounting standards in general, or the standards that
have not been revised in the interests of financial statement
users that we are criticizing? And who has stood in the way of
such revisions?
“EMPIRICAL” RESEARCH
I use this heading to cover research on the association of
financial accounting variables and securities values. In the
course of my normative work in the 1950s I began to realize that
I should try to find ways of providing empirical evidence on the
merits of methods that my reasoning indicated “ought to be
used” if one sought to provide financial statement information
that could be used by investors to make better decisions than
they could without it. Because I placed a great deal of emphasis
on the relationship between cash flows from the enterprise to its
investors and net cash flows to the enterprise, I felt that I could
not be sure that depreciation accounting (and amortization of
intangibles) improved the usefulness of a net operating flow
measure. A major concern was that I could find no connection
between (1) the amortization of historical cost according to a
semi-arbitrary formula and (2) an economic cost to owners. Nei-
ther could I believe that, under the stable price level assumption,
limited-life assets retained their original market-established val-
ues. That posed an extremely important accounting question: Is
net income after deducting depreciation per GAAP superior to
net income with no deduction for depreciation as a measure of
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operating success for use in making investment decisions? That
is, is depreciation accounting, as practiced, helpful? I did not
know, nor did decision-usefulness theory tell me; it did not help
me choose between two defective measures: income with an
expense missing, or income with a poorly measured expense.
I had had one undergraduate course in statistics, but it did
not cover the coefficient of correlation, r-squared, and least-
squares methodology. I was, to say the least, statistically chal-
lenged. Unaware that I did not know how to carry out such a
research project, in the summer of 1959 I hired research assis-
tants—one of whom (Clarence Houghton) later became partner
in charge of the Northern California practice of Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells and, since his early retirement, has served with
distinction as an adjunct professor at Berkeley—and we started
collecting data on a random sample of companies to ascertain
which of those variables—earnings or “cash flow”—was the
more closely associated with the discounted values of common
stocks. I was interested in ex post discounted values—assuming
various holding periods from one to 12 years—of the dividend
streams and terminal market values as a surrogate for value, as
opposed to current market price, which, I reasoned, reflected
current fads and misperceptions. At that time, allowing for vary-
ing risks among the stocks in the sample was not feasible as I,
like other accountants, was unaware of beta as a measure of
risk.
The work expanded to the testing of other accounting hy-
potheses—LIFO vs. FIFO, other versions of cash flow, tax alloca-
tion, nonrecurring items, as well as dividends and book value as
indicators of investment value—and it went very slowly. The
desk calculators of the time, later punched cards and then an
IBM 701, were time-consuming for a novice quantitative re-
searcher. Chicago’s “CRISP” data were not available. Develop-
ment of an alternative to the seriously limited least squares
methodology (the median deviation percentage), a one-year
leave of absence, and the learning of enough statistics to muddle
through took additional time. Nevertheless, the seven years of
work yielded some understanding of empirical research; several
fairly convincing results, and several inconclusive results, in-
cluding that pertaining to the original depreciation accounting
issue; a few journal articles [Staubus, 1965, 1967a, 1968a,
1968b]; and some ability to follow the subsequent market asso-
ciation tests made by much better qualified researchers com-
mencing in the late 1960s and continuing by the thousands
since then. The totality of that effort is summarized in an un-
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published report: “Testing Accounting Hypotheses” [Staubus,
1966].
I might add that I also learned that an insecure academic
should not attempt research for which he/she is not qualified—
without a qualified partner. If only I had had some training in
research methods—even if far short of the great skills used so
effectively by “the Chicago Boys” of the late 1960s, including the
king of empirical research and all-round accounting scholar,
William H. Beaver. To some of my friends, the most incompre-
hensible aspect of my struggle was that my office mate in the
early stages was Tom Dyckman, who was teaching statistics as
well as accounting—obviously exceptionally well-qualified for
such work. As I look back on it, my failure to enlist his aid must
have been due to a combination of my being too ignorant to
understand fully how badly I needed help and Tom’s lack of
confidence in me as a possible partner. I guess I proved that I
was a loner; I’ve only collaborated on two occasions. Later,
when I was at the FASB, I did engage Tom to do a research
study on the market response to the oil and gas exposure draft.
ACTIVITY COSTING
During the many years that I was working on what turned
out to be A Theory of Accounting to Investors, I felt that the
complete accounting academic should, over the course of a ca-
reer, work on accounting to investors, accounting to managers,
and accounting to government, thereby covering the major users
of enterprise financial information. Two of the three is the best I
can do, I’m afraid. My early acquaintance with managerial ac-
counting a la Vatter and my ongoing work on developing the
curriculum at Berkeley gave me some feel for cost accounting
but no satisfaction with its state. In the late 1960s, I was spend-
ing a majority of my time teaching and writing on managerial
accounting topics, and at some point I settled down to work on
a major study of cost accounting—an example of a research
project growing out of teaching. The immediate impetus was the
raging argument over direct costing vs. full costing and espe-
cially a pair of articles by Horngren and Sorter in The Account-
ing Review [Horngren and Sorter, 1961; Sorter and Horngren,
1962]. I entered the fray with “Direct, Relevant, or Absorption
Costing?” [1963] to which The Accounting Review editor ap-
pended Sorter and Horngren’s “A Reply to a Postscript”. It was
the type of measurement issue that I should be able to answer.
As in the case of my serious look at financial accounting for my
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dissertation, I found no solid foundation on which to work.
That’s when I came up with the idea that management decisions
tended to focus on doing things, on choosing from among alter-
native courses of action—in short, on activities. I proposed that
products should not be treated as objects of costing but that
producing commodities and/or services was commonly the focus
of decisions so should be the objects of costing. Managers need
to know the cost of making a product, of acquiring a resource,
of using resources—in general, the costs of performing activi-
ties.
My interest in microeconomics affected my thinking a great
deal, as did the importance of a future orientation as empha-
sized by Vatter. Cost must be thought of as an economic sacri-
fice resulting from the decision to do something. It followed that
(1) the objects of costing must be activities, (2) cost data must
be as relevant to the future (as current) as possible, (3) the cost
of using a resource must include all required inputs, such as
holding costs (including cost of capital) between acquisition and
use, (4) the resources being used were not necessarily direct
materials, direct labor and overhead; each significant input
should be identified and costed separately to facilitate managers’
decisions regarding mix of inputs, (5) decisions are made re-
garding activity increments of various sizes (calling for a range
of cost concepts from marginal costs to life cycle costs, i.e.,
tailor-made incremental costing), (6) cost data must be free of
aberrations that are not predictive (standard costs). This reason-
ing led to such developments as supply adjustment analysis to
determine whether the cost consequences of using a resource
would be its replacement (replacement cost), reduction in its
sale (net realizable value), or less use in another enterprise activ-
ity (value in alternative use). Variable rate costing was empha-
sized—an approach that is getting a lot of attention these days
by folks interested in “peak-load pricing” of electricity, bridges
and roads, and airline seats. All of this called for a real-time
integrated system that was kept up-to-the minute by cost ac-
countants so as to provide managers with current information
on the cost of using any internal resource, such as machine
time, or of replacing products sold to the outside world. If all of
this could be done, the managerial accountant would indeed
make himself/herself a valuable member of Vatter’s manage-
ment team.
Activity Costing and Input-Output Accounting was com-
pleted in early 1970 before I left the University of Kansas, and
was published by Richard D. Irwin with the date January, 1971.
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Robert N. Anthony at Harvard had some responsibility for advis-
ing the publisher on accounting books at that time, and he
strongly recommended its publication. As in the case of deci-
sion-usefulness theory, activity costing received little attention
in the early years following its publication. In the 1980s and 90s,
“activity-based costing” has become popular. As I see it, ABC
typically incorporates the emphasis on activities in that it treats
service activities in a manufacturing setting as providing fairly
specific resources to “producing” activities—a more careful ap-
proach to accounting for overhead—but the other features of
activity costing have not become popular. That may well be
defensible from a cost-benefit viewpoint. I wonder what the fu-
ture holds.
MARKET SIMULATION ACCOUNTING
My work on market simulation accounting [1985, 1986]
marked an about face in my theory approach. In my previous
efforts in financial reporting theory and managerial accounting
I had adhered strictly to a normative approach; I loved telling
readers what accountants ought to do. I think it is fair to say
that normative work by an individual scholar reflects consider-
able conceit; by applying my reasoning powers I can ascertain
what financial information would contribute most to achieve-
ment of users’ objectives. Descriptive research, such as market
association tests, may involve less dependence on imagination;
perhaps that is a strength.
I became interested in describing accounting practices in
1983. I noticed that the literature of accounting included no
major work that could be identified as a descriptive theory of
financial accounting. For example, the FASB’s conceptual
framework was not intended to be descriptive. Indeed, the
Board intended to establish a set of long-range goals—a target
for standards setters to aim at over years of work. In other
words, it—the Board’s version of decision-usefulness theory—
was/is a normative theory. But no concise statement of a theory
of GAAP was available. According to Vatter’s above-quoted para-
graph, every science, methodology, or body of knowledge must
have a conceptual structure; I sought to find it, not to establish
it.
My analysis of measurement methods applied in GAAP em-
ployed seven qualities of accounting measurements—essentially
the criteria for evaluating alternative accounting methods from
Chapter III of Making Accounting Decisions but omitting the
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relevance criterion—emphasis on simulated market prices takes
care of that. My observations uncovered three additional criteria
that seemed important to the profession: flexibility and control
of income measurement by management; stability of income
statement numbers over time; and conservatism. I found that
stability of income numbers and conservatism appeared to be
weighed most heavily and that reliability, economy, comparabil-
ity, and understandability were valued less highly; flexibility and
control of income measurement by management fell in between.
These rather mundane results were not terribly satisfying; I
was hoping for a central objective of GAAP comparable to the
decision-usefulness objective in normative theory. Then another
look at the measurement methods in use showed a commonal-
ity: some version of a past or present market price is nearly
always the starting point for each method. Those market prices,
however, typically were adjusted, tinkered with, or revised to
accomplish—what? Two considerations became apparent. One,
to make the market price a more relevant measure of current
market value. Two, to temper the result by the above-mentioned
criteria prized by the profession, especially stability of the series
of income numbers. For example, amortization typically pro-
duces a stable charge to expense, and, under GAAP’s stable price
level assumption, tends to produce a balance sheet number for
the used asset that is closer to its current market value (than
unamortized historical cost). Similarly, the discounting of fu-
ture cash flows, providing for uncollectibles, and the practice of
combining costs of various resources going into a product—
such simulation techniques produce liability or asset values
closer to what both economic reasoning and observations sug-
gest would be market value in a complete and perfect market.
So I concluded that the central objective of GAAP measurement
was to simulate the price for an asset or liability that would
prevail in a regime of complete and perfect markets. That re-
quires recognition of the specific setting in which the asset or
liability exists. All observable market prices are defective as
measures of entity wealth because no observable price reflects
the exchange of money at the precise measurement date for the
rights/obligations associated with the net asset item in its exist-
ing unique setting. I visualized the accountant as attempting to
simulate the setting-specific market value of a wealth item, and
that requires using whatever techniques can be applied with
acceptable reliability. I recognized that the observable anomalies
are so material that the market simulation theory of accounting
measurement is hard to swallow. Also, the MSA view fails to
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account for jointness just as do other views of accounting mea-
surement. I would say, however, that the rough trend in stan-
dards setting is consistent with the market simulation hypoth-
esis, despite the roadblocks thrown up by those who place a
high value on stability of the series of reported income numbers,
conservatism—forms of secret reserves available for smooth-
ing?—and flexibility and control over income measurement.
In sum, accountants have little choice but to record newly-
acquired assets at their (historical) cost (current market value);
they could not reasonably ignore the cash disbursement or in-
currence of liability, or record a gain or loss on acquisition.
They could conceivably continue over time to report historical
cost, but they do not, except in minority cases such as land and
certain investments in financial assets—practices explained by
the preferences of preparers of financial statements. Instead,
they amortize it or write it down, or less frequently, write it up,
in the interest of more relevant, even though often less reliable,
measurement. Nominal amounts of financial assets and liabili-
ties are discounted, amortized, and/or adjusted for estimates of
uncollectibility. All of those changes in measurements are in-
tended to improve the item’s measurement as an estimate of
current fair value. They attempt, without articulating it and in
crude ways, to simulate market values, and standards setters are
staggering towards that intuitive objective without seeing the
target.
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING IN FIRMS
This book [Staubus, 1996] continued to reflect the descrip-
tive interest that produced market simulation accounting. How
did accounting get to be what it is? My economics orientation
led me to study the economic environment in which accounting
developed in past centuries. In studying the nature of the firm, I
learned a lot from Ronald Coase, Oliver Williamson and many
other economists. The result was to emphasize bounded ratio-
nality, self-interest and opportunistic behavior, firm uniqueness,
externalities, information losses in transmission, and indivisi-
bilities (and economies of scale in acquisition of resources) as
the most fundamental, “tier I” influences. Then came cost of
information, asset uniqueness, performance evaluation and in-
centive plans, and (especially) conflicts of interests. Finally, size
of firm, vertical integration, diversification, and form of organi-
zation were found to be important direct influences.
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Consider bounded rationality, perhaps the greatest influ-
ence on accounting. If the ancient merchant had been able to
remember all of his debtors and creditors, he might not have
gone to the trouble of keeping records of them. Similarly, there
can be little doubt about the influence of self-interest and oppor-
tunistic behavior on the development of such control devices as
double-entry bookkeeping. Conflicts of interests call for audit-
ing, and so on. Some of these influences, such as indivisibilities
in acquisition of plant assets (e.g., buying a ten-years supply of
machine services in one transaction), represented serious chal-
lenges to accounting—solved in practice by allocation to time
periods. Others, such as the great size of some enterprises, were
primarily positive. This study significantly improved my under-
standing of why accounting is what it is. I also note that recent
history has shown the importance of clear recognition of just
how critical asset uniqueness—consider intellectual property—
and conflicts of interests, as manifested in the financial scandal
du jour, are as challenges to accounting. That investigation gave
me a much better understanding of extant accounting.
Thinking about the historical development of accounting in
relation to the decision-usefulness objective is appropriate at
this point. Accounting has always had objectives, or reasons for
being. Helping a merchant manage his rights and obligations,
controlling the assets and operations of a branch, and dividing
profits among partners were good reasons for accounting. Rec-
ognition and articulation of a decision-usefulness objective may
not have been helpful. We can see now that achievement of the
above-mentioned objectives involved using accounting informa-
tion for making decisions, but it was not necessary to call the
reasoning of managers using that information “decision-mak-
ing”. Investing in a joint merchandising venture may seldom
have been based on accounting information since such an in-
vestment typically would have been made before there was any
record of that venture, although the promoter’s records of previ-
ous ventures might have been relevant. According to my limited
reading of history, the type of bank lending activities that seem
to have become common in the 19th century in Europe and
North America might have been the first common situations in
which it would have been natural to speak of using accounting
information as a basis for making financial decisions. The wide-
spread development of share ownership in the 20th century ex-
tended that use greatly, of course. It is not surprising that the
language of using accounting information in making financial
decisions did not develop in those centuries in which the use of
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joint stock companies with numerous absentee owners was un-
common. Also, there is no reason to criticize pre-20th century
accountants for not thinking of the processes of using account-
ing information in running the enterprise as decision making. In
my opinion, the decision-usefulness objective could have been
identified, and used productively, by the rapidly developing ac-
counting profession much earlier in the 20th century than it was
but its lack of identification and articulation before nineteen
hundred need not be lamented. Indeed, its contribution to date
in a world of antipathetic preparers may not be detectable by
financial statement users.
MY GREATEST INTELLECTUAL DEBTS
The positive influences of two senior colleagues and teach-
ers—Rufus Wixon at Buffalo and Bill Vatter at Chicago—have
been noted above. They contributed immensely to the develop-
ment of my thinking on accounting issues. The third such influ-
ence was Maurice Moonitz. Perry Mason was the senior profes-
sor in the accounting group when I arrived at Berkeley in 1952,
but he left two years later to join the American Institute of
Accountants staff in New York. That left Maurice and Lawrence
Vance as the senior full-time professors in accounting. Maury
had the greater interest in financial accounting theory. The two-
volume textbook in use at the intermediate/advanced level at
Berkeley at that time was by Moonitz and Charles Staehling
[1952], who had just retired. The unique feature of that book
was the “valuation experiment” in which the authors and stu-
dents worked through two periods’ financial events for a firm
with only monetary assets and liabilities subject to present value
measurement. It was difficult for the students, but I took to it
like a duck to water. It fit nicely with the cash flow orientation
of the decision-usefulness theory that I was working on at the
same time. Present values of future cash flows were recognized
as the most relevant to investors’ future cash flow-oriented deci-
sions of all measurement methods in Chapter III of A Theory of
Accounting to Investors. (Now, I would state my preferences
slightly differently, in the context of market simulation account-
ing [Staubus, 1986]).
More generally, Moonitz set a high standard of reasoning
and was more devoted to research than most of my colleagues in
the 1950s. His AICPA monographs, The Basic Postulates of Ac-
counting [1961] and A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Prin-
ciples for Business Enterprises [1962] (with Bob Sprouse) prob-
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ably are his best-known works. Like Vatter, he is a musician,
continuing to play violin parts in quartets to the age of 90.
(Come to think of it, Perry Mason was also a musician, but
when I became group chairman, that requirement was
dropped.) Coincidentally, Moonitz, like Vatter, grew up in Cin-
cinnati, they attended the same high school (Vatter five years
ahead of Moonitz), and both started their higher education at
the University of Cincinnati. His was a consistent voice for eco-
nomics-based theory and has been a good friend to this day,
even though he was slow to climb aboard the decision-useful-
ness train.
Aside from colleagues, the two accounting writers that I
admired most in my formative intellectual years were Paton and
Canning; I know I am in good company as admirers of their
works. W. A. Paton’s greatest contribution was his Accounting
Theory [1922] which included certain principles that he tempo-
rarily ignored under the influence of 1930s economic conditions
and A. C. Littleton. He subsequently returned to those more
progressive views. Canning’s Economics of Accountancy [1929],
which was his dissertation at the University of Chicago, empha-
sized the lack of logic in accounting measurements in practice
and the logic in present value measurements. For example, I was
impressed by his cynical version of the profession’s definition of
financial position: “That which the balance sheet is intended to
reflect” [p.180].
A little later in my career I came to admire the works of
Raymond J. Chambers and Robert R. Sterling as progressive
thinkers who embraced the decision-usefulness objective. They
were the most brilliant creative writers of accounting literature
in the second half of the 20th century, in my opinion. I remem-
ber, shamefacedly, my belated discovery of Ray in the summer
of 1958 when I read his “Asset Revaluations and Stock Divi-
dends” article in the Journal of Accountancy. I thought it was the
most exciting accounting article I had ever read and I wrote him
a fan letter telling him so (December 29, 1958), including recog-
nition that our thinking was similar. That was the start of a
rewarding (for me) professional relationship that included work-
ing together at Kansas in 1970, his visits to Berkeley and the
FASB, and my visits to Sydney, among other contacts. Later, I
discovered that I had overlooked several earlier and more funda-
mental works by Ray, especially his thought-provoking blueprint
articles [1955, 1957]. My failure to read them earlier reveals, I’m
afraid, a weakness that has cost me a lot of time and possibly ill
will over the years: not keeping up to date on published litera-
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ture (and pre-publication drafts) of colleagues whose work de-
served recognition and could have been helpful to me. This ob-
servation is relevant to my disappointment in the level of intra-
group communication at Berkeley and my tendency to work as a
loner.
I studied Ray’s and Bob’s works carefully once I caught on
to their consistently high quality. Bob’s works that impressed
me most were his devastating journal articles. Ray’s major
monuments that serve as bookends for hundreds of other good
pieces were his 1966 and 1995 books. I learned the most from
Accounting, Evaluation, and Economic Behavior [1966] because
of its contributions to areas of special interest to me, but I think
my greatest admiration is for his thesaurus [1995], which shows
a lifetime of scholarship that is unsurpassed in the accounting
field as far as I know. I wrote him another fan letter when I
discovered it.
It is common, I believe, for a person greatly devoted to his/
her work to cast an especially critical eye on those works closest
to his/her own. So it is with my views of Ray Chambers’ work.
Overall, I think he was the greatest. I also think he would have
had more influence if he had not gotten stuck on a single-value
theory. As decision-usefulness theory became more accepted,
the superior relevance, to cash flow-oriented decisions, of cur-
rent measurements over old measurements became widely rec-
ognized. Furthermore, many agreed that properly chosen exit
prices were likely to relate more closely to the future course of
the asset than entry prices—that they typically would be more
relevant and so, given equal reliability and measurement cost,
preferable. That brings us to the divergence of views. Some of us
did not believe exit prices typically were as reliable and eco-
nomical as entry prices. And of course prices in an unlikely
course of action, such as current liquidation of assets generally
thought of as integral to ongoing operations, simply did not
seem to us to rank high on relevance to users’ cash-flow oriented
decisions. Ray and a few others liked to think of the decision
facing the owner/manager of an asset who was faced with the
decision to sell or hold that particular asset. The majority of
users of external reports, in my opinion, were more concerned
with the decision facing external, noncontrolling owners and
creditors faced with the choice of whether or not to hold an
investment in the company. They are the users of financial state-
ments on which I focused. To such decision-makers, I reasoned,
the cash flow potential of assets in their most likely future
course (typically not current liquidation) was the more relevant
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measure. In most nonmonetary asset cases, such a value-in-use
or likely course measure had to be rejected on reliability and
cost grounds. That steered us back to the less relevant mea-
sure—replacement (current) cost—as our choice in many non-
monetary asset cases. Personally, I referred to the “gap chart,”
which I first used in my original dissent [Staubus, 1967b] to
Chambers’ views, as illustrative of the economic relationship
between cost and selling price that showed the logical surrogacy
of current cost for net realizable value when the latter failed the
reliability test—and the relevance test if the exit price under
consideration was related to an unlikely future course for the
asset. This reasoning can be adapted to liabilities as well.
Another way of looking at our difference is to note that Ray
was concerned with the asset owner’s sell or hold decision and
he recognized the need for valuation of the sell side. I looked at
the present or prospective external investor’s choice of whether
or not to hold an ownership or creditor interest in the enterprise
and saw the opportunity for enterprise financial statements to
inform the hold side of that choice. Those external investors
rarely have a decision to make about either selling or holding a
company’s specific asset or about liquidating the enterprise. To
me, the liquidation values of assets owned are quite relevant to
assessing the enterprise’s liquidity, an important concern to
which cash flow statements and net “quick assets” are relevant,
whereas balance sheets should be relevant to assessing the
enterprise’s ongoing wealth under the most likely future course.
In fairness to Ray, I must address his greatest concern
about my approach: lack of additivity. He felt that the amount of
one asset measured at present value, another at replacement
cost, a third at net realizable value and a fourth at historical cost
produced a sum comparable to the addition of US dollars,
pounds sterling, Australian dollars, and Swiss Francs. My view
was, and is, that none of those accounting measurement meth-
ods is perfect. All reflect a market’s estimate of an asset’s value, at
some time, somewhere, so are additive. Differences in estima-
tion techniques do not destroy additivity, although the addition
of dollars of different sizes (from different dates) is highly ques-
tionable, so the omission of historical cost from the tool kit is a
great leap forward in logic.
In my opinion, Ray could have had more impact on ac-
counting thinking if he had been more in tune with finance
theory where concepts such as enterprise continuity, present
value of cash flows, and best use of assets are more imbedded in
contemporary thinking. In the practitioner community, I believe
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that Ray’s underestimation of the reliability weakness in current
exit values and his unwillingness to address the problem (fore-
seen by many) that acquisition of nonmonetary assets typically
would require reporting a loss were viewed as demerits of his
proposal. Indeed, that is a good, although not overwhelming,
reason for objecting to the current treatment of home-grown
intangibles in GAAP. Nevertheless, Ray Chambers was a power-
ful force for progress and discipline in accounting thought.
THE AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION
Now I turn to two institutions with which I have had re-
warding experiences. The AAA is the only professional organiza-
tion in which I have maintained membership throughout my
career. The first annual meeting that I attended was at the Uni-
versity of Michigan in 1949. In those days, universities were
hosts and their faculties made arrangements for the logistics
and the program. Attendance, of course, was much smaller than
it is now, perhaps partly because employers were not as liberal
with expense reimbursements and travel was more difficult.
More importantly, there were fewer accounting teachers then.
Among the several committees on which I served, I learned
the most from the other members of the Committee on Con-
cepts and Standards for External Financial Reports during the
1973-76 period, despite my frustration at its inability to settle on
decision-usefulness theory as the most helpful theory for ac-
countants to embrace. We presented three “basic theoretical ap-
proaches” to accounting: “(1) classical (‘true income’ and induc-
tive) models; (2) decision-usefulness; and (3) information
economics” [AAA, 1977, p. 5]. A 21st century reader may be
surprised at such indecisiveness; only decision-usefulness has
provided significant guidance since 1977. Kermit Larson and
Larry Revsine served effectively as successive chairs. Jim
Boatsman, Joel Demski, Jack Kennelly, Bob Sterling, Jerry
Weygandt and Steve Zeff all contributed significantly as mem-
bers.
My association with the AAA has been rewarding to me in
two other respects. I was selected to serve as the outgoing Dis-
tinguished International Lecturer in 1982 to visit Japan, Korea,
China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia. Sarah
and I added periods of teaching at the Beijing Institute of
Foreign Trade. Two anecdotes have stayed with me. When we
visited the railroad office in Beijing to arrange for train trans-
portation, a clerk looked in a file for information on us, which
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he did find. I never knew how the railroad office got it; we had
never made plans to travel by rail. Second, when I arrived at the
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics to arrange for
my lecture there as agreed by the AAA office the chairman asked
me to give five three-hour sessions on Activity Costing. When I
questioned whether I would be able to prepare satisfactory ma-
terials in time, he said: “That shouldn’t be hard; you wrote the
book”. So I did the best I could: preparing hand-written trans-
parencies each evening; meeting with the interpreter in the
morning; and delivering the lecture in the afternoon. The as-
signed interpreter was having a difficult time with the sequential
translation, with frequent second-guessing by members of the
audience. After two such sessions, we were able to get one of the
latter—a Touche, Ross & Co. staff member from Canada whose
native dialect was Shanghaineze—to take over the interpretation
duty. Needless to say, I did not see much of Shanghai.
My other satisfying association with the AAA is the recep-
tion that its flagship journal has given to my writings. I have had
more material (pages) published in The Accounting Review than
any other living author (but not as much as an early editor, the
late A. C. Littleton). Naturally, I consider The Accounting Review
to have been the best of the accounting journals, even if I find
little of interest in it these days.
As an aside here, Berkeley’s involvement in the AAA, and
AICPA, is noteworthy. AAA presidents who were students or pro-
fessors at Berkeley include Henry Rand Hatfield, Perry Mason,
Lawrence Vance, Robert Sprouse, Maurice Moonitz, Thomas
Dyckman, Gerry Mueller, and Michael Diamond. Furthermore,
14—that’s right, 14—AAA presidents have served as visiting pro-
fessors at Berkeley, several of them in summer sessions in
Henry Rand Hatfield’s era. Four alumni or ex-faculty (Michael
N. Chetkovich, John F. Forbes, N. Loyall McLaren, and Louis H.
Penney) have headed up the AICPA or its predecessor, the
American Institute of Accountants. We have a long history of
professional involvement.
THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD
EXPERIENCE
My association with the FASB was truly a learning experi-
ence although I never did learn why I was chosen to serve as
Director of Research and Technical Activities. My speculation is
that the two board members who knew my work, Bob Sprouse
(vice chairman) and Oscar Gellein, who has been widely recog-
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nized as one of the most valuable members the Board has ever
had, were most influential in the Board’s choice. Bob had been
my next-door colleague at Berkeley for seven years and Oscar
had served as discussant of my paper at the 1970 Kansas Con-
ference. As a conscientious discussant—and every task that
came Oscar’s way was done conscientiously—he was thoroughly
familiar with decision-usefulness thinking. Bob was, I believe, a
late 1960s convert; his monograph with Maurice Moonitz in
1963 did not adopt decision-usefulness theory (much to my dis-
may). In any event, I was invited to interview in November 1975,
and served part-time on a traveling basis until July 1, 1976 when
I started full time.
This may be an appropriate point to note that I was follow-
ing a well-established Berkeley tradition when I went into the
business of establishing accounting principles, or standards. In
the 1930s, Berkeley’s Henry Rand Hatfield, the first full-time
professor of accounting in the U. S., had worked with T. H.
Sanders and Underhill Moore in writing A Statement of Account-
ing Principles [1938], commissioned by the Haskins & Sells
Foundation and published by the American Institute of Accoun-
tants. The intention of the Foundation was to establish “a body
of principles which will become useful in unifying thought and
which by its acceptance will serve to standardize accounting
practices” [p. xi]. Perry Mason moved from Berkeley to the
AICPA office of accounting research in 1954, followed by
Maurice Moonitz as Director of Accounting Research in 1961.
Reed Storey (Ph.D., 1958) served in that same office, succeeding
Maurice Moonitz as Director of Research, then moved to the
FASB staff when it was established. Bob Sprouse, long-time
FASB vice-chairman, was a Berkeleyan for seven years and
board member Gerhard Mueller came out of our Ph.D. program
(1962).
The “conceptual framework project” was a prominent activ-
ity during the time I was there, having been selected by the
Board as one of the original seven projects it would undertake.
The “Trueblood Committee,” more properly the Study Group on
the Objectives of Financial Statements, had submitted its report
in October 1973, and the Board used that report as its starting
point. Sprouse, Gellein and staffer Reed Storey were actively in
charge of the project. It would be reasonable to speculate that I
had some influence on the development of the conceptual
framework during the period I was in Stamford, but that would
be wrong. Any influence I had came earlier and worked through
others. The fact of the matter was that the trio running the
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project were so active and so well-qualified and had such a good
start that there was nothing for me to do in that area. There was
one exception. I commissioned David Solomons, who was recog-
nized as the primary author of the “Wheat Commission’s” origi-
nal design for the FASB, to write a report that served as a start-
ing point for SFAC No. 2, “Qualitative Characteristics of
Financial Information” (1980). The Board was happy with his
work. My only complaint was that it should have been called
“Criteria for Making Accounting Choices” but the Board was
already committed to qualitative characteristics.
Those with an active interest in the development of account-
ing standards in the mid-1970s remember the intense argument
that went on for several years. The opposition to decision-use-
fulness theory was well organized and active. Robert K. Mautz
was the accounting guru partner in Ernst & Ernst who led the
opposition. He was a member of the Board’s Conceptual Frame-
work Task Force, so had full access to all of the materials being
gathered and developed. Then, as now, the Ernst firm had a
special relationship with the Financial Executives Institute
which welcomed Mautz and allies as speakers against the FASB
at many FEI meetings. They also wrote papers stating their posi-
tion. As I saw it, FASB opponents believed, quite rightly, that
acceptance of the decision-usefulness objective would lead to
acceptance of current values when they could be measured with
acceptable reliability and cost. That would mean the loss of a
great tool for managing earnings—the ability to convert noncur-
rent values to realized gains or losses as needed. They did not
give high priority to informing investors, and who can blame
them? We all give high priority to our own interests. Managers’
interests in how to report on their own performance will always
conflict with investors’ interests in information for decisions
and the Ernst firm sided with their client managements, not
with financial statement users. That’s why a regulatory body is
needed. But many accountants do recognize the concept of so-
cial responsibility.
Mautz and company fought tooth and nail against the con-
ceptual framework and did succeed in delaying it somewhat.
But the case for decision usefulness eventually carried the day
through most of the conceptual framework. Even at the end, the
acceptance of alternative measurement methods to fit varying
cost and reliability circumstances fits the theory, in my opinion.
However, we progressives must not feel too satisfied. In prac-
tice, the forces of resistance to informing investors continue to
win battles, as in the cases of valuation of marketable securities,
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treatment of the costs (to stockholders) of stock options, and
accounting for costs of pensions and other post-employment
benefits. As I write, the U.S. Congress is holding hearings on the
financial reporting at Enron, which may serve to shine a bit
more light on the difficulty in getting managements to inform
investors.
When I arrived in Stamford, the Board was busily engaged
in several other contentious projects, notably those pertaining to
exploration and development costs in the extractive industries,
the restructuring of troubled debt, and leasing. The public hear-
ing on the restructuring of debt was held in New York at the end
of July 1976. Banker after banker—Walter Wriston of Citicorp,
David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan, Norborne Berkeley of
Chemical Bank—told the Board how hard it would be for impor-
tant borrowers to get loans if bankers knew that those loans
would have to be marked to market if they ran into trouble.
They cited the nearest they could find to heart-rending potential
cases—friendly foreign governments, municipalities (New York
City was at that time very publicly broke), and fledgling minor-
ity businesses—to convince the Board of the potential adverse
economic consequences of a tough standard on the restructuring
of debt. Personally, I was more concerned about the economic
consequences of not requiring lenders to bite the bullet when
loans went bad. In the end, the Board compromised—and lend-
ers have continued to take great risks, often being bailed out by
taxpayers. Think of the financial disasters associated with
Mexico, Indonesia, Argentina, savings and loans, etc.
The economic consequences argument, i.e., the concern
about adverse effects on managers’ and/or investors’ decisions of
a significant change in a financial reporting standard, was
brought up in opposition to changes in the reporting of leases
and in other projects on which the Board worked during my
tenure. The granddaddy of them all, in terms of the efforts ex-
pended by opponents to change, was the oil and gas project. The
“successful efforts” method, to which most of the board mem-
bers were leaning, required taking a hit to the income statement
for the costs of a dry hole. The “full cost” method was more
liberal in capitalizing and amortizing the costs of all drilling,
thus typically yielding a smoother series of income numbers.
The “Ad Hoc Committee for Full Cost Accounting” was chaired
by the late J. Stanford Smith, the chairman of International
Paper Co. which had a large oil and gas subsidiary. We saw him
as an enemy of the Board. I remember a dinner party at our
home that happened to include as guests Don Kirk (Board mem-
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ber) and a young lady neighbor of ours who worked for Interna-
tional Paper. We were amused when she told us the story of how
John S. Smith became J. Stanford Smith. She reported that
John Smith held a contest among his friends to find the most
impressive alternative name. The winning entry was J. Stanford
Smith. My staff also was able to get a copy of Smith’s employ-
ment contract showing the dependence of his earnings on the
company’s reported earnings. All of this helped Board personnel
understand “where J. Stanford Smith was coming from”.
The Board’s exposure draft (ED) “Financial Accounting and
Reporting by Oil and Gas Producing Companies” favoring suc-
cessful efforts accounting was issued in July 1977. I commis-
sioned two research studies to detect possible adverse effects of
successful efforts accounting on producers’ ability to raise capi-
tal. A market response study by Tom Dyckman was unable to
find any lasting, statistically significant effect of the exposure
draft on the prices of companies using full cost accounting—
those that would have to switch to more conservative account-
ing if the ED were to become GAAP. Horace Brock interviewed
officers of 27 successful efforts companies in the Southwest and
found that none of them felt that successful efforts accounting
had hindered their capital-raising activities. But the ad hoc com-
mittee for full cost accounting continued its resistance, working
the Washington beat intensely. It also hired Dan Collins of the
University of Iowa to do a market response study. Surprise!? He
found that the ED did hurt the prices of full cost companies’
securities. The conflict between Dan’s and Tom’s results surely
did not boost the stock of market response research, nor did
Dan’s sway the Board nor Tom’s influence the SEC. As many
remember, the Board went ahead with its standard favoring suc-
cessful efforts [1977]; the SEC issued a statement [1978] cancel-
ing the GAAP status of the Board’s standard; and the Board
issued a revised standard [1979] rescinding its requirement for
successful efforts accounting. So much for the power of an inde-
pendent, private sector standards-setting body!
Economic consequences got special attention at the FASB
during the oil and gas imbroglio. The issue had risen to such a
prominent level in intercourse pertaining to major projects, and
was so heavily weighted as an argument by many respondents,
that I felt more light should be shone on it. I was familiar with
the reasoning supporting consideration of economic conse-
quences because it (under the name “effects via other parties”)
was a criterion an evaluator with a special interest might use in
choosing an accounting method as discussed in Chapter III of
194
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 30 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol30/iss1/11
187Staubus: Autobiographical: An Accountant’s Education
my Making Accounting Decisions [1977]. Prem Prakash at Pitts-
burgh and Al Rapport at Northwestern, among others, were
writing about it [1976]. I discussed the issue with Al, then got
Board Chairman Marshall Armstrong’s approval to issue a call
for papers and hold a conference on the subject. I sent letters to
many organizations whose members might be interested and
had notices published in several journals inviting one and all to
submit research papers that might shed some light on the issue
of possible economic consequences of financial reporting. It is
interesting that, despite their frequent citing of possible eco-
nomic consequences as a basis for objecting to proposed
changes in accounting standards, when the opportunity came
for them to show something specific about possible adverse eco-
nomic consequences, not one of the Financial Executives Insti-
tute member firms submitted a paper. In fact, the Institute’s
president, Charles Hornbostel, was exceptionally vociferous in
complaining about my call for papers and plan for a conference.
In due course, I received 22 papers—mostly from academ-
ics, none from the most vocal complainers—and my committee
of six judges (research directors of the FASB’s six sponsoring
organizations) picked five for presentation at our conference
and one more for publication in the related book [FASB, 1978].
The one-day conference, which I chaired, was held on March 23,
1978. As I had anticipated, no one was able to show that finan-
cial reporting standards adversely affected the economy through
either managers’ or investors’ decisions. In my opinion, that ef-
fort substantially weakened the economic consequences argu-
ment, although it certainly did not stop it from being dredged
up by those opposed to a position taken by the Board. The
points became clear to many: (1) economic consequences of
financial reporting can be favorable or unfavorable for the
economy; (2) the economic consequences of financial reports
that include irrelevant or unreliable measurements or that mis-
represent risks being taken by the entity can be unfavorable,
whereas financial reports with the opposite characteristics are
most likely to have favorable economic consequences. It would
be a rare case in which the Board should pull its punches be-
cause of possible adverse economic consequences.
When Marshall S. Armstrong, the Board’s highly respected
first chairman, retired, Donald J. Kirk succeeded him. Marshall
permitted Don to reorganize to suit his own style before the
official handover, at which point Don brought in a more mana-
gerial type of person—Michael Alexander—to replace me as Di-
rector of Research and Technical Activities. I was switched to
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full-time work on the “inflation accounting” project, where I
might have been more valuable and which I certainly found
more satisfying. During my term as director, each of the major
projects was under the supervision of a board member—an ar-
rangement that probably served best at the beginning because it
gave those board members an opportunity to learn about the
various phases in the development of a project. Also, much of a
board member’s time when the organization got into a steady
state was spent on matters pertaining to public hearings, re-
sponses and deliberations on exposure drafts and final state-
ments, matters requiring little board member time in the
organization’s youth. That arrangement meant that the Re-
search and Technical Activities director did not provide much
direction to the staff; most of them worked more closely with a
board member. Later, when Jim Leisenring and Tim Lucas
served as Research and Technical Activities directors, the job
became more of a chief operating officer position. In my term,
however, technical advisor was a better job description; I did a
great deal of reading and commenting on project managers’
drafts, especially on a couple of projects that were not super-
vised directly by a board member. One of those was capitaliza-
tion of interest cost, which was issued as Statement No. 34. That
topic had been of great interest to me since my first published
paper, in 1952. I was pleased to see it become part of GAAP.
One minor duty of the Director of Research and Technical
Activities was to interact with other research directors of North
American accounting organizations in a six-member organiza-
tion known as the Council of Accounting Research Directors
(CARD). We met every six months to exchange ideas and keep
each other up to date. I especially recall attending one of those
meetings in Toronto. Two or three other members were based in
New York and it so happened that we all traveled to Toronto on
the same flight. We chatted in the waiting room, then boarded
together. On the plane, however, we parted. One of the privi-
leges of the FASB research director was first-class travel. I found
my seat in the first-class section but the others went on to
economy class. My embarrassment was heightened by my
awareness that the members of their organizations were funding
the FASB, so I was traveling first-class at their expense. From
that date forward, I forewent my first-class privilege. Another
lesson in the education of an accountant!
A more time-consuming duty was recruiting, which was
much more difficult than I had anticipated. In one case I re-
jected an applicant who later became an effective board mem-
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ber, fortunately after I had left the organization. I’ll never know
if he would have made a good project manager. It’s safe to say
that the sets of personal qualities required for the two jobs are
far from identical. To a large extent, qualified people were part-
ners or heading for partnerships in accounting firms, enjoying
similar success in industry, or full professors at universities. By
academic standards, FASB personnel were well paid, but the
salaries were only competitive with those in other fields, and
many applicants did not see much upside potential. Temporary
positions—as industry fellows, practice fellows, or academic fel-
lows—could be filled more easily, and we were fortunate to at-
tract some good people for those roles. The qualities needed for
senior staff—technical knowledge, writing ability, and interest
in evaluating accounting alternatives—were not so easy to find
in people willing to join that peculiar, risky organization, the
FASB. I can think of senior staff members who were nearly
worthless to the FASB who went on to great successes else-
where. But we also had some outstanding people, such as Jules
Cassel, whom I believe is the longest serving staff person at the
FASB, having started well before I came and continuing as I
write.
My most successful recruit was Bryan Carsberg, who came
in 1978 and became my partner on inflation accounting. I first
met Bryan when I was at the London Business School in 1967
and Bryan was a graduate student and lecturer at the London
School of Economics and Political Science. Will Baxter invited
me over to the LSE to lecture on divisional performance mea-
surement. I structured my lecture to start with a possible but
poor measure of performance, point out its weaknesses, then
move on to a better measure, etc. Each time I would pause for
questions before suggesting the preferable measure, Bryan
would raise his hand and say something like “but I would have
thought (what I was about to suggest as the preferable measure)
would work better”. Naturally, I thought that young man was
very smart.
As chairman of the accounting group at Berkeley in the
early 1970s, I invited Bryan to spend a term with us as a visitor,
which reinforced my judgment. At the FASB, we worked to-
gether on the specific technical content of the inflation account-
ing statement until the time came to draft the exposure draft.
Bryan asked if I would like for him to have a go at it; I agreed.
He worked on it two evenings at home, writing in longhand and
bringing the work to me in the morning. I was astounded. Not
only did he seem to have never needed to cross out any of his
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first choices of words, but I could not find any editorial sugges-
tions to make either. In one week he joined the ranks of such
top technical writers as Reed Storey and Paul Pacter. And his
understanding of the technicalities of the subject, once again,
agreed precisely with mine. Bryan stayed with the Board for
three years during which period he was promoted to assistant
director. That experience may have contributed to his later suc-
cesses in leading major regulatory bodies of Her Majesty’s Gov-
ernment (Director-General of Telecommunications (Oftel) and
Director-General of Fair Trading) as well as the British and in-
ternational accounting standards-setting bodies. I am sure that
the skills he polished at the FASB have served him well in all of
those positions. Will Baxter and the LSE should be proud of Sir
Bryan.
Of all the projects in which I was involved at the FASB, I
surely made the greatest contribution to Statement No. 33, “Fi-
nancial Reporting and Changing Prices”. including the title,
which I chose as the best I could think of to cover both specific
price changes and changes in the (price of the) measuring unit—
the U.S. dollar. I drafted an exposure draft on general price level
adjustments that was issued in March 1979, but which the
Board did not expect to finalize; it followed through with an
approach that was started earlier but was already deemed unac-
ceptable: accounting for inflation without updating measure-
ments of specific net asset items. The technical features of that
ED did, however, carry through to Statement 33, including my
definitions of monetary and nonmonetary assets and liabilities,
which were stated carefully so were difficult to understand. That
has been characteristic of much of the writing in FASB work:
we/they have not always struck the balance between precision
and readability that many readers would have preferred. The
Board has insisted on “getting it right technically”. Subse-
quently, the staff has developed ways of helping readers compre-
hend technical standards by providing supplementary educa-
tional materials.
From the above comments, I am sure the reader can see
that my FASB experience contributed heavily to my education. I
added much to my technical competence, although I would not
claim to have reached the level of such genuine experts as Oscar
Gellein or Tim Lucas. I acquired the habit of arguing two or
more sides of issues, of seeking counterarguments, of presenting
as whole a picture as I could. Because the Board was deter-
mined to work within the logic of GAAP rather than overturn
the whole structure, reasoning by analogy within GAAP became
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important. High quality writing was admired and I sought to
improve my own, and I gained some experience speaking to
groups that I did not know as well as students and fellow-aca-
demics. I learned to think about the background for a person’s—
especially a critic’s—point of view and to recognize that no one
was completely objective, not even my admired academic
friends, or myself. All of the Board’s constituents had special
interests; advocacy of those interests is not an evil act, but it
does impede the performance of a body established to work in
the interests of the general public. The Board’s mission was to
represent the latter; in my opinion, Board members have consis-
tently sought to do so.
My admiration for Board members I have known, while I
was there and subsequently, has been quite general, although
not universal. Marshall Armstrong was the type of steady, calm
leader that the first Board needed. Don Kirk, a younger, vigor-
ous man, provided a stronger style of leadership and added an
emphasis on business-like efficiency, including individual work
plans and monthly reports, in the operations of an organization
of some 100 people. Bob Sprouse served as vice-chairman for
nearly all of his 13 years on the Board and consistently offered
balanced, well-reasoned views; he had served with distinction as
president of the American Accounting Association and was the
ideal choice for the first academic position on the Board. Oscar
Gellein, who came from Haskins and Sells, was greatly admired
by all who knew him, as nearly as I could tell. His reasoning
often made the difference in the conclusion reached by the
Board. In an environment in which nearly every professional felt
pushed by the work load, Oscar once told me, “I like this job; my
only complaint is that there is not enough to do”. Just a little
later, Ralph Walters and David Mosso became very effective
members. I enjoyed reading the transcripts of David’s well-
crafted, highly literate speeches. In general, the Board Members
made the transition from their special interest positions to rep-
resentatives of the public interest quite effectively. I never felt
that any of them exhibited special interest bias. Unfortunately,
the Board was subject to a modest degree of “regulatory cap-
ture,” but far less than what one sees in such U.S. regulatory
bodies as the SEC and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, or the auditing profession.
My views of the FASB have changed a bit over the years. As
one board member explained to me when I inquired about the
change in his position on an issue after moving from a corporate
financial officer position to the Board: “Where you stand de-
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pends on where you sit”. I was, naturally, loyal to the cause
when I was a part of it but in later years I have been disap-
pointed in two aspects: speed and independence. When the
chronological length of projects is counted in decades, as in the
cases of pensions and other post-employment benefits, consoli-
dations, and financial instruments, I cannot be proud of it. And
the repeated cases of yielding to pressure, including by delays,
have been discouraging. It surely is difficult to make a case that
the Board’s standards involving restructuring of debt, pensions,
other post-employment benefits, marketable securities, and
stock options are consistent with the conceptual framework.
The trend of board decisions surely has been in the direction of
providing more useful information to investors, and I think the
Board deserves to have reached the greatest age of any U.S.
accounting standards setting organization, but still the record is
not one deserving strong accolades. On balance, however, it is a
force for good in financial reporting.
I am pleased to see that recent legislation has provided for
financing the Board from fees paid by public companies to the
SEC, thus eliminating the threat that unhappy corporate man-
agements might withhold contributions to the privately financed
Financial Accounting Foundation that has funded the Board in
the past. I am convinced that that threat has influenced Board
members’ judgments on controversial issues. Members of Finan-
cial Executives International have been the most frequent and
politically strongest opponents of proposed changes in financial
accounting standards; their agents in the auditing profession
have also been poor supporters when the chips were down.
None of the sponsoring organizations, however, have good
records of support, including the generally apathetic AAA. I
would not object to the Board’s supersession by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Board. One way of meeting the
widespread concern that detailed “cookbook” standards are too
easily “loopholed” is to adopt the “general principles” approach
that many critics of the Board and the IASB prefer and to estab-
lish an advance opinion service that would, for a fee, provide an
ex ante opinion on a company’s proposed reporting. The auditor
would then be required to call attention to any deviation from
that opinion. Should the SEC do this?
CONCLUSIONS
Academic accountants have shown a much lower level of
interest in accounting theory in the last quarter century than
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they did in the previous two quarters. That applies to both their
research and their teaching. I have no good explanation of why
this has been so. I think we all know that such an explanation
would have to explain the reward systems in university faculties.
I am willing, however, to confess that my interest has not
waned. If that marks me as antiquated, so be it.
What have I learned in the course of my education? These
points I find enduring:
• That accounting has the honor of serving as a major
provider of information, and information lubricates
markets. Those who enjoy the fruits of markets should
recognize the value of accounting. Governmental regula-
tory activities that positively influence the flow of objec-
tive information are consistent with belief in the value of
free markets in other goods.
• Education makes information accessible. Accounting
education empowers information providers and users.
• Accounting is a branch of economics. The measurement
of wealth—positive and negative, inflows and outflows—
is the heart of accounting, including the use of account-
ing in controlling the handling of wealth.
• That teachers can add value and interest to their finan-
cial accounting courses by emphasizing decision-useful-
ness theory in addition to generally accepted accounting
principles.
• That measurement methods that simulate the market
price of the asset or liability item in a regime of com-
plete and perfect markets provide information relevant
to the decisions of interested parties who are future cash
flow-oriented.
• That the prospective reliability of those measurements
must be weighed heavily in choosing among them and in
making the cut-off between those items that are measur-
able with useful reliability and those that are not, espe-
cially intangible investments.
• That no accounting system using only one measurement
method can serve users well.
• That accounting measurements always will be fraught
with imperfections and that the portion of net asset
items that is not measurable with acceptable reliability
is increasing.
• That cost finding can be taught by starting with ad hoc
situations calling for predictions of economic sacrifices
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required to perform an identified activity. Then, com-
mon cost information needs can provide the basis for
developing cost accounting systems.
• That many academic accountants can improve their
teaching and research by using each to help the other in
a symbiotic relationship. That requires that the teaching
and research focus on the same subject matter.
• That a career in academic accounting can be rewarding.
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NOTICEBOARD
THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
2003 VANGERMEERSCH MANUSCRIPT AWARD
In 1988, The Academy of Accounting Historians established an annual
manuscript award to encourage academic scholars new to the field to pursue
historical research. An historical manuscript on any aspect of the field of ac-
counting, broadly defined, is appropriate for submission.
ELIGIBILITY AND GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSIONS
Any accounting faculty member, who holds a full-time appointment and
who received his/her masters/doctorate within seven years previous to the date
of submission, is eligible to be considered for this award. Coauthored manu-
scripts will be considered (if at least one coauthor received his/her master/doc-
torate within the last seven years). Manuscripts must conform to the style re-
quirements of the Accounting Historians Journal. Previously published
manuscripts or manuscripts under review are not eligible for consideration.
Six copies of each manuscript should be submitted by August 1, 2003 to the
chair of the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee:
Professor Richard K. Fleischman
Department of Accountancy
Boler School of Business
John Carroll University
University Heights, OH 44118
USA
A cover letter, indicating the author’s mailing address, date masters/doctoral
degree awarded, and a statement that the manuscript has not been published or
is not currently being considered for publication should be included in the
submission packet.
REVIEW PROCESS AND AWARD
In addition to the chair, the Vangermeersch Manuscript Award Committee
includes the following members:
Salvador Carmona Universidad Carlos III
David Oldroyd University of Newcastle
Chris Poullaos University of New South Wales
Thomas Tyson St. John Fisher College
The committee will evaluate submitted manuscripts on a blind-review basis
and select one recipient each year. The author will receive a $1,000 (U.S.) sti-
pend and a plaque to recognize his/her outstanding achievement in historical
research. In the case of coauthored manuscripts, only the junior faculty
member(s) will receive prizes. The winning manuscript will be published in the
Accounting Historians Journal after an appropriate review. The award will be
given annually unless the Manuscript Award Committee determines that no
submission warrants recognition as an outstanding manuscript. The award will
be presented at the Academy’s 2003 annual research conference in Denton,
Texas.
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CALL FOR PAPERS
Academy of Accounting Historians
2003 Research Conference
November 6-8, 2003
Denton, Texas
Conference Theme: “Accountability — Pre-Post Enron:
Alternative Global Views”
The theme of the 2003 Academy of Accounting Historians’ Research Confer-
ence, “Accountability — Pre-Post Enron: Alternative Global Views: is intended to
stimulate a historical analysis of the concept of accountability. Specifically, we
are interested in an evaluation of:
• In search of the moral compass
• Accounting and auditing responsibility
• The role of accounting research in rendering accountability invisible
• Corporate culture and its impact on accountability
• Comparative practices of accountability in international contexts
• Professional ethics
• Impact of standard setting on accountability
• Corporate governance
• Abdication of academia in the advancement of normative research
• History of earnings management
• History of off-the-balance sheet financing
• An educator’s response to Enron
• An historical analysis of how the profession responds to crisis
• History of auditor rotation
Submission of papers: The deadline for submissions is June 15, 2003. Three
copies of papers (double spaced) and an abstract of 500 words or less should be
submitted to:
Professor Sarah A. Holmes
Department of Accounting
Texas A&M University
4353 TAMU
College Station, Texas 77843-4353
Papers are subject to double blind review. Abstracts (but not papers) will be
published in the Proceedings of the conference and on the Academy’s Home
page.
Registration: Registration is $125. This fee includes a Thursday night reception,
Friday and Saturday continental breakfasts, Friday and Saturday luncheons, and
Friday evening dinner. Registration forms should be returned to Sarah A.
Holmes, Department of Accounting, Texas A&M University, 4353 TAMU, College
Station, Texas 77843-4353.
Hotel Accommodation: The conference will be held at the Radisson Hotel
Denton & Eagle Point Golf Club. The conference rate is $99 plus tax per night –
single or double. Reservations should be made directly with the hotel at 940-384-
2254 or by Fax at 940-384-2244. Be sue to reference the Academy of Accounting
Historians.
Airport: Denton is served by the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport. Shuttle services will
be provided.
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15th Annual Conference on
Accounting, Business & Financial History
at Cardiff Business School 10-11 September 2003
Sponsored by:
BDO Stoy Hayward
Theoretical, empirical and review papers are welcomed in all areas of account-
ing, business and financial history.
The conference provides delegates with the opportunity of presenting and dis-
cussing, in an informal setting, papers ranging from early working drafts to fully
developed manuscripts. The format of the conference allows approximately 40
minutes for presentation and discussion in order to help achieve worthwhile
feedback from those attending.
In the past, many papers presented at Cardiff have subsequently appeared in
print in Accounting, Business and Financial History, edited by John Richard
(Dick) Edwards and Trevor Boyns, or in another of the full range of interna-
tional, refereed academic accounting, business and economic history journals.
The conference will be held at Aberdare Hall, Cathays Park, Cardiff, CF14 3UX,
UK, from lunchtime on Wednesday, 10 September 2003 to mid-afternoon on
Thursday, 11 September 2003.
The fully inclusive conference fee (covering all meals, the conference dinner on
Wednesday and accommodation) if £100.
Those wishing to offer papers to be considered for presentation at the confer-
ence should send an abstract of their paper (not exceeding one page) to:
Debbie Smith
Cardiff Business School, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU
Tel +44 (0)29 2087 5731 Fax +44 (0)29 2087 4419
Email. SmithDL@cardiff.ac.uk
The deadline for submissions is 31 May 2003 with earlier proposals for
papers encouraged.
Following the refereeing process, applicants will be advised of the conference
organisers’ decision on 30 June 2003.
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CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT & CALL FOR PAPERS
FOURTH ASIAN PACIFIC INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH IN
ACCOUNTING CONFERENCE
Singapore 4-6 July 2004
&
APIRA 2004 Emerging Scholars’ Colloquium
(2-3 July 2004)
Organised by Singapore Management University
(Supporting Organisation: Nanyang Business School,
Nanyang Technological University)
In association with Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal
The triennial APIRA conference now moves to the “Lion City” Singapore, follow-
ing on from its predecessors in Sydney (1995), Osaka (198) and Adelaide (2001).
APIRA is the premier interdisciplinary accounting research conference in the
Asia-Pacific region, rotating in a three-year cycle with the European IPA and the
New York CPA conferences.
With a reputation for academic rigor, and the participation of accountancy’s
foremost thinks, APIRA 2004 promises to attract strong representation from
accounting researches the world over. Some of the most prolific researchers
from the United Kingdom, Europe, North America, the Asia-Pacific region, and
many other countries are represented in APIRA’s International Editorial Com-
mittee. A strong interdisciplinary program of research papers and forums ad-
dressing the relationships between accounting, auditing and accountability and
their social, institutional, economic and political environments will be included
in the program.
This interdisciplinary accounting conference is dedicated to the advancement of
accounting knowledge and practice. It provides a platform to discuss the interac-
tion between accounting/auditing and their social, economic, institutional and
political environments.
Conference sessions and papers will critique contemporary theory and practice,
examine historical and interdisciplinary dimensions of accounting, debate policy
alternatives, and explore new perspectives for understanding and change in the
accounting discipline.
Papers may explore policy alternatives and provide new perspectives for under-
standing the accounting discipline, covering the following themes:
• Accounting Communication
• Intellectual Capital
• Knowledge Management
• Risk Management
• Corporate Governance
• Social and Environmental Accounting
• Critical Financial Analysis
• Accounting and Gender and/or Feminist Theories
• Accounting and Accountability in the Public Sector
• Non-profit Organizations’ Accountability
• Accounting Policy and Standard Setting
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• Corporate Regulation and Accountability
• Accounting Professions
• New Forms of Accounting and Auditing
• Auditing and Accountability: Professional and Business Ethics
• Accounting in the Third World
• Accounting and the Public Interest
• Critical, Explanatory, Oral and Visual Approaches to Accounting History
• Critical and Ethnographic Case Studies of Accounting in Action
• Accounting and Management Planning and Control
• International Accounting and Globalisation
• Accounting and Technology
• Accounting and Culture
• Accounting and the Home
• Methodological and Theoretical Issues
APIRA 2004 will be held at the Grand Hyatt Singapore, and its associated
Emerging Scholars’ Colloquium (2-3 July) will be held at the beautiful Bukit
Timah campus of Singapore Management University. The conference’s plenary
speakers on the subjects of corporate governance and management control will
include Professors Niamh Brennan (University College Dublin), Trevor Hopper
(University of Manchester), and Ken Merchant (University of Southern Califor-
nia).
For full conference and colloquium details,
access the SINGAPORE APIRA website now!
http://www.accountancy.smu.edu.sg/Apira/index.htm
or
using www.Google.com, type in “APIRA 2004”
Key Dates:
• Deadline for electronic submission of papers : 30 January 2004
(only full papers considered for refereeing)
• Submission of Revised Paper : 30 April 2004
• Early Bird Conference Registration : 30 April 2004
Fees:
Early Bird Registration by : Full Registration (S$595)
30 April 2004 Full-time Postgraduate Student (S$365)
Emerging Scholar’s Colloquium (S$50)
Regular Registration after : Full Registration (S$695)
30 April 2004 Full-time Postgraduate Student (S$415)
Emerging Scholar’s Colloquium (S$60)
For further enquiries, please contact:
Ms Adelene Ang or Professor Lee D Parker
Singapore Management University The University of Adelaide
Email: aang@smu.edu.sg Email: aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au
Conference co-chairs:
Professor Lee D Parker Associate Professor Low Aik Meng
The University of Adelaide Singapore Management University
Email: aaaj@commerce.adelaide.edu.au Email: amlow@smu.edu.sg
CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT & CALL FOR PAPERS
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Accounting and Business Research
Volume 32 Number 3 2002
Contents
Articles
The use of accounting information for the Gongmeng Chen 123
valuation of dual-class shares listed on Michael Firth
China’s stock markets Jeong-Bon Kim
Coals from Newcastle: an evaluation of Richard K. Fleischman 133
alternative frameworks for interpreting the Richard H. Macve
development of cost and management
accounting in Northeast coal mining during
the British Industrial Revolution
UK brokers’ characteristics: does size mater? Simon Hussain 153
Auditor economic incentives and going-concern Ann Vanstraelen 171
opinions in a limited litigious Continental
European business environment: empirical
evidence from Belgium
Book Reviews
Jeff Pearcy, Recording an Empire: an A. J. Arnold 187
accountinghistory of Imperial Chemical
Industries Ltd 1926-1976
Helliar, Lonie, Power and Sinclair, Attitudes Roger Mills 188
of UK managers to risk and uncertainty
Rob Gray and David Collison with John Markus J. Milne 188
French,Ken McPhail and Lorna Stevenson,
The professional accounting bodies and the
provision of education and training in relation
to environmental issues
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Contents
Articles
The beginnings of accounting for capital A. J. Arnold 195
consumption: disclosure practices in the S. McCartney
British railway industry, 1830-55
Top executive dismissal, ownership and Martin J. Conyon 209
corporate performance Annita Florou
Capital budgeting, valuation and personal taxes Ian M. Dobbs 227
Anthony D. Miller
The ownership structure of UK firms and the Raymond Donnelly 245
informativeness of accounting earnings Caitriona Lynch
Measurement of de facto harmonisation: Aileen Pierce 259
implications of non-disclosure for research Pauline Weetman
planning and interpretation
Book Reviews
Ken Shackleton and Stephen P. Walker, A Future T. Baxter 275
for the Accountancy Profession: The Question of
Closure and Integration, 1957-70
Robert J. Bricker and Gary J. Previts (eds), Stephen A. Zeff 276
 The Murphy-Kirk-Beresford Correspondence
1982-1996: Commentary on the Development
of Financial Accounting Standards
Kathleen Anders, Beyond Results: Accountability, Maurice Pendlebury 277
Discretion and Performance Budget Reform
Gary Kleinman and Dan Palmon, Understanding Ira Solomon 278
Auditor-Client Relationships: A Multi-Faceted
Analysis
Tim Amber, Patrick Barwise and Chris Higson, John Holland 279
Market Metrics: What Shall We Tell the
Shareholder?
Notices 281
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William D. Samson (University of Alabama), 2003-2005
Kathleen E. Sinning (Western Michigan University), 2001-2003
Thomas N. Tyson (St. John Fisher College), 2002-2004
Mary S. Stone (University of Alabama), Corporate Agent
In addition to publishing the Accounting Historians Journal, the Academy pub-
lishes The Accounting Historians Notebook, Monographs, and reprints of Ac-
counting History Classics. Annual membership dues, including subscriptions
to the Accounting Historians Journal and The Accounting Historians Notebook,
are $45 (U.S.) for individuals, $55 (U.S.) for institutions and libraries and $10
for students. Inquiries concerning membership, publications, and other mat-
ters relating to the Academy (other than submission of manuscripts to the
Accounting Historians Journal) should be addressed to Kathy H. Rice, The
Academy of Accounting Historians, The University of Alabama, Box 870220,
Tuscaloosa, AL, USA 35487.
Vice-President - Partnerships
and International
Gloria L. Vollmers
University of Maine
(207) 581-1979; FAX: 581-1956
email: vollmers@maine.edu
Treasurer
John T. Rigsby
Mississippi State University
(662) 325-1635; FAX 325-1646
email: jrigsby@cobilan.msstate.edu
Secretary
Robert B. Williams
University of Wollongong
61 242 213616; FAX 61 242 214157
email: Robert Williams@uow.edu
President
Sarah Holmes
Texas A&M University
(979) 845-7934; FAX: 845-0028
email: sholmes@cgsb.tamu.edu
President-Elect
Richard K. Fleischman
John Carroll University
(216) 397-4443; FAX: 397-3063
email: fleischman@jcu.edu
Vice-President -
Communication
Daniel L. Jensen
Ohio State University
(614) 292-2529; FAX: 292-2118
email: jensen.7@osu.edu
THE ACADEMY OF ACCOUNTING HISTORIANS
APPLICATION FOR 2003 MEMBERSHIP
Individual Membership: $45.00
Student Membership: $10.00
Name:  (please print)
Mailing Address:
City: State:
Zip Code: Country:
Accounting History Area of Interest:
Phone: Fax:
E-mail:
 ____
Method of Payment: /___/ check enclosed
 ____  ____
/___/ Mastercard /___/ VISA
Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Signature:
Mail to: Mrs. Kathy H. Rice
The Academy of Accounting Historians
The University of Alabama
Box 870220
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
USA
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